سیاست

THE AUTHOR

KHURSHEED KAMAL AZIZ was born in December 1927 at village Ballamabad in the Faisalabad district of the Punjab, Pakistan, and was educated at the Forman Christian College and the Government College, Lahore, and at the Victoria University of Manchester in England. He has taught at Government College, Lahore, (1953-57) and at the University of Khartoum (1963-73). In 1959-60 he was Research Fellow in Political Science at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. He served as Deputy Historian to the Government of Pakistan in 1961-63. He was Chairman of the National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, from 1974 to 1978.

Among his other publications are:

Britain and Muslim India (London, 1963), *Some Problems of Research in Modern History* (Rawalpindi, 1966), *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1967), *Ameer Ali : His Life and Work* (Lahore, 1968), *The Historical Background of Pakistan, 1857-1947* (Karachi, 1970), *The All India Muslim Conference* (Karachi, 1972), *The Indian Khilafat Movement* (Karachi, 1972), *Britain and Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1974), *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (Islamabad, 1976), *The British in India : A Study in Imperialism* (Islamabad, 1976) and *Complete Works of Rahmat Ali*—2 vols. (Islamabad, 1978, 1979).

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1937-1939

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1937 - 1939

A DOCUMENTARY RECORD

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"THE CIVIL AND MILITARY GAZETTE" OF LAHORE ON SALUTING THE CONGRESS FLAG : 7 AUGUST 1937

While it is possible to ignore the extravagance of the demonstrations which marked the inauguration of Congress Ministries in six of the Provinces, there are aspects of these demonstrations which are likely to arouse controversy and produce other results which are undesirable. In the course of his complaint against the policy of the Congress in regard to Muslims in the six Provinces where the Congress is in the seat of power, Khan Bahadur Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Chief Secretary of the Punjab Unionist Party, mentions the fact that the Congress expects Muslims to salute the Congress flag and to sing "Bande Mataram" while the representation of Muslims in the Congress Ministries is totally ineffective. Apart from the question whether Muslim representation in the Congress Ministries is ineffective or not, there is involved in the ceremony of saluting the Congress flag, a ritual which many Muslims will hesitate to perform. Then if the Congress retained the ceremony strictly for those subscribing to the political creed of the Congress and, in conformity with this principle, kept its flag for hoisting it at the headquarters of its organisation, there would be no ground for complaint. It is not usual for political organisations to have flags different from those of the country in which they carry on their work, and in any case political organisations do not ordinarily expect, when they are in power, everyone regardless of any differences of political opinion to bow down before them, much less to salute what may be called their House Flag as the symbol of supreme authority. Before the Congress can reasonably expect its flag to be regarded as anything more

Source : "The Congress and its Flag" (leader), *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, 7 August, 1937.

than its own flag, it has to prove beyond a shadow of doubt that it is the flag that the whole of India recognises as its flag. We have reason to believe—and Khan Bahadur Mian Ahmad Yar Daultana's reference to the Congress ceremony of saluting the flag supports our belief—that a large number of Muslims do not recognise the Congress flag as the flag of India. Besides the Muslims there are other communities in India which would hotly resent the substitution of the Congress flag for the flag which India itself and the world recognises as the flag of India.

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BHAI PARMANAND'S STATEMENT ON THE CONGRESS MUSLIM MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN : 29 APRIL 1938

In a recent statement I suggested that the Congress should give up the wild-goose chase of winning over the Muslims. In certain quarters a doubt has been expressed about my diagnosis. Again, a question has been put :

"How is it that there are more Muslim members of the Congress than of the so-called Muslim League?"

Before I answer this question, I should like to give the reasons for my diagnosis. The most prominent point that comes before us is that, ever since its start, the Congress has been trying to use all sorts of means to placate the Mahomedans to win them over to its side. In its early years some of the means employed for this purpose were lacking in fairness and honesty. I can give a good many illustrations. But I am afraid that it is not proper to do so at this time. But all those who know the history of the Congress are fully aware of them.

The Muslims of India have all along looked upon, and even now look upon, Sir Syed Ahmad as their greatest leader. It was he who, soon after the Congress was started, advised the Mahomedans to keep out of it. He was not in favour of even the one simple demand of the Congress that simultaneous examinations be held in India [for recruitment to the Indian Civil Service]. His argument was that if these examinations were held in India, the whole administration would pass into the hands of Bengali Hindus.

Source: *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, 30 April 1938.

Mahomedans practically kept aloof from the Congress for a period of twenty years. And when, in 1905-06, the swadeshi and boycott movements were started in Bengal, it was the Bengal Muslims under the leadership of the Nawab of Dacca who set up the Muslim League, a rival body to the Congress for the protection of Muslim rights and interests in the country. Ten years later the Congress and the League met together at Lucknow and entered into a pact for the division of political rights of both communities in the country. This was a clear indication of the fact that the Muslims and the Hindus could never be fused into one nation even for the political good of the country.

Again, when Mr. Gandhi succeeded in bringing about a combination of Muslims and Hindus under the banner of the Khilafat and the Congress, the Mahomedans joined the Congress not for the purpose of Swaraj, but only for the protection of their religion in Europe, quite away from India. Their minds were concentrated on the preservation of Islam and not on the liberation of India. The Muslim poet whose recent death has been mourned by the leaders of both communities has openly preached that the great peculiarity of the Arabian prophet was that he raised a magnificent structure of Islam, which is above and free from all patriotism and knows no boundaries of land or country.

My last and conclusive evidence is found in the statement made by Mr. Gandhi himself about the forthcoming interview between himself and Mr. Jinnah. "Hindu-Muslim unity", says Mr. Gandhi, "has been a very passion from early youth. It is as dear to me as life itself. In my letter to Mr. Jinnah I clearly stated that all before me was darkness and that I was praying for light. If anything, the darkness has deepened and the prayer has become intenser. Add to this the fact that, for causes, some of which I know, and some I do not, for the first time in my public and private life I seem to have lost self-confidence. I do not consider myself fit for negotiations or any such thing for the moment."

All of us know that Mr. Gandhi is the greatest apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity. He has always been ready to make every sacrifice for this cause so dear to him. He did all that was possible in human power to work for the Khilafat. But all his efforts, among which the open offer of a blank cheque to the Muslim delegates in London during the Round Table Conference ranks high, failed to create a feeling of confidence

among the Muslims. He sees his way full of darkness and is praying for light. I am sure I do not mean any disrespect to his feelings, but I think this confession of his is tantamount to saying that the path he had chosen was not the right one and that, however intense his prayer for light might be, it will always be covered with darkness.

From a study of past history of events during the last fifty-three years, I have come to a positive and definite conclusion that the Indian [National] Congress leaders have been building on false hopes and that is the reason of my conviction.

As regards the question of large numbers of Muslims being members of the Congress, I have to say many things. In the first place, I doubt this statement very much. In the second place, I do not attach much value to such membership, because I know many cases in which one man has paid Rs. 100 or Rs. 200 from his pocket and a proportionate number of members is put down on the list. Congress people, having become enamoured of Pt. Jawahar Lal's Muslim Mass contact theory, wanted to show their work by enlisting Muslims. By a simple trick I think they have succeeded.

The Muslim League had gone into disfavour on account of dissensions among the Muslim leaders themselves and naturally nobody was earnest in the enlistment of members for the League. But I state a fact which Bengal will come to know after the lapse of a little more time. And it is this: there is one thing in Muslims on which the Muslim leaders can always rely; it is the real basis of the strength of the Muslims—that is their attachment and devotion to Islam, of which the Hindus cannot form an estimate, because they are devoid of any such devotion for their nation. By depending upon that quality in the Muslims, the Muslim League can always be a power for that community. It is that quality I call the Muslim mentality, which Mr. Jinnah, in my opinion, presents.

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SIR ALBION BANERJI ON CONGRESS TOTALITARIANISM IN THE SPHERE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS: JULY 1938

Lord Samuel, in a lecture on "India Today" before the East India Association, under the chairmanship of Lord Stanley, said much on the working of Provincial Autonomy by the Congress Ministries in seven of the eleven British Provinces. He also gave his impressions of the All-India Congress held in Haripura, where many of the outstanding questions were discussed by the Congress leaders. He was invited as a guest, and had naturally many opportunities of informal conversation during this Congress session. The picture he drew of the situation created by the Congress majority in the Provincial Parliaments was optimistic, but he erred on the right side in emphasizing the prevalence of goodwill between the Ministers and the Civil Servants on the one hand, and between the Governors and the Prime Ministers on the other.

It was noticeable that he did not, probably by deliberate intention, make any reference to the feeling that is now spreading all over the country amongst those who do not belong to the Congress, that India is drifting towards dictatorship. In Germany, when Hitler was almost a voice crying in the wilderness, nobody anticipated that his power would grow to such an extent that the very foundations of the German Constitution would in the near future be swept away. Lord Samuel dealt with the creed of separation and independence, which is an essential part of the Congress propaganda, and gave it a very liberal interpretation. He adds that it will be necessary to grant Dominion Status to India, and that if she is left free to choose she will remain with-

Source : Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji, "Dictatorship by Proxy", *The Asiatic Review*, London, July 1938, pp. 565-569.

in the British Empire.

Be that as it may, one has now to consider how far the grant of Dominion Status would prevent the control of Government passing from the hands of democracy into the hands of those who want a Totalitarian state. Further, democracy is on its trial in India, and, as emphasized in Lord Samuel's address, the system of party government which is essential to the smooth and satisfactory working of democratic institutions shows no sign of development either in the Provinces or at the Centre. It is not generally known in this country that the Congress Premier of Madras, speaking at a gathering which was not entirely political, almost challenged his opponents to form an organized party.

No question was put to Lord Samuel as to his impressions regarding the prospect of dictatorship, and what the position of the several minority communities would be should the Congress Party, as the only strong organised party in the country, gradually get hold of the four remaining Provinces and rule over them. We see every day now a kind of conflict spreading over the Indian States between the Congress propaganda and the autocratic or semi-autocratic form of government in the States under the Princes.

Should Federation come into being and the obstacles now in the way are removed by the introduction of suitable reforms in State administrations and in the constitutions, the representatives in the Federal Assembly as well as the Senate will undoubtedly be for the most part Congress adherents. The Prime Minister of India will surely be one of the leaders of the Congress commanding the highest majority, and thus able to form a Cabinet of Congress followers. All these developments will not remove the necessity of a high command which now exists with Mahatma Gandhi in power in the background. It is greatly to be feared that when Mr. Gandhi's influence disappears, the young bloods of the Congress Party, who now represent the Extreme Left, will gradually secure ascendancy in the Congress itself, and may choose a leader who, while not occupying any position in the Parliament of India, Provincial or Centre, will exercise dictatorial authority over the whole Government, making use of the so-called representative institution which would be only representative in name, for merely Congress purposes. This was the case in the earlier stages of the Fascist regime in Italy, and also in Germany. Elections will be held, as in these two countries, under a certain form of coercion. As a result of all this the country

would gradually drift into Fascism.

If this be so, and these conjectures are not too far-fetched, what is the use of granting Dominion status to India? Will she be able to make use of the Constitution under such a status continuing as an integral part of the British Empire, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa? That is a moot question.

There are other implications. We see forming in India a new kind of political institution unheard of in past history—namely, dictatorship by proxy. Such a dictatorship does not need military strength behind it, but uses great popularity and support from the general masses of the people under the avowed creed of non-violence, and uses the democratic institution of an elected Parliament as an instrument to carry out its policy. Even so, the Cabinet is no more than a servant, acting on the commands of its master, who is constitutionally not responsible to anyone. It will be interesting to watch how this kind of dictatorship by proxy will work. To quote one example, Mr. Gandhi has always been urging that Hindi should be the lingua franca of India, and he has now given his world of command that the Congress Ministries should introduce legislation immediately to bring this about. As a result, the Minister of Education in a Province will, no doubt, bring a Bill before the House. Supposing there is a strong opposition (and we know there is a very strong feeling amongst the Muslims on this matter), what will be the consequences if the measure is thrown out? According to Parliamentary procedure the Ministry should resign, but I doubt very much whether the Congress Ministry will be willing to resign on any one particular measure. It will try and carry out other similar measures, disregarding defeat on the plea that the matter will be brought up at a later stage. When such tactics are pursued, can the House as a whole bring about a motion of censure or want of confidence against the Government? Even if such a motion is brought, is there the slightest likelihood of its being carried, especially as the majority of the Members being Congressmen will muster in their strength to vote against it? It should be noted that on the election platforms the Congress candidates did not put forward this particular measure as one that they would force through the Legislatures once they come into power. The other alternative for consideration is that by the sheer force of the majority the House may pass a measure of this kind in spite of the bitter opposition of non-Hindi speaking communities, and it will then be a case of forcing

a sudden change upon the people through the dictatorial powers of the Congress High Command.

Supposing there are strikes in schools, boycott, and even the threat of violence, is the Congress Party going to direct from its headquarters that force should be met with force, violence with violence, and should the police of the country be instructed to coerce the people to accept this change? It stands to reason that, if the Government seriously intended to carry out such a policy, it would have to use force in the ultimate resort. In such cases, how would the Congress creed of non-violence help the introduction of changes in the face of bitter opposition? The only course open to the High Command would be to direct the police to enforce it. All this would result in much discontent, not to say hardship, also disturbance of a serious kind throughout the length and breadth of the country.

The situation has brought about a recrudescence of the communal clashes in India between the Hindus and Muslims, and it is ominous that Mr. M. A. Jinnah, in his presidential address to the special session of the All-India Muslim League at Calcutta on April 17, made a declaration criticising the Congress High Command. He said that

"Muslims could not submit to the dictates of the High Command of the Congress which is developing into a totalitarian caucus, functioning under the name of the Working Committee and aspiring to the position of a shadow Cabinet of the future Republic."

The point that I wish to make is that India is gradually drifting to the curious and anomalous position of having in Mr. Gandhi a dictator by proxy, who does not directly rule as the head of the Government, but who dictates policy which is accepted without demur. almost as a religious obligation. Evidently Mr. Gandhi's personality is too sacred for him to come into the arena of party politics and fight his battles in the open for himself, although he is quite capable of doing so. Direct consultations take place between him as the *de facto* head of the Congress and the highest British representative, the Viceroy, in all matters which excite controversy. My conviction is that such a situation will be a stumbling-block to an All-India Federation, which the late Congress President, Mr. Nehru, has emphatically characterized as a plan which must be destroyed before it takes effect.

Thus we see that politics in India today, irrespective of the conversion of modern youth to Congress doctrines, are in the melting-

pot. I think that there is little hope, though I may be considered a pessimist, unless those who do not agree have the courage of their convictions, are not afraid to speak out, from themselves into a strong party in healthy opposition and use every legitimate means in their power to educate public opinion against the establishment of such a dictatorship in the general government of the country. Mr. Gandhi while he is alive will undoubtedly exercise a wholesome influence over all matters political, economic, religious and social, but India with her teeming millions cannot be governed justly and impartially unless there are leaders who are prepared to take the risk and stand before the bar of public opinion and abide by the consequences. A dictator by proxy, guarded by the halo of his own greatness, does not make himself liable to any of the dangers which European dictators every day have to face. Nor is he responsible to the electors, who are really the final arbiters in choosing the men who should, by selection amongst themselves, govern the country and yet be liable to be turned out when they fail, by those in opposition who are prepared to apply their view in practice when called upon to do so with the support of the majority of the general electorate. Political opinions must differ on major questions of social, educational, or agrarian reform, but a healthy organized opposition is essential to the success of democracy in Federal India that is to be.

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JUSTICE PARTY RESOLUTION ON CONGRESS POLICY : MADRAS : 30 DECEMBER 1938

This Cofederation views with apprehension the policy followed by the Congress Ministry in Madras in suppressing legitimate political opposition and thereby endangering the healthy growth of parliamentary democracy.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 382.

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JUSTICE PARTY RESOLUTION ON THE WARDHA SCHEME OF EDUCATION : MADRAS : 30 DECEMBER 1938

This Confederation is of the opinion that the Wardha Scheme of Education is injurious to the educational advancement of the people and impresses on the Government its duty to introduce free and compulsory elementary education in the country.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 383.

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JUSTICE PARTY RESOLUTION ON THE EXHIBITION OF GANDHI'S PORTRAIT : MADRAS : 30 DECEMBER 1938

This Confederation urges the cancellation of the G. O. General Order allowing local boards to hang Gandhiji's portrait along with that of His Majesty the King-Emperor.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 383.

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EXTRACTS FROM P. N. SAPRU'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL LIBERAL FEDERATION : BOMBAY : 30 DECEMBER 1938

There is [a] tendency on the part of the leading spokesmen of the Congress to identify it with the nation. Undoubtedly the Congress is a powerful organization and it is the government in eight provinces. But we are thinking in democratic and not totalitarian terms. A constitutional opposition is as essential for the successful operation of democracy as a clean and honest government. There are bodies of men who do not belong to that organization and they have a right to insist that their existence shall not be ignored. Perhaps a reason for this tendency where it exists is that the average man feels that united action under well-directed leadership is necessary in the circumstances in which India, which has not achieved her freedom, finds herself. But that is line of development which is, in my judgment, no longer open to us. Social and economic questions are coming to the forefront and the introduction of responsible government has made it essential that the country should be able to provide alternative governments to the governments in power. It is to be regretted that the oppositions are weak and often communal in composition. That perhaps is a penalty that we have to pay for our system of electorates.

Further, there is a tendency to rush through legislation without a thorough consideration of its reactions on the social and economic life of the community. Often the procedure of a select committee

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, pp. 372-373.

is dispensed with. You have had an example of this in the Trade Disputes Bill recently before the Bombay legislature. Instances have occurred where the highest courts have had to comment on interference by individual Congressmen with the civil and judicial administrations of their districts. There have been cases of interference even on the part of Congress ministries with judicial processes and with judicial findings. Some Congressmen have sometimes behaved as if they individually had power over district or judicial authorities and complaints have been heard—complaints of which even Congress Governments have had to take notice—of attempting to influence administration otherwise than by means of open discussions in the legislature and other formal procedure. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, to which we objected and they objected, has been used to stifle anti Hindi agitation in Madras. There is too much intolerence in the party and even its leaders are not free from it. A refusal to see the other side of the picture and a belief that wisdom and patriotism are to be found exclusively in their ranks only are characteristic of it.

I shall now come to the institution of the so-called High Command. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you and I are not accustomed to semi-military language, and I confess it is hard for me to understand the reasons which have been used to justify its existence. I can understand the case for national governments, national coalitions and united fronts. We ourselves are a national party and we have always been opposed to exclusive provincialism. I can understand ministries of different provinces consulting each other and even consulting their party outside the legislatures and keeping in touch with their party machines. But I cannot understand this institution. What is our objective? Is it democracy or is it some abnormal form of democracy unknown to countries in which the liberal state flourishes? That is the vital question raised by the Khare controversy. We are not interested in the personal quarrels between Dr. Khare and his colleagues. But there is a public aspect of the incident which we cannot ignore. That a body of men, however eminent, who are outside the legislature, should dictate to the Premier and his colleagues and that the Prime Minister and his colleagues should, forgetting their responsibility in the legislatures, be controlled by them, is something which is quite inconsistent with democracy as we understand it. Healthy conventions of collective responsibility cannot grow if ministers and legislatures are made to take orders from a body

outside the legislatures. Just consider what the High Command is. Colleagues can appeal to it against their chief, chiefs can be censured and expelled for asserting their authority, cases in which ministers have taken, rightly or wrongly, certain decisions, can be submitted to it for revision, legislation pending before the legislature can be referred to it for settlement. We cannot approve of all this. Even parties which have revolutionary background have never developed a machine like the High Command. Parties preserve their integrity and control their extreme elements by other means and the Congress, if it wishes to preserve its integrity and control its heterogenous elements, must devise some other methods of doing so.

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NATIONAL LIBERATION FEDERATION RESOLUTION ON CONGRESS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS : BOMBAY : 31 DECEMBER 1938

The Federation expresses satisfaction that in all the provinces provincial autonomy, as consistently advocated by the Liberal Party, is being worked on constitutional lines without any undue interference from the Governors, and trusts that this atmosphere will continue and lead to the establishment of complete autonomy in the provinces and early introduction of responsibility at the centre. The Confederation strongly deprecates the Congress Working Committee's attempt to impose its will and decision on the provincial Ministries, as such interference is calculated seriously to hinder the growth of a healthy democratic system of government.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 377.

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"SCRUTATOR" ON THE RESULTS OF CONGRESS RULE ON THE MUSLIMS : NOVEMBER 1939

Two men have won. One of them is Mr. Jinnah and the other is Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose. Mr. Jinnah has fought the Congress with communal weapons. Mr. Bose has fought it with his own weapons. Others who were discontented with the Congress have neither had the pluck of these two men nor their perseverance.

When Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru won the elections of 1937 for the Congress, the Muslim League was a pale shadow of itself. It was sickly and anaemic. And if the Congress after its victory at the last elections had remained steady on its legs, and moved forward with surer steps, it would have simply outdistanced the League. This was not to be, however. Pandit Jawaharlal was intoxicated with the wine of his own eloquence. He spared no opportunity to attack Mr. Jinnah. He heaped insult upon insult on his devoted head, and then as if a malicious fate was hiding itself round the corner, he discovered it and began to call it by the name of Muslim mass contact. The meaning of it was that the Congress did not care to conciliate, or settle differences with, the Muslim Leaguers. The Congress would directly approach the Muslim masses who suffered from the same economic evils as the Hindus It had simply to tell the toiling Muslim masses what the matter was with them, and they would make common cause with the new protector of the masses, namely, the Congress. In its last resort, the idea was inspired by a Marxian study of human history.

While other Muslim leaders were wondering as to what the mean-

Source : "Scrutator", "The Declaration—Before and After". *The Twentieth Century*, Allahabad, November 1939, pp. 85-98.

ing of it all was, Mr. Jinnah was more quick-witted and more clear-sighted than they. He interpreted it as a challenge to Muslim leadership, as an attempt to bring the Muslim masses within the zone of the influence of the Congress. Accordingly, he raised the banner of revolt against the Congress—and Pandit Jawaharlal. Nothing could rally the Muslims more rapidly or effectively round the banner of the League than an appeal to their religion, to their historic traditions, to their "sense of helplessness as a minority" whose lot has been cast in the midst of "a tyrannical majority". Mr. Jinnah knew at that time that the Muslim youth and many Muslim leaders including their divines were under the spell of the new slogan of independence. Dominion Status was with them also an outworn creed. What was necessary to do was to make a show of fight with British Imperialism. He was not lacking in adroitness or readiness to adopt new slogans and to make the average young Muslim Leaguer feel that he was just as forward, as patriotic, as hostile to British Imperialism, as the average Hindu Congressman. He adopted all these tactics, and with a fine sense of discrimination between the offensive and the defensive, he took the offensive when the occasion demanded it and similarly he was on the defensive when it was necessary for him to do so.

The world is governed more by words and slogans and symbols than by substance. Mr. Jinnah recognised that if the Congress considered it a piece of good political propaganda to have its own flag-hoisting ceremony, there was no reason why the League should not have similar ceremonies. So the battle began first as a battle of flags. If the Congress underlined the civil liberties, there was no reason why the Muslim League should not underline the same. The Muslims had clearly the right to demand their civil liberties. That this competition between two kinds of civil liberties—the Congress and the League—was bound to lead to clashes between the Hindus and the Muslims, was inevitable. Clashes followed. And some riots took place. And although the Mahatma had at an early date in the history of the Congress governments come out with the statement that the day the Congress governments sought the assistance of the police or of the army, that very day they should cease to exist. Yet the fact remains that in the course of certain riots and conflicts, *lathi* charges took place and firing was also resorted to—all this when the Congress governments whose creed is non-violence were in power. The Congress governments noted the Mahatma's injunction but followed the method

of all governments. They were in charge of law and order and they must maintain it whether the challenge came from the Muslims or from the Hindus or from the communists or from any other variety of people. The inevitable consequence of all these happenings was that the Mus'ims developed a new psychology, and the development of this new psychology gave them a new strength. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage of this. It was not until the middle of 1938 that the Congress felt that the situation was getting rather serious. Then the very man whose name was spurned by Congressmen as a communalist, as a narrow-minded bigot, was asked to see the Mahatma. He would not see him. The Mahatma, however, went and saw him. Then the President, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, saw him and carried on correspondence. It led to nothing. The relations continued as bitter as ever. Mr Jinnah was blamed all over the country by Congress papers and Congress leaders as a vain person, not big enough to recognise the greatness of the Mahatma, and not patriotic enough to make peace with the Congress. This sort of criticism—and worse —did not affect him at all.

The Pirpur Report came and dealt with an incident in an obscure town called Tanda where a communal riot took place and there were similar other occurrences. Very few people have read it. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Muslims swear by it as a record of the atrocities committed by the Hindu Congress Governments on the Muslims. Whether in fact the atrocities have been committed by Hindu Governments or not, is not the question. The question is whether the Muslims say that such atrocities have been committed. So the situation went on drifting from bad to worse. And people in certain provinces, for example the U.P. and Bihar, began to feel that a month was auspicious if it did not witness a communal riot or some kind of communal trouble. Each grievance of the Muslims, real or fancied, only tended to strengthen the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah.

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C. R. REDDY ON THE INTOLERANT CHARACTER OF CONGRESS RULE : DECEMBER 1939

Has the communal situation—to use the term in respect of Hindus and Muslims—become worse or better, since the Congress accepted office? There can only be one answer to that question. *Let us consider the number of communal riots that have taken place during the last 2½ years, and compare it with the number for the previous five years. That is an objective test.*

Then, again, we have to consider the fact that the Muslim League has practically refused to deal with the Congress unless the latter concedes that the League is the sole representative of the Muslims. The Congress claim to represent the whole country and to be the only deliverer of the political, economic and cultural goods is not accepted by the Muslim League. Secondly, the Muslim League enunciates the principle of separate existence for the Muslim community and wants communal representation.

The Congress now says that it would give the Muslims any amount of safeguards in a new constitution, but Mr. Jinnah turned round and asked what was the good of safeguards as, in parliamentary democracy, they had already reduced the safeguards. Are safeguards necessarily operable in parliamentary democracy? Obviously, they are not, unless the people have that spirit of accommodation which distinguishes the British race.

The cabinet is supposed to possess the confidence of the Governor, How could the Governor exercise safeguards against men in whom he had full confidence? Analysing the theory of safeguards, we will find that if the safeguards are to be operated that must

Source : C. R. Reddy, "Congress Versus Muslim League", *The Twentieth Century*, Allahabad, December 1939, pp. 165-186.

be done by some power outside the cabinet because they are against the cabinet. That power could not be the judiciary because it has to decide on political issues. Therefore, the only person to be trusted is the Governor, the Governor General, or the Secretary of State. But if the Governor exercises his powers, Congressmen turn round and say, "You are trying to divide and rule"! Under such conditions where is parliamentary democracy? Thus we see that Mr. Jinnah's proposition is not so absurd as some orthodox people declare.

If the Congress, when its nominees were returned in an overwhelming majority at the last elections, had provided a really national and had Cabinets of national concentration allowingMuslims, Scheduled Classes, etc., to choose their own men, then 90 out of the 100 problems now facing them would have been solved.

The questions of hoisting the Congress flag and the singing of Bande Mataram show that the Congress has proceeded on a certain philosophy which has rendered toleration of opposite views difficult, if not impossible.

All this shows that the Congress which started with high professions and high promises has now come down to the excellently human level. The angels have dropped their wings, though I for one never believed that those wings were composed of anything but lac.

The Congress originally objected to coalition cabinets as wrong in principle and refused to give a place for the Muslim League; but subsequently, in Assam, it changed its views. Having once made a departure from their original principle, the Congress should have reconstituted its cabinets before the situation reached the present acute condition where accommodation has an ugly aspect of surrender whereas earlier it would have been generosity.

I believe that no party in India has been under the leadership of such noble and great persons as the Congress, but under certain principle or philosophy that it followed, the Congress called the Muslim League and other such organizations by one sweeping term, "communal organizations". The idea of Congressmen that they were the only party and the only people who could deliver the goods, led to the consequence that the Congress should do its best to dissolve those communal organizations while allowing them to exist for cultural and economic purposes!

How could we ask the Muslim community, with its historic traditions, to dissolve it in an arithmetical mass in the name of democracy? Are numbers more sacred and more effective than race, religion, and history?

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EXTRACTS FROM R. P. PARANJPYE'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL LIBERAL FEDERATION: ALLAHABAD : 27 DECEMBER 1939

The insistence on a constituent Assembly seems to be equally impolitic. The scheme can be riddled with objections and its discussion is likely to create further difficulties. It seems magnificent to call such an assembly elected on adult suffrage; but does one seriously think that the illiterate villager, who would form the vast portion of the electorate, is capable of pronouncing an opinion upon complicated matters like the machinery of the Government of a vast country like India? Is it too uncharitable to say that Mr. Gandhi expects to carry the uneducated voter off his feet by means of a whirlwind campaign in which high-sounding words like truth, *ahimsa*, *Charkha*, *dharma*, untouchability reinforced if need be, by the threat of a fast, would be used as slogans to give him a mandate to do what he likes? Is it not likely that such a campaign will lead to inter-communal riots unless there is previous understanding with the leaders of other parties? Already there have been several modifications of the original idea of the adult suffrage; minorities are to be given the right of separate election for the purpose of electing this assembly; the question of weightage has been left beautifully vague; the question of the representation of Indian States has been untouched; the way in which minorities of opinion that do not bow the knee at the Shegaon shrine are to be represented has been left unconsidered; and a vast number of other questions have been held over possibly to give a chance to the Mahatma's 'inner voice' to express itself. Several of these questions are to be first settled, according to

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1939*, Calcutta, 1940, Vol. II, pp. 287-291.

Mr. Gandhi, by a consultation among the leaders of the various parties, or even by the award of the Government which it is intended to replace. If such an agreement is possible on these vital preliminary points in regard to the formation of the constituent assembly by a friendly discussion between the leaders or even through the benevolent intervention of [the] Government itself, what objection can there be to such discussion on the whole question of our constitution itself? If the thing is possible in one connection it should be possible in another.

In a true democracy the elected representatives must realise their responsibility to their electors, and the cabinet to the elected representatives. If by the interposition of an extraneous authority the sense of this responsibility is deadened, democracy cannot be said to be stable whatever external facade it may have or by whatever name it may choose to call itself. The Congress ministries in the eight provinces could not by any stretch of imagination be called responsible to the members of their legislatures or the primary electors. They are the bond slaves of a small junta called the Parliamentary Committee and of the Mahatma who really controls all organizations of the Congress and whose word is law. The electors are only expected to vote once in five years for the candidates representing Congress and take part in periodical demonstrations for the greater glory of the Mahatma or any of his henchmen of greater or less importance. As for the Congress members of the legislatures 'theirs is not to question why, theirs is but to vote and lie' often to their own convictions. All this goes under the name of discipline which is said to be necessary in a time of war, even of a non-violent character. By the way this continued use of military language in the mouth of the apostle of ahimsa appears to me to be mere cant. I can appreciate a sense of discipline in any organised body of individuals, but it should be so exercised as not to kill all sense of self-respect or independent judgment. I can understand the Congress laying down general lines of policy comparing notes at intervals. But when it comes to one member of the Parliamentary Committee interfering in the choice of the personnel of the cabinets, or in the details of administrative or legislative measures, even, if rumour is not a lying jade, in matters of appointments great and small, in three or four provinces, we are no longer within the dominion of legitimate discipline but are dreadfully close to Fascism or Nazism. The last and the most important of the ten commandments of the Fascist militia is 'Mussolini is always right'; the Nazis are taught that 'Justice and Hitler's will are

one and the same'. In the Congress organisation from the humblest primary member of a village Congress Committee to the Premier of a province every body has to regard the view of the Mahatma as sacrosanct. And this view may change as violently as you like. Thus the refusal in April 1937 to form ministries unless the Government gave an undertaking not to use their safeguarding powers, and the decision to form such ministries in July of the same year without obtaining such an undertaking, were both praised by the obedient Congressmen as the highest exhibition of statesmanship. The decision to fast at Rajkot and the decision to give up that fast a few days later without much having happened in the interval, both sent our patriots into ecstacies as supreme illustrations of Mahatmaic grandeur. The Latin poet held up a woman's heart as the perfect type of what is varying and changeable, but he obviously never came across a Mahatma in those primitive days! Seriously, this absurd veneration for the word of an individual, however eminent, is the absolute negation of .the democratic ideal. We have in our country but too many of such deified men and the hosts of their misguided devotees; but they generally wear a religious garb. But democratic politics is a practical business based on history, reason and experience; it should not find a place for such supermen whether they are called a Duce, a Fuhrer or a Mahatma. If at the present time we express sympathy for democracies fighting for freedom, we should take care that we ourselves are unwittingly heading for the abyss of totalitarianism which is its very antithesis.

On the side of the majority party there is too great an insistence on non-essentials which are being represented as matters of vital national concern. Thus the stress laid upon the Congress Flag and the attempts to force it down upon all as a national flag leads to the Muslim League insisting upon its own flag. After all a flag is a mere symbol, and it should be symbol of unity rather than of discord and I hope the recent declaration of the Mahatma that it should not be hoisted at any place if there is any objection to it will be strictly followed by all Congressmen. The same is the case with the Bande Mataram song, the Charkha and Khaddar and Gandhi cap. All these may be very good in their way but the attempts to force them down the throats of others even though they may be in a numerical minority, only help to accentuate the tension. When the larger and more vital questions have been satisfactorily settled and there is a general feeling of friendliness everywhere, it would not be very difficult to devise a national flag or to have a national anthem

acceptable to all.

The Congress is undoubtedly the biggest and best organised political body in the country. But it cannot be considered as the sole representative of the sections. In spite of the presence in it a few Muslims and in spite of various attempts at mass contact with them, one must admit that the large body of Muslims do not regard it as representing themselves and do not consider their interests safe in its hands. This may be an unreasonable attitude on their part, but it is absurd to deny its existence. The landlords and capitalists have also not joined it in any large numbers. Liberals also do not belong to it though we are always prepared to support many individual items in its programme. In spite of the praise-worthy efforts of the Mahatma for the uplift of the Harijans there is, I believe, a feeling among them that the sympathy of many Congressmen is only skin-deep, and it is undoubted that Dr. Ambedkar, their undisputed leader, has not identified himself with Congress activities like the Harijan Sevak Sangh intended for their advance. On the other hand the Kisan movement and the labour movement are undoubtedly critical of the aims and methods of the Congress, though they may not in all cases have formally separated from them. The Congress cannot entirely represent either the large body of progressive Hindu opinion represented by Mr. Savarkar, Bhai Parmanand and Dr. Moonje, or the large though comparatively silent body of Sanatani Hindus who sigh for the revival of ancient Hindu culture. I leave out of account the question of the attitude of the Indian States and their peoples, though any national political movement must include them in its purview. In view of all these facts the Congress cannot claim to be the sole representative of India, though it is the most important single political body in the country and though it can command huge majorities in many provinces, which perhaps in partly explained by the general existence of single-membered constituencies which tend to leave minorities unrepresented and also by the glamour attaching to Mr. Gandhi's name and personality.

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C. R. REDDY ON THE NATURE OF CONGRESS RULE: JANUARY 1940

But the greatest blunder of the Congress has been in refusing members returned by the Separate Electorate of such important communities as the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes, to have representatives in the Government commanding the confidence of the majority of the "communal" members concerned. There can be no denying that the Congress in this respect pursued a totalitarian programme. A Muslim returned on any non-Congress ticket, if he signed the pledge, was treated as a convert to the new faith, and the old ethical principle that the Congress itself applied to other parties, namely, that under such happenings the new convert should be forced to undergo re-election on the new ticket, was conveniently forgotten. The Congress claimed, though it may have lost the majority of the Muslim separate seats, and in one Province though it did not have even a single Muslim elected on the Congress ticket, that any isolated Muslim who joined the Congress was a proper representative of all the Muslims. In other words, the Congress sought to serve Muslim interests by its own nominations, just as the bureaucratic Governments used to do in the old days. But Congressional nomination cannot be regarded as more justifiable than bureaucratic.

With respect to the double elections provided for the Scheduled Castes, the Gandhian pledge that they would be allowed to choose their own candidates without interference from the Congress, was honoured by organized violation after it had served its purpose.

Source: C. R. Reddy, "The Indian Constitutional Problem: A Reply to Congres Leaders", *The Twentieth Century*, Allahabad, January 1940, pp. 263-272.

Can it be said that these acts by which they tried to absorb or destroy the Muslim League and other parties, were due to thoughtlessness or to momentary aberrations of judgment? Such a construction, if permissible, would brand the Congress Party as wanting in good sense. But in point of fact, this policy towards the other Parties was based on a principle of Life and Politics, namely, that the Congress should cease to have political significane if they were to be allowed to exist. They employed unscrupulously and ruthlessly their doctrine that political salvation was possible only through *Nirvana* in the Congress. Only to the Congressmen should the sanctuaries remain open.

In the pursuit of this idea, they went back on their original pledge made before the elections that they would not enter into Coalitions in Bengal and in Sind. In Assam and the Frontier, they succeeded. And in Assam, in order to strengthen the Ministry, they increased the numbers of Ministers by two—tactics which if employed by any other Party, would have brought upon their heads the moral thunder of Wardha. And through all these tergiversations the Mahatmaji remained either silent or if he spoke, spoke excusing, palliating, forgiving [*sic.*]. What was right for the Congress was treated as wrong for others. What was wrong in others became right for the Congress. The Congress which appealed to all persons irrespective of their differences to support it in the elections on a broad, all-embracing Nationalist platform, became a sect after it got into power. The *Indian Express*, a Congress daily which has not prostituted its integrity of thought, tone and character to Office Retention as the chief good to be pursued, has in several leaders pointed out how the advancement of the material interests of the mas es and communal unity were sacrificed on the altar of the moral drive for enforcing by legislation and administration the Gandhian remedies for individual and social ills.

One need not be shocked by this kind of evolution under office acceptance and the influence of secular power. It has ever been the case in human history that when spiritual leaders acquire earthly superiority, they naturally try to use their powers ruthlessly and unscrupulously, because they are obsessed by the deep moral conviction that what they are doing is necessary for human salvation. I do not think it is easy to overcome this very natural tendency. Given a party that believes that the world has taken a wrong

course, that a new prescription and a new diet is necessary to restore it to health, peace and order, given further that after 20 years of teaching in the wilderness and finding it fairly ineffective, it got into a position from which it could employ secular engines of coercion, power and influence—is it any wonder that it employed them in the authoritarian and totalitarian manner? This is not the first time in history that prophets have turned into policemen, and proved that they were far more efficient as policemen than they were as prophets. It seems to me, therefore, that the intolerant attitude of the Congress towards what it denounces as communal parties and even non-Congressmen generally, has had its root and being in their own settled principles. And on moral grounds, no fault could be found with them. In their sincere pursuit of their gospel, in objective, agency and machinery, they had to wreck the possibility of a united national front and they did it unwittingly.

PART XI

Muslim Sufferings :
British Evidence

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"THE TIMES" CORRESPONDENT ON CONGRESS RULE AND THE MUSLIMS : 29 NOVEMBER 1937

The awakening of political consciousness among the Muslims is of more recent growth and has largely been concerned with the protection of Muslim interests. From time to time political circumstances have thrown the two communities together, but the alliance has never been more than artificially sustained. . . . Local Congress agents [in the Punjab], although divided among themselves, are in agreement in doing everything possible to make the task of governing in the Punjab more difficult. A similar policy has been directed against the Bengal Government, which is also headed by a Muslim. The hostility shown to these two Ministries undoubtedly contributed to the curious agreement recently reached in Lucknow between Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Mr. Fazlul Huq, Premier of Bengal, and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League. . . the general opinion is that the Muslims of all political persuasions have been brought into agreement for the purpose of consolidating their community against the Congress Party, with a view to preventing a Hindu domination, which Muslims believe to be the aim of Congress men and the purpose behind their propaganda against the Muslim Ministries.

This new Muslim alliance has intensified communal feeling in a manner that has more than Provincial significance. The electoral success of Congress did not increase Muslim regard for the Hindu movement. Proposals that Hindi should be regarded as the national language, and so on, have exasperated the Muslims, who look upon such suggestions as outward symbols of an attempt to create a Hindu

Source : India Correspondent, "Moslem India : Two Northern Provinces : Congress and Communal Dangers", *The Times*, London, 30 November, 1937.

oligarchy under the reforms. Exasperation has been further aggravated by the contention of the Hindu Press that the Muslim Ministries are reactionary and are achieving nothing, which is scarcely compatible with the facts in the Punjab. It is apparently the intention of Muslims every where to show battle to Congress men, and they are closing their ranks on a communal basis. The tactics of the Congress Party, particularly in seeking a foothold in those areas where the Congress writ does not naturally belong, have been largely responsible for this recrudescence of communalism, which may have serious repercussions in the Punjab and beyond . . . those who represent the traditional characteristics of the Muslim race are preparing to resist the expansion of the Hindu political philosophy in their areas. This may mean communalism in its old sense in the Punjab; but it is communalism only in an academic sense in the North-West Frontier Province. The difference is that in the Punjab Hindus and Sikhs are being directly influenced in hostility to the Muslim Government by those forces which sustain nationalism in India as a whole; whereas in the North-West Frontier Province the Congress Ministry is mainly composed of Muslims, who will forget neither their race nor their traditions in developing a political theory they have absorbed from a Hindu movement with which the Muslims have few racial, social, or cultural affinities.

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THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN ON THE WORKING OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS : APRIL 1938

The second great political party in British India is the Muslim League. This organization is the only other All-India Party. The Sikhs only operate in the Punjab, and the other minorities represented in the legislatures can wield little real political power. The Muslims, I found, were profoundly disturbed from one end of India to the other. Though under the new Constitution they were given in effect control of four Provinces and had separate electorates and had weightage in the other Provinces, the advent of Congress to power in most of British India made them feel for the first time what it was to be a minority in Provinces in which political responsibility had passed out of the hands of Great Britain into that of the Hindu majority. They had become acutely aware of the rising tide of Hindu rule, and that produced a consolidation of political opinion and the political organization in India. There used to be two main Muslim parties. They are now united in the Muslim League under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah.

Source : The Marquess of Lothian, "The Working of the new Constitution in India", *The Asiatic Review*, London, April 1938, pp. 260-276

102

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN ON THE EFFECT OF CONGRESS RULE ON THE MUSLIMS : APRIL 1938

The Muslim League has also recently declared that India's goal is "Independence". But the Muslims can never forget that, whatever the non-communal professions and the real desires of enlightened Congressmen may be, the vast majority of Congress members are Hindus, who look forward, after many centuries of British and Muslim rule, to the re-establishment of Hindu Raj.

Fear as to their future as a minority and the fact that Congress is making a vigorous drive to capture the Muslim youth for its creed of Indian nationalism and the Muslim villagers by its agrarian programme, have consolidated the great majority of Muslims into a revivified party—the Muslim League led by Mr. Jinnah. In essence the position of the Muslims in India is not unlike that of Ulster in Ireland. Difference in religion is the real basis of their organisation as a political minority, and, unless all European experience is falsified, it will be long before the communal factor disappears from the Indian scene. The only Muslim objection to Federation is that it will, despite all safeguards, consolidate a permanent Hindu majority in Delhi.

Source : Lord Lothian, "The New India II : The Muslims and the States : Non-Violence in Office : Defence and other Foreign Problems", *The Sunday Observer*, London, 24 April, 1938.

103

"THE TIMES" CORRESPONDENT ON MUSLIM REACTION TO CONGRESS RULE : JANUARY 1939

Minority political groups in India are developing a more aggressive attitude towards the Congress Party, whose identification with the Hindu majority becomes of greater significance as Federation approaches. . . .

It is their fear that their traditions, culture, and economic standing may be undermined by Hinduism that is encouraging present-day Muslim opposition to the Congress Party. . . . The Muslims are apprehensive lest they be segregated into a caste in the political field, particularly as Hinduism is a social and economic system as well as a religion. They realise that such an assimilation, while enabling Mohammedanism to adhere to Hinduism, would leave Hinduism radically unaffected by the contact.

This Muslim suspicion of Hinduism greatly weakens what is called the Nationalist front. The Congress Party still wants to concentrate Nationalist opposition on the British authority in India, but the Muslims, realising that under the Reforms British authority is being relaxed, are consolidating themselves in opposition to the Hindus. It is lamentably true that the Reforms, by arousing the ambitions of the Hindus and the anxieties of the Muslims, have given a new emphasis to Hindu-Muslim competition. The canon of tolerance set up by the British in the pre-Reform days, when a neutral authority restricted Hindu-Muslim rivalry to narrower spheres, is rapidly being broken down.

. . . . It is true that the majority of Congress leaders condemn the purely religious aspects of communalism; but the eradication of this

Source : India Correspondent, "Minorities in India : Caste and Commune", *The Times*, London, 28 January, 1939.

weakness from Congress thinking derives mainly from a conviction of Hindu strength in other directions.

With Congress Governments in most Provinces, patronage and preferment have largely fallen into Hindu hands, with all that that implies under the peculiar Hindu form of nepotism. So bitter have Muslims become that they have resolved to use the Congress weapon of civil disobedience in several Congress-governed Provinces to redress their political grievances. The proposal is disquieting, and its seriousness is not lessened by the scorn which some sections of the Nationalist Press have poured upon it.

Indian Nationalists have always contended that British policy has been one of "divide and rule", but it is obvious that the removal of British authority in the Provinces has increased rather than lessened the hostility of the Muslims to the Hindus . . . the Congress and the Muslim League are drifting farther and farther apart. It is, clear, however, that any other form of Constitution than that proposed in the Government of India Act will be looked upon with even less favour by the Muslims, particularly if it should emerge from the deliberations of a Constituent Assembly, which the Congress Party continues to favour.

104

SIR LOUIS STUART ON THE IMPACT OF CONGRESS RULE ON HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS : MAY 1939

The fact that there is tension between Hindus and Muslims in India is well known. But its importance is not recognised sufficiently. Its extent was indicated in the Report of the Simon Commission in 1930. The comments are lucid, and weighty. These are the comments....

The census of 1930 enumerated about 177 million Hindus and 66½ million Muslims in the eleven provinces of British India. The division by provinces shows that Hindus are in an overwhelming majority in Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar, Orissa and Assam, and that Muslims are in an overwhelming majority in the North-West Frontier Province, and Sind, and in a majority in the Punjab and Bengal. If the franchise had been strictly according to population, and parties had been based on religion apart from political views it is clear that under ordinary conditions Muslim minorities would remain perpetually under the rule of Hindu majorities in the first seven provinces. The voting power of other communities would be insufficient in the provinces in question to affect the result.

The framers of the Government of India Act did not overlook these considerations, but the circumstances were too strong for them. There was no device by which the two communities could be brought on a voting equality, and it was not within the power of anyone to persuade the Indian communities to substitute effectively a political loyalty for a religious attachment. Recourse was had to weightage

Source : Sir Louis Stuart, "Hindu and Muslim Tension", *The Indian Empire Review*, London, May 1939, pp. 189-195.

in the opportionment of seats, to supplement the separate electorates that were already in existence. But it was obviously impossible to allot sufficient seats to the Muslims of the United Provinces or Bihar—for example—to enable the Muslims of a party to obtain an independent majority at the elections. It was hoped that the introduction of provincial self-government would make for the creation of political parties which would be independent of religious prepossessions. That hope has not been realized, nor is it likely to be. The main parties are the Congress party, essentially Hindu with a small sprinkling of Muslims, and the Muslim League entirely Muslim.

Two safeguards were provided. The first was that the Governors should include in their Ministries a representative of an important minority. The other was that the Governors should exercise special responsibilities to protect the interests of the minorities. There was an obvious difficulty in respect of the first. If the Ministry were a Ministry in a province containing solid Hindu majority and the division were on communal lines, any Minister representing Muslim interests would be in complete opposition to his colleagues, and any Minister who was not in such opposition would not represent Muslim interests. This difficulty has appeared already in every Congress provincial ministry which contains a Muslim Minister. There remains the Governor's special responsibility. That safeguard is, however, restricted considerably by the fact that its exercise against the views of the Ministry can easily lead to a constitutional crisis and the resignation of the Ministers.

It could hardly have been expected that an extension of self-government would tend to reduce communal friction. The Report of the Simon Commission had noted that such friction had increased in the past as a result of the introduction of representative institutions. The Report says....

The breach between the Congress Party and the Muslim League is growing wider. The Muslim League Party complains that, wherever the Congress Party is in authority, it uses its power to the detriment of the Muslims. The League recently appointed a Committee to examine and report on complaints of "hardship, ill-treatment and injustice" to Muslims in various Congress provinces. The report of the committee was issued on the 15th November 1938. Very little publicity has been given to this report. The committee which was under the chairmanship of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur, a leading

landed proprietor of Oudh, confined its inquiries to the United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, the Central Provinces, Mardas and Bombay.

The report is to the effect that in all those places there have been organized attacks by Hindus upon Muslims, which have failed to attract sufficient attention from the Congress Governments, and which in certain instances have been the work of Congress sympathisers. It is alleged that Muslims have been unfairly excluded from the public services, that they are kept out of local bodies and debt conciliation boards, that there has been interference with the use of the Urdu script, and that obstacles have been placed in the way of Muslim culture. There are complaints that their children are prevented from being educated as their parents wish them to be educated. It is urged that Congress ideas are forced down their throats—notably in the matter of the singing of "Bande Mataram" and the use of the Congress flag.

While it is not possible to apportion the responsibility for the communal riots of the last few years on the allegations in the report, there can be no doubt as to the fact that communal riots are on the increase and that they show no sign of diminution. The Prime Minister of the United Provinces stated on the 8th February in answer to a question in the Legislative Assembly that during the eighteen months that the Congress Ministry had been in office there had been 24 communal riots in the province with 54 persons killed and 787 persons injured. The report of the Simon Commission noted that in the five years from 1923 to 1927, 450 persons had been killed and 5 000 persons injured in communal riots over the whole of India. It will be seen that the figures for the United Provinces since the Congress Ministry came into power are worse on the average. There have, further, been more riots of a serious nature since the 8th February.

The report of the committee contains one statement which it will be hard to meet. The Congress Chairman of the Local Board in Chandwar in the Central Provinces issued a letter to the headmasters of the Urdu schools which are attended by Muslim boys, directing them to display a portrait of Mr. Gandhi on the day of his birthday and to order the boys to worship it. The words in Urdu are—"*Mahatma Gandhi ki taswir ki puja ki jawe.*" As orthodox Muslims conceive the worship of any man a blasphemy to God, and the stricter take exception to making the likeness of any living thing, this injunction to Muslim boys speaks for itself.

It would serve no useful purpose to take all the charges made in this report in detail and to consider how far they are brought home. In the nature of things the complaints cannot be taken as made out until the other side has been heard, and the matters therein are matters for inquiry and not to be decided without inquiry. This much, however, is certain. An important body which claims to represent the vast mass of the Muslims of India, and which undoubtedly represents a mass of Muslim opinion, is profoundly dissatisfied with the position of Muslims in the Congress provinces in which the Hindus are in a majority. The discontent is voiced by men of position and influence, who are beyond doubt leaders of their own community.

These leaders say that the appointments of Muslim Ministers in the provinces where they have been appointed have in no way met their grievances, because the Ministers so appointed belong to the infinitesimal minority of the Muslims who have accepted the Congress creed, and in no way represent Muslim opinion. In respect of the special responsibilities of the Governors to protect Muslim interests, they say that the Governors have been unable to afford sufficient protection through the exercise of those responsibilites. They recognise the difficulties of a Governor's position. If, for example, a local authority under a Congress Minister issued an order prohibiting the slaughter of cattle and the sale of beef in a place, where cattle had been slaughtered and beef sold for the last hundred and fifty years, and the Governor in exercise of his special responsibilities rescinded that order, the result might well be the resignation of the Ministry and a constitutional crisis. The Muslims understand the position.

The grievances, however, go much further than actual instances of maltreatment or oppressive conduct. There is a general grievance that under the present regime in the Congress provinces the Hindu is everything and the Muslim is nothing. It is not only what the Hindus do, it is the way they carry themselves. Before 1937 a Muslim vegetable seller in a ward in an Indian city may have had to do with a Hindu constable on the beat, a Hindu municipal overseer, a Hindu octroi clerk, a Hindu in the booking-office and the like. He may not have cared for them particularly. He may even have disliked them somewhat because they were Hindus. But he did not regard them as having got above him and they did not regard themselves as having done so. The position was that Hindu and Muslim alike

were subjects of the British Government, and under the same flag—the Union Jack. But now the Hindu is under the Congress Government and under the Congress flag, and the Muslim vegetable seller is an outsider, unless he becomes a Congressman. For various reasons he does not join the Congress. So the Hindu policeman, who is made to regard himself as a servant of the Congress, and the rest lord it over the Muslim. Muslim Raj was superseded by British Raj. Well—British Raj is now superseded by Congress Raj, and let the vegetable seller remember that.

The attitude of the hypothetical vegetable seller may not be completely reasonable, but the importance is that it exists. In similar circumstances a similar attitude has been found to exist in other places, and in the result to have been effective. The explanation suggested of the antagonism of the Muslim minorities in face of Hindu majorities' rule may not be complete. It may not even be accurate. But there can be no doubt as to the existence of the antagonism. The authorities must be as alive to its importance as they were 13 years ago, when the then Viceroy made a moving appeal to the leaders of the two communities . . . . There have been many similar exhortations since. All have been ineffective.

The Congress Party attributes the existance of the tension to the dissensions, which, they assert, have been created deliberately by the British in pursuance of their policy of dividing and ruling, and to separate electorates. The accusation that the British sowed dissensions is absolutely devoid of truth and has never affected anyone who knew the facts. The system of separate electorates has not influenced the matter one way or another. The Simon Commission disposed of that contention in the following passage of their Report. . . .

These views, which were enunciated nine years ago, are reproduced, because they state the situation as it is at present. *The struggle is for political power and for the opportunities which political power confers.* There in lies the difficulty. Under the present system in India most of the provinces must remain for what would seem to be an indefinite period under the control of one community or the other. The Muslim League committee report says : "The majority and minority parties in Britain are interchangeable : their complexion and strength go on changing with the conditions of the country. Today a National Government is in power, but the Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties have an equal chance of running the Government of the country. Here, in

India we have a permanent Hindu majority and the other communities are condemned to the position of a perpetual minority." There is substance in this. In these circumstances what will be the final result of the struggle for political power? The Muslims are not likely to abandon that struggle, even though they are not in a position to obtain majorities in certain provinces. Nor are Hindus likely to abandon the struggle in places where they are the minority. And there are other minorities.

When the Act was framed it was hoped that the difficulty would be overcome by the inclusion of Ministers representing important minorities and by the conferment of special powers on the Governors. But it would appear that the difficulty has not been overcome by these provisions. The solution has yet to be discovered. The solution proposed by the Congress is that all Muslims should join the Congress Party, which will undertake to meet all their needs. But the Muslims, and in particular the Muslim League, refuses [*sic.*] to enter the Congress. They are determined not to merge themselves with the Congress Party, and they do not accept their assurances. There has been talk of a settlement between the Aga Khan and Mr. Gandhi. But negotiations have not progressed, and there is further doubt as to the willingness of the League to accept such a settlement. The solution should preferably come from the Muslims or from the Hindus, or from both. Such a solution may yet be suggested.

105

SIR WILLIAM BARTON ON THE HINDU TOTALITARIANISM OF CONGRESS RULE : JUNE 1939

British statesmen who modelled that amazing piece of legislation, the India Act, built on the hope that self-government would bridge the gulf between the two opposing nations in India, Hindu and Muslim.

The success of the new policy depends on whether that hope is realised. The experience of two years' working of the new constitution has not been encouraging. The hostility between the two great divisions of the Indian people has, on the contrary, been intensified. Hindus and Muslims are farther apart than ever.

The growing tension constitutes a serious threat to the federal scheme. Unless Hindus and Muslims can work in harmony in the central government, ultimately some system other than a parliamentary system of government must be evolved. Muslims now feel that federation is an impossibility; that it would mean for them the dominance of the Hindu, and with it the suppression of Muslim culture and traditions. Leading Muslims, including outstanding Muslim statesmen like Sir Sikandar Hayat, Prime Minister of the Punjab, have made it clear that they would prefer civil war to the submergence of Islam in the rising tide of political Hinduism. The establishment of federation is awaiting the adherence of the Princes. For nearly four years they have studied its implications on their sovereignty; they are still reluctant to take the plunge. The attitude of the Muslims must be a disturbing element in their judgment of the situation.

What are the root causes of Muslim intransigence? In examining the question it is necessary at the outset to recall outstanding but easily

Source : Sir William P. Barton, "Indian Muslims reject Hindu Tyranny", *National Review*, London, June 1939, pp. 751-758.

forgotten facts. Indian Muslims have never demanded democracy in India, for the simple reason that it would mean the political predominance of the Hindus; it is not democracy, in their view, if one nation, the Hindu in this case, should prevail over and govern a smaller nation, the Muslim, even if the two nations are living side by side in the same country. India, now that Burma is a separate political unit, comprises roughly 335 millions of people, including the dominions of the Indian Princes. Of these between 80 and 90 millions are Muslims; there are four or five millions of Christians and smaller groups; fifty millions of out-castes; the rest, about 200 millions, are Hindus.

The greater part of India is now ruled by Congress, essentially a Hindu political party, though it claims that it alone speaks for India. It refuses to recognise its Muslim counterpart, the All-India Muslim League. The immense superiority of the Congress organization and its system of propaganda enabled it to sweep aside the opposition of more conservative Hindu elements, *e.g.*, the landowners, and even in many cases to capture Muslim seats for its nominees, looked on as renegades by the vast majority of Muslims. The success of Congress in capturing the Muslim strong-hold of the North-West Frontier is eloquent testimony to its efficient system of propaganda; it looks as if Sind, thanks to Muslim dissensions, might fall into Congress hands; the Muslim ministry in Bengal is not over stable.

Muslims regard the Congress record in the provinces as clear proof of their intention to establish Hindu *raj* throughout India. Muslim interests are, they assert, everywhere disregarded in Congress provinces. In the Central Provinces, for example, a new scheme of education (the Wardha scheme devised by Mr. Gandhi, based on Hindu culture) is being tried out. Muslim boys in the school are expected to stand with folded hands while the Congress National Anthem, Bande Mataram, is sung. Hindi, essentially a Hindu language, is being compulsorily introduced in the schools throughout Congress provinces, while Urdu, the official and cultural language of the Muslims, is pushed aside. No Muslim Minister genuinely representing Muslim interests has ever been associated with the administration in a Hindu Province. In Bombay strong Muslim opposition has been raised to legislation aiming at joint electorates in local bodies, which would almost everywhere mean the exclusion of Muslims from participation in local government.

Other Muslim criticisms concern Congress administration and policy generally. There is no trace of democracy in Congress methods.

Congress is, in fact, an oligarchy, dominated by Mr. Gandhi, at whose bidding ministries are made and unmade irrespective of the wishes of the elected representatives of the people. The policy of prohibition, with its disastrous effects on provincial finance, is being pushed through under Mr. Gandhi's orders. Respect for law and order is everywhere weakening, especially in Bihar and the United Provinces, largely due to the interference in the administration of Congress Committees in the districts, which seek to influence, and in some cases to terrorise, the local officials. Another dangerous element in the situation is the *Kisan*, or peasant movement, especially in the Punjab, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces. Agrarian unrest has been for many years a jarring element in the rural life of India, attributable mainly to indebtedness, uneconomic holdings, and the difficulty of making a living in an overcrowded countryside. Congressmen in their election campaigns exploited peasant discontent to the utmost; wild promises impossible of fulfilment helped them to gain the peasant vote, and in most provinces their majority. The *Kisans* organised and led by Congress leftists are now trying to force ministries to carry out their pledges, to the great embarrassment of the administration. In the Punjab, where a Muslim Ministry, reinforced with conservative Hindu elements, is in power the *Kisan* attack is aimed solely at discrediting the administration. Sir Sikandar Hayat, Prime Minister of the Punjab, recently denounced the movement as threatening red ruin if allowed to develop. In the Punjab, he said, it was in the hands of Congress political extremists from the towns who did not own a square inch of land.

The conviction that Congress stands for Hindu rule pure and simple has broken down any feeling of confidence Muslims might otherwise have had that the 1935 Act would ultimately be workable as a measure of Home Rule. The growing antagonism has led to an appalling outbreak of communal strife in practically every province; already the casualties outstrip the average of a Frontier campaign.

Congress has, Muslims think, taken on a totalitarian complexion. Its moral standard does not justify its claim to rule India. Even Gandhi indicts it for corruption and graft; he does not hesitate to say that unless it mends its ways its efforts will end in defeat and disgrace. He admits that many of its members have joined it simply in order to exploit the opportunities of graft it offers. Its ex-President, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, criticises its "appalling indiscipline". It cannot control its left wing, which has strong Communist leanings, utterly opposed to Muslim

principles. Its declared policy is to take advantage of trouble in Europe to sever the connection with Britain; any attempt of the kind might easily result in anarchy. "Can we", Muslim leaders ask, "be expected to place our fate in the hands of such a body of men?"

In a recent statement to the Press, Sir Abdullah Haroon, a Muslim politician of repute, expressed the view that two years' working of the India Act had proved that democracy was not suited to Indian soil, clime or environment. The purpose of Congress was to establish a *raj* of one particular community by exploiting the ignorance of the people and fomenting trouble. Nationalism was perverted to set Hindu against Muslim, the people of the States against their Rulers, tenants against landlords, millhands against owners. To bring India under the sway of the political exploiters who dominate Congress would inevitably result in civil war.

At the outset of the new democratic regime in the provinces Muslim statesmen felt that there was at least some hope that in a federation including the Princes a national government of a conservative type, representative of all interests, might be formed. That the hope has been dissipated constitutes another reason for Muslim hostility to the federal scheme. What has happened is that Congress has extended its activities to the States with the avowed object of forcing the Princes to democratise their administration and so to allow their people to elect their own representatives to the federal legislature. The vast majority of the States are Hindu and the result would inevitably be that the greater number of States representatives would wear the Congress label. Congress has, it may be noted, laid down that the election manifestos of the States must necessarily be assimilated to that of the provinces; in other words, of Congress. In such circumstances the States would send a mere handful of Muslims to the Central Government. Muslims bitterly observe that in Kashmir, where Muslims outnumber Hindus by three to one, Congress has made no attempt to influence their Hindu Ruler to confer self-government on his people. They comment further on the incongruity of an oligarchy like Congress, ruled by a dictator, endeavouring in its own selfish interests to force on the States a democracy it has discarded itself.

A regrettable feature of the existing situation is that Muslims have lost confidence in the British Government. Their attitude is, in fact, hostile. Britain has, they feel, sold them to the Hindu. They had expected the British Government to interfere to protect their interests in

Congress provinces, for example, to assure the appointment of a representative Muslim minister in such provinces and to prevent discrimination in any form. So far nothing has, they assert, been done for them; the hope has vanished. The British Government, in its anxiety to prove the genuineness of the reforms, has been, in their view, too inclined to give Congress a free hand to pursue its selfish policy of establishing caste Hindu Rule throughout India. No stronger proof of this is needed, Muslims thinks, than the attitude of Congress itself. Everywhere the Congressmen display exuberance of victory. Paramountcy, they assert, now lies in their hands. Let Mahatma Gandhi threaten to withdraw his ministries and the British Government will carry out his injunctions as regards the States. The British Government climbed down over the release of the Bengal terrorists; they did so again over the appointment of a civilian of Orissa as acting Governor; yet again they gave way at a threat of resignation when Congress Ministries demanded Viceregal intervention in Rajkot to prevent a fatal termination to Gandhi's fast. The result has been, in Congress eyes, to confer on Gandhi for all practical purposes the unofficial status of dictator of India. The final battle is almost as good as won.

Indian Muslims have other grievances against the British Government. They strongly resent British policy in Palestine; they bitterly criticise the administration of tribal areas on the North-West Frontier, especially the handling of the Waziristan problem. The use of the aeroplane for bombing purposes is strongly criticised, with very little knowledge of the limited extent to which the air arm is used in a Frontier campaign. The truth is that Indian Muslims do not wish the Pathan tribes to be disarmed and dominated. It conforms more to their interests to have half-million fighting men of the Border hinterland as a reserve force to uphold Islam against the Hindu should there be in the end a life and death struggle for supremacy between the two great religious groups. Here it may be noted that, despite this feeling of resentment among the Muslims, Sir Sikandar Hayat pledged the loyalty of the Punjab during the crisis of last September, a striking contrast to the Congress attitude.

Put briefly, the Muslims of India regard the India Act of 1935 as destructive of their hopes of the establishment of a system of Home Rule in which their interests would be protected. For them the much-vaunted Indian Nationalism of Congress is a blind. Bitter experience has

convinced them that Congress does not desire to give freedom to India as a whole, but merely to replace British Rule by the rule of the caste Hindu. The provincial scheme has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of Muslim minorities in most of the provinces.

Muslim fears are widespread, and must be reckoned with by those responsible for the fate of India. And it would be idle to deny that they have a solid foundation in fact. It is not surprising that in the circumstances described Muslim leaders are considering the possibility of an alternative to the federal system devised by the British Government.

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SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER ON THE PERFORMANCE OF CONGRESS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS : LONDON : JULY 1939

Thus the fundamental principles underlying the Act [of 1935] were Partnership and effective Safeguards. How far have these been realized up-to-date ? The elections for the 11 Provincial legislatures took place early in 1937. The Congress party, as a result of its superior organization and a skilful propaganda which appealed to the cupidity and racial and religious prejudices of an electorate of 35 millions, four-fifths of whom were illiterate and had never voted before, obtained a majority in the seven provinces where the Hindus predominated, and later even in the Muslim North-West Frontier Province by an alliance with the anti-British Red Shirts. The Muslims had a majority in Bengal, and in the Punjab and Scinde, where they outnumber the Hindus ; but in Bengal and Scinde there is a strong Congress opposition. Thus, since the new Ministries took office some two years ago, the Congress have had political control of eight out of the eleven Provinces.

How have they used their power ? One of their first declarations was that of July 2nd, 1937 :

> "The Working Committee is unable to subscribe to the doctrine of Partnership. The existing relation between the British Government and the people of India is that of exploiter and exploited."

Their hostile attitude towards the British partner is affirmed even more emphatically in the oath which the Congress President administered at Delhi on March 16th, 1937, to all the newly-elected Congress representatives (between 700 and 800) to secure that there should be no

Source : M. F. O'Dwyer, "India under the Congress", *National Review*, London, July 1939, pp. 41-49.

back-sliding. The oath runs :

"I pledge myself to the service of India and to work in the legislature and outside for the independence of India and the ending of the exploitation and poverty of her people. I pledge myself to work under the discipline of the Congress for the furtherance of Congress ideals and objectives to the end that India may be free and independent."

But these same Congress members, on entering the new Provincial Legislature in July, 1937, also took the following oath of allegiance to His Majesty :

"I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the King Emperor, His heirs and successors."

The Congress oath, which involves the ousting of his Majesty's sovereignty and the severance of the British connection, is clearly inconsistent with the oath of allegiance. The point was raised at the time, but Mr. Gandhi's sophistry overcame the twinges of conscience. The oath of allegiance was and is regarded as a mere formality. It has as much binding value as a Hitler pledge. Thus the party which today controls three-fourths of British India has made it clear that so far from accepting partnership, their object is to oust the British partner—after which the other partner, the Princes, will be an easy prey.

The determination to oust the British is shown whenever the opportunity offers, *e.g.*, the hauling down of the British flag in the Legislative buildings, the refusal to join in the Coronation celebrations, the repudiation of honours bestowed by His Majesty, the ban on all social relations between Congressmen and officials from the Viceroy down, the repeated rejection of the Budget by the All-India Assembly, its demand for the withdrawal of the British troops from India and of the British officers in Indian units, the attempt by Congress agents to prevent recruitment to the Indian Army, especially in the Punjab, the declarations of Congressmen in the Assembly in the September crisis, which —as described by the Finance Member—"*pointedly announced to the world that in the next war India would not only not fight for the empire but would actively conspire to hinder and injure it*", and the resolution of the All-India Committee (*Times*, May 1st) that they were determined to oppose all attempts to impose a war on India or to use Indian resources without the consent of the Indian people, *i.e.*, of the Congress. While according to *The Statesman* of February 13th :

"Speakers at the recent Congress Conference at Jalpaiguri simultaneously talked of fighting Britain, of explaining the justice of their

cause to foreign nations, and getting aid."

It may be asked—What of the "effective safeguards" of which we heard so much from the Secretary of State and others during the Parliamentary dabates ? They have gone, or are going, the way of such safeguards. A former Prime Minister (Mr. MacDonald) stated in an Irish debate, "I am one of those who do not believe that safeguards of any certain efficiency can ever be embodied in any Act of Parliament." The Irish Treaty of 1922 proves that, and it is hard to understand how, with that warning before it, Parliament pinned its faith on the safeguards in the India Act.

We have seen how the policy of "Partnership with Safeguards" has been repudiated by the now dominant Congress Party in the case of the British partner. The Congress has now adopted the same hostile attitude towards the third partner—the Indian States. The States, with their 80 millions of people, are noted for their active loyalty to the Throne and the British Government, and are therefore regarded by the Congress as an obstacle to their "Independence" policy, which must be removed at all costs. For some years, agitation within the States against the Rulers had been fomented by the Congress from British India, but it refrained from an open campaign. A few months ago Mr. Gandhi, having suffered a temporary rebuff by the failure of his nominee to be elected President in place of the extremist Mr. Bose—who was re-elected—saw an opportunity to recover his prestige by announcing that the awakening of the States people justified the Congress in British India in giving them open support. Accordingly he, with his lieutenants, headed the campaign in Rajkot, Jaipur, and other States. That campaign against authority among an ignorant and excitable population has caused and is still causing riot, bloodshed and murder on an appalling scale, not only in the so-called "backward" States such as Ranpur and Gungpur, but even in those which are known to be well governed, such as Jaipur and Mysore. Alarmed by the results Mr. Gandhi has now called off Civil Disobedience in the States. The Congress aims to bring all the States under its control.

By treaties and agreements of over a hundred years' standing, the British Government is pledged to protect the internal sovereignty and integrity of the States against external aggression or internal disorder, both of which the Congress is now encouraging. Moreover, the Act of 1935 and the Instructions to the Governor-General and Governors

contain most explicit injunctions to prevent any such attacks. The Princes, whose position is so seriously threatened from British India, have every right to call upon the British Government to fulfil its obligations. Doubtless, some of them have done so. But so far the agitation goes on unchecked and has got beyond Mr. Gandhi's control. A Governor who was asked recently why he allowed his Province to be used as a base for attacks on adjoining States, is reported to have replied : "What can I do ? If I take action, my Congress Ministry will resign!" Clearly the States cannot rely on the so-called "safeguards", and one can understand their hesitation to enter into a Federation with British India while the dominant Congress Party is making every effort to wipe them out. It is clear that the India Act does not protect the interests of two of the partners. But the Act also bristles with safeguards for the Muslim, Anglo-Indian, and other minorities in British India, for the protection of the Services, of British Trade, and so on.

How far have these proved effective ? The position today is summed up in an editorial in the Calcutta *Statesman* of February 13th—a newspaper of great influence, which has steadily supported the policy of the India Act. The article runs :

> "Hindus and Muslims murder each other in Cawnpore. Mr.Gandhi calls for war throughout the States of India. Kisans (peasants) are in revolt against one Congress Ministry in Bihar, Trade Unionists against another in Bombay, Muslims conduct civil disobedience against Mr. Gandhi's education schemes in the Central Provinces, Hindus conduct it against the enforcement of Hindi in Madras. Schoolboys and students conduct it all over the place. . . . From Burma comes a bitter Indian cry. . . and a demand for protection. Liberty is sinking through lawlessness and democracy dying of disorder."

Such is the picture drawn by a friendly critic. It shows that throughout the length and breadth of India there is growing discontent, growing social, economic, and communal strife, growing contempt for the law and authority. The Pax Britannica is rapidly becoming a memory of the past under Congress rule. The Congress is, for the time, all-powerful in the United Provinces. There Sir J. B. Sapru [*sic.*], the ablest of the moderate leaders, whose influence here was a main factor in getting the Bill though, now says of the Congress Government : "It has alienated the support of the Zamindars, the middle classes, Hindus and Muhamedans. It stands bereft of all moral prestige

behind it." In the three Non-Congress Provinces, and especially in the Punjab, matters are better, for the Muslim majority has wisely associated the minorities in the Ministry. This, though contemplated by the Act, the Congress Provinces have refused to do. Today, as admitted by Pandit Jawahir Lal at Cawnpur on April 10th, commenting on the recent riots, in which over 50 people were killed and several hundred seriously injured, the whole country is faced with the communal problem.

Everyone now admits that the age-long Hindu-Muslim antagonism has been immensely intensified since the Act came into force owing to the struggle of the Muslims to retain their social, cultural, and religious independence, threatened by the Hindu domination of seven provinces. The Muslim minority in these provinces complain that they are not getting a square deal, that the safeguards are not enforced by the Governors, and that their vital interests are menaced by the Congress endeavour to establish Hindu domination over all India.

A shocking example of Congress intolerance is the direction of the Congress Chairman of a local Board in the Central Provinces to the headmasters of Urdu schools, which are attended by Muslim boys, to display a portrait of Mr. Gandhi on his birthday, and to order the boys to *worship* it.

"Mahatma Gandhi ki taswir ko puja ki jawe."

It is well known that to a Muslim such an act would be blasphemy.

The Muslim League, now a powerful and united organization, appointed a Committee last autumn to report on the complaints by Muslims of "hardship, ill-treatment and injustice" in the Congress Province[s]. The report not only alleges serious grievances such as the above, but brings out the general grievances that while the Muslim Raj of seven centuries was superseded by the British Raj, which held the scales even, the British Raj is now superseded by the Congress Raj, which unduly favours the Hindus.

The Muslim League was so impressed by this report that at a meeting on December 12th, attended by the Muslim Premiers of Bengal and the Punjab, it was proposed to start civil disobedience in the United Provinces, Bihar, and Central Provinces on the ground that "atrocities had been committed on Muslims and their elementary rights trampled on, and that the Congress Government had failed to afford redress in spite of the constitutional methods of the Muslims". The matter was, however, left to the Muslim [League] Working Committee, which

passed resolutions (1) strongly opposing an All-India Federation as likely to confirm Hindu ascendancy; and (2) appointing a Sub-Committee to explore suggestions for an alternative Constitution which would safeguard Muslim interests. The report of the Sub-Committee was published on March 30th. It is, in fact, a revolutionary proposal to replace the present Constitution by one based on the creation of separate homogeneous and autonomous exclusively Hindu and Muslim Provinces, thus enabling Muslims to retain their separate social, cultural, and religious existence. The general lines of the scheme are under consideration by the League Executive; but it bristles with difficulties, not the least being the transfer of millions of Hindus from the proposed four Muslim Provinces of North-West India, Lucknow-Delhi, Bengal-Assam, and Hyderabad, to the adjoining proposed Hindu Provinces, and *vice versa*. Under the scheme, the Indian States would be linked up with their adjoining province—a proposal also presenting enormous difficulties. The scheme, indeed, appears to be a fantastic one, and alternatives are being sought, but the fact that it is receiving serious study shows to what lengths the Muslims are prepared to go to escape from Congress supremacy.

One word about the Services. In so far as the new scheme is working at all, that result is mainly due to the loyal support afforded to the new Ministers by the Services, British and Indian. Indeed, the Congress Ministers have often acknowledged this support, while at the same time demanding the removal of the small British element, which has set the standards of integrity and efficiency, and menacing the security of all the Services by cuts in pay, or a special tax on salaries now proposed in the United Provinces.

In regard to law and order, it is clear from the reports of all Provincial Governments that since the transfer there has been a formidable increase in crime against person and property, which generally the police and the Courts find it difficult to cope with. Their task is not rendered easier by the fact that the British Government has relinquished this primary responsibility, that Parliament is apparently debarred from even asking for information as to what is going on in the Provinces, that the British *personnel* in the Services is being steadily reduced, and that Indian Ministers and men of influence are showing a dangerous tendency—common in the East—to interfere in the course of justice or in matters of administration. There have been scandalous instances in Bombay and the Central Provinces of the release by Congress Ministers

of convicted criminals in whom they were interested. Pandit Jawahir Lal recently publicly rebuked Congressmen for pushing claims on behalf of their relations.

It is a sad reflection that the two great boons which we prided ourselves on having given to India—the *Pax Britannica* and impartial and efficient public services—are both seriously menaced. It is to be feared that apart from the hostile attitude of the Congress, this will materially affect the aid we can expect from India in the event of a war.

Reviewing the situation as a whole, the melancholy conclusion is that the new Constitution has so far been a failure because the Congress Party demands complete independence, repudiates all partnership and rejects safeguards; and that consequently the Constitution, instead of uniting India as a whole, has intensified the disunity, while the efficiency of the administration is steadily going down and every Congress Province is heading straight for bankruptcy. The Congress panacea for all this is "Get rid of the British and then everything will come right". They ignore the fact that the disappearance of the British would be the signal for invasion from without and civil war within on a scale which the world has not yet seen. Their attitude reminds one of the story of the old lady in Dublin, after the Treaty of 1922. When the last British soldier went on board the transport, she shouted :

"Glory be to God ! The English have gone at last. Now we can fight in peace."

They did in Ireland and they will in India if Britain abandons control. But what will history have to say to that policy?

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SIR JAMES CRERAR ON THE NATURE OF CONGRESS RULE AND ITS WITHDRAWAL : LONDON : MARCH 1940

It must be recognized that the Congress Ministries were confronted by inherent difficulties in the work of administration which had taxed, and not infrequently defeated, the best efforts and the accumulated experience of their predecessors. They had also peculiar difficulties of their own. They had never held office before and hitherto had devoted to agitation time and talents that would have been better bestowed on something more positive. They had made extravagant promises which they could never hope to redeem. And—an even more serious handicap—they were dominated by the central caucus of their party, which had not much regard for the needs and desires of the constituencies to which it did not recognize any responsibility. To this last cause was due a grave tactical blunder at the outset. There can be little doubt that immediately after the elections opinion among the supporters of the Congress in the provinces was for the most part strongly in favour of accepting office and 'working the constitution'. Acting, however, on the *diktat* of the Congress Working Committee, they made a concerted demand on the provincial governors for an undertaking in restraint of the exercise of the special powers conferred upon them, in certain contingencies, by the Government of India Act. It was obvious that no governor could lawfully contract himself out of statutory provisions which gave him no power of dispensation. The demand was, therefore, unconstitutional. To concede it would, moreover, have been a betrayal of interests for the protection of which, in the main, these powers had, in the general settlement, been reserved. Fortunately, better

Source : James Crerar, "India and Her Future", *Fortnightly Review*, London, March 1940, pp. 245-255.

counsels and probably the pressure of provincial opinion, which has generally been sounder in its instinct and more responsive to realities than the central Junta, prevailed and the Congress Ministries assumed office without the obnoxious stipulation.

It may well be believed that in the Congress Ministries there were able and public-spirited men who had no deliberate desire to deal unfairly with the minorities. But they had little or no control over the petty Congress 'Gauleiters', the subalterns of the party machine, who had no such prudential scruples and all the arrogance of their kind. It is doubtful whether the party headquarters had any effective discipline over these people. However that may be, incidents occurred well calculated to justify members of the minority communities, especially the Muslims, in their always latent suspicions of Congress politics. The result has been to exacerbate the tension between Muslim and Hindu to a pitch which experienced observers declare to be unprecedented.

Then certain demands were put forward. So far as these can be formulated with any cohesion, they require that Great Britain should here and now define precisely the political changes to be effected in India on the conclusion of the war; and—it is not quite clear whether this is an elaboration or an alternative—that a constituent assembly, representing all Indian parties and interests, should at once be summoned, whose decisions should receive legislative sanction forthwith. These demands are evidently not practical politics. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government in Great Britain to bind themselves in detail to any post-war settlement in India as it is to formulate and commit themselves irrevocably to the form and contents of the general post-war settlement. A Machiavellian mind might have accepted the proposed constituent assembly, with the reasonable proviso that its conclusions should require such measure of agreement as is required, for example, for an amendment of the constitution in the United States. It may be confidently predicted that no such conclusions would have been reached. The Federal Chief Justice has pointed out how ill-adapted such a large and unwieldy body is to frame the vast and complex structure of a constitution; moreover, the proposal has excited the most violent opposition of the minorities, especially of the 70 or 80 million Muslims. They oppose it because they fear that the institution of any unrestricted form of majority rule would reduce them to the state of political helots under what they call a 'Hindu Raj'. he Indian States, on their part, are no less apprehensive of a central

Government, in which they should have no part, being armed with federal powers which vitally affect their interests and might even threaten their existence. Under no pressure, from the war or otherwise, could the British Government betray these interests, even if it were clear, as it is not, that it had anything to gain by doing so. The existing safeguards must be in some form or other retained until they can be replaced by the consent of those concerned.

Lord Linlithgow has made strenuous efforts to promote agreement, but, so far, in vain. The response of [the] Congress was to direct the Ministries in all the provinces under its control to resign. The automatic consequence has been that in these provinces the administration has been assumed by the Governors in direct relations with the permanent civil services and the great measure of responsible government set up by the Constitution of 1935 has been suspended. The Muslims have celebrated the departure from power of the Congress Ministries as a Day of Thanksgiving.

The Congress party, as has already been argued, made a serious error in tactics when the Government of India Act was first put into operation. A friend of India will recall with greater satisfaction that wiser counsels prevailed. There is something analogous in the present position and the demands that have been put forward. Nothing irreparable has as yet happened ; nothing, indeed, that mutual toleration and practical good-will cannot amend. But the traditional British method of settling communal dissensions are not methods applicable to a general settlement on a national scale. Great Britain cannot impose such a settlement ; she can only promote it by mediation. But the limits which necessarily govern any such mediation should be clearly understood. Great Britain can undertake to implement any agreed settlement that does substantial justice, but she cannot undertake, in default of such a settlement, to impose any scheme of unlimited majority rule on which might be based the dictatorship of a single party. She cannot do so because it would be a plain breach of her engagements and responsibilities and because no plan conceived in defiance of the vital principle of government by consent could bring forth anything but disaster. Democracy is not simply the rule of a majority ; respect for the indefeasible rights of minorities and of the individual is equally of its essence.

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PROFESSOR RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS ON THE NATURE OF CONGRESS RULE : MARCH 1941

Any impartial examination of the employment by Congress of the enormous power placed in its hands by its acceptance of office in seven out of eleven Indian Provinces under the provisions of the 1935 Act, must lead to the conclusion that the best interests of the country were sacrificed upon the altar of party politics. Not only did the successful leaders act as though they were entitled, without regard to the claims of other sections of the community, to confine place and power to Congress men ; but, in addition, they placed their actions and their consciences at the disposition of an irresponsible central caucus, regardless of their duty to their own constituents, to the Provinces over which they were called upon to rule, to the elected chambers whose confidence was their only claim to office. By so doing they gave to the Muslims, to the Indian States, and to other minority interests, a lesson which will take long to unlearn, of what Swaraj, as interpreted by the Congress, means to those who remain outside the fold.

. . . . the action of the Congress in withdrawing the Ministries—no doubt, in some cases at least, much against their will—from Congress-ruled Provinces, appeared to the Indian Princes, as well as to many Muslims, a gross dereliction of duty in face of danger, and a sacrifice of broad national interests to party prejudice.

The Congress rule in the Provinces has taught the minorities that administrative, or even constitutional, safeguards are no effective protection against an attitude of mind in the numerically dominant party which treats all other sections of opinion as politically-defeated anta-

Source : L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "Reflexions on Indian Discontent", *The Nineteenth Century and After*, London, March 1941, pp. 235-239.

gonists. It is not protection that the minorities want so much as partnership : and partnership implies that their ideals, their ways, their traditions, must take their places side by side with those of the Congress.

. . . . But effectively to meet the minorities' point of view—which is a very different thing from making them lordly offers of "protection"—entails compromise : and, so far, this word has not entered into the vocabulary of Congress. It still remains, in its own view, the sole repository of progress, of patriotism, of wisdom.

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RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS ON THE EFFECT OF CONGRESS RULE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM SEPARATISM : LONDON : MARCH 1941

[The] Congress continues to demand 'complete independence' (although how complete independence is to be maintained in the predatory world of today it does not deign to explain) ; the immediate establishment of a 'national government' of a kind to command the confidence of the elected members of the Central Legislature and to secure the co-operation of the Provincial Governments (in other words, a Congress Government that would govern India on Congress lines) ; the shaping of India's constitution by a constituent assembly, based on universal suffrage all over India, including the Indian States (in other words, entire Hindu ascendancy).

Congress leaders profess, doubtless in the utmost good faith, their readiness to make full provision for safeguarding the rights of the minorities. Trust us, they say, and all will be well. They fail to see that this is not enough. Congress rule in the Provinces has taught the minorities that administrative, or even constitutional, safeguards are no effective protection against an attitude of mind in the numerically dominant party which treats all other sections of opinion as politically defeated antagonists. It is not protection that the minorities want so much as partnership : and partnership implies that their ideals, their ways, their traditions, must take their place side by side with those of the Congress.

It is only on such a basis that the system of government by counting heads becomes a fair one ; while if it should come to breaking heads

Source : L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "Reflexions on Indian Discontent", *The Nineteenth Century and After*, London, March 1941, pp. 238-239.

intsead of counting them—well, some at least of the minorities believe they are better at this than is the Congress. But effectively to meet the minorities' point of view—which is a very different thing from making them lordly offers of 'protection'—entails compromise : and, so far, this word has not entered into the vocabulary of [the] Congress. It still remains, in its own view, the sole repository of progress, of patriotism, of wisdom. Nevertheless, the growing tide of Muslim resentment has alarmed it, for it is very clear—and here it may be right—that any attempt to break up India, such as the Pakistan scheme, would be fatal to all progress, political or otherwise. Amongst its many grievances against Britain is the accusation that public opinion here has not expressed itself sufficiently strongly against this manoeuvre. This accusation is ill-founded, for the Pakistan project is deplored by every responsible administrator both in Britain and in India. The Secretary of State has insisted strongly upon India's fundamental unity, and plainly sees in the Pakistan project an attempt to reverse the steady, if difficult, process of Indian political evolution. If it has been frequently mentioned, it has not been supported, but has only been used as an illustration both of the bitterness of the feelings aroused by [the] Congress policy in those who deem themselves obliged to suggest so fatal an expedient, and of the urgent necessity of establishing some elementary basis of unity among the political parties of India.

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SIR VERNEY LOVETT ON THE EFFECT OF CONGRESS RULE ON THE MUSLIMS : OCTOBER 1941

By the first elections under the new Constitution the Congress party secured control of eight of the eleven (major) provinces. This unexpected accession to power warped the judgment of Congress leaders. Believing that its success at the polls justified its claim to represent all India, the Congress proceeded to launch a mass campaign in the hope of enticing the Moslem masses into the Congress fold. The belief emerged that the Congress party was trying to cause divisions among the Moslems with the object of impressing the world that the Congress party was the sole representative of politically-minded Indians. The Congress policy gave new life to the Moslem League whose members rallied with such enthusiasm behind their leader, Mr. Jinnah, that he was virtually given a blank cheque on its behalf. The League quickly became the focussing point on an all-India scale for Moslem political opinion. It is held by some that the younger educated Moslems of today disagree with League policy. But support for it has lately been developed for political reasons, particularly since the Congress leaders demanded a declaration of independence. The majority of the politically-minded Muhammadans support the League, not necessarily by membership, and no existing Muslim party is strong enough to supplant it. The League does not recognize the authority either of the British Government or of the Congress party to determine the future constitutional position of the Muslim community, and it rejects any proposal for a constitutional solution along lines implying the supremacy of the Hindu majority. As the 'Civil and Military Gazette' recently remarked :

Source : V. Lovett, "Indian Politics, 1940-41", *The Quarterly Review,* London, October 1941, pp. 264-265.

'Mr. Jinnah's arguments against the democratic form of Government in India are obviously based on a conviction that Hindus, as a result of centuries of observance of caste, cannot act democratically in politics.'

Sir Harry Haig, lately Governor of the United Provinces, told the East India Association last year* that :

'Had the Congress on assuming office invited the co-operation of the Muslim League, this dangerous antagonism between the two communities need perhaps never have developed. But as time went on the Muslims became more and more convinced that it was the intention of the Congress party to constitute themselves the sole inheritors of British power, and by the use of a permanent Hindu majority to become the effective rulers of the country.'

Further on he said, 'grave communal riots have been of unprecedented frequency'.

**Asiatic Review*, July 1940. [Footnote in the original].

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IR REGINALD COUPLAND ON THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF CONGRESS RULE : 1943 AND 1945

The attitude of the Congress 'high command' towards the communal problem was determined by the same strategy as their attack on the Government of the States. If the survival of autocracy in Indian India was one of the two major obstacles to the attainment of their ideals of Indian freedom, the other was the refusal of the minority communities in British India and in particular of most of the Moslem leaders to accept the Congress claim that it represented all the nationalists of India and was entitled to the sole succession to the British Raj. On both fronts they took their triumph at the polls as the signal not for a policy of compromise and conciliation but for a bold attack. Their hold on public opinion in most of British India had been shown to be stronger than they had supposed. They felt themselves to be riding on a wave of nationalist and democratic enthusiasm; and they decided to use its force, before the tide slackened, in an attempt at once to undermine the power of the Princes and to overrun the opposition of the Moslems. On the one front the result, as has seen, was a measurable, though not a spectacular, success; on the other it was a disastrous failure.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and if the Congress leaders' decision on the communal issue may have been to some extent inspired, as their critics put it, by the 'intoxication of victory', it was not, in all the circumstances of the time, an unnatural decision. To come to terms with the Moslem League, in the first place, was a negation of the totalitarian doctrine which had now taken so firm a hold on Congress minds. The Congress was the only 'national' party: it had many Moslems

Source : Reginald Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942*, Oxford University Press, London, 1943, pp. 179-198, 206-207.

in its ranks : it had had Moslem Presidents in the past and was soon to have another : all the official bodies from the Working Committee downwards had their due quota of Moslem members. If the Moslems of the League desired to take their full share in the attainment and enjoyment of *Swaraj*, they should join the Congress. Their only reason for not doing so, it was argued, must be the small-mindedness of Moslem politicians who jealously refused to share their leadership with others in the cause of Indian freedom. The Congress, secondly, claimed to be the only effective instrument of social progress. Compared with it, the League was a conservative, if not a reactionary body : it had attempted no organised research on social problems : its constructive programme was little else than a copy of the great Congress programme which only its authors had the power to execute and in the fruits of which the Moslem masses would share equally with the Hindus. No only for *Swaraj*, then, but for the uplift of the people Moslems should work inside the Congress, not outside it and against it. And, thirdly, there was a more concrete argument based on the political facts at the time. In all but one of the Congress Provinces, the Moslems were relatively small minorities—14 per cent. In the United Provinces, 12 in Bihar, 8 in Bombay, 6 in Madras, 3 in the Central Provinces, 2 in Orissa. They had greater weight, it is true, than these small numbers might suggest, especially in Northern India, where they were concentrated in the towns and in contact with neighbouring majorities in the Punjab and Bengal. But the moral strength which local minorities might draw from the knowledge that they belonged to an All-India community which now numbered about 90 millions was not reflected in political organisation. There was no Moslem party at that time which could truly claim to represent the bulk of Moslem India. The League was certainly the strongest but its strength lay in the Hindu-majority Provinces. Little was known of it on the Frontier. Its weakness in Bengal the Punjab, Assam, and Sind was betrayed by the fact that neither the Moslem Premiers of those Provinces nor the bulk of their Moslem supporters in their legislatures were then members of it. It could not hope, indeed, to fight the Congress on anything like equal terms. In organisation, in machinery for publicity, in financial resources it was immeasurably poorer. Most of the Hindu daily newspapers published in English and readable therefore in any part of India were either controlled by the Congress or more or less reflected its opinions. In 1937 there was only one Moslem English daily, the *Star of India*. Nor had the League attempted

to win the same sort of hold over the Moslem masses of the country-side as that which the Congress, thanks to its army of keen young workers, the eloquence of such spokesmen as Pandit Nehru and, above all, the prestige of Mr. Gandhi, had won over the Hindu masses. In a village of any size in the North there was a Congress agent and an office flying the Congress flag. There was no such ubiquitous and systematic leadership for the Moslem peasantry. Thus, for the Congress to recognise so small and weak an organisation and to take it into partnership not only meant a sacrifice of totalitarian principles : it seemed in 1937 a wholly needless sacrifice. The League's help was not wanted. Was it not wiser for the Congress to use all its new power and fame in an effort to overwhelm or absorb it ?

That, at any rate, was the decision taken. Two moves resulted. First, the formation of coalitions with the League or any other party in any Province was ruled out as described in previous chapters. Second, renewed efforts were made, particularly in the United Provinces, to bring the scattered Moslem villagers within the Congress fold. The arguments used in this 'mass-contact' campaign, as it was called, were simple and cogent. The Congress Raj had now been established in the Province as it would be over India as a whole before long, and there was no hope of overthrowing it. There might be reason for anxiety in that for self-seeking Moslem politicians but not for the Moslem poor. The real issue was not communal. The cry that Islam was in danger was a baseless slander, fabricated by those politicians for their own factious ends. Congress was non-communal, and under its auspices the religious rights of the Moslems would be scrupulously protected. The real issue was social and economic, and the Congress, not the landlords and lawyers of the League, was the champion of the poor. Already it was hard at work at its new agrarian reforms, and there were more to come. They were intended for Moslem countryfolk as much as Hindu, but the former would be wise to make sure of their full share in the blessings of the new regime by joining the Congress party. There were arguments, too, for Moslems of a higher social status, arguments so obvious that they scarcely needed to be put into words. Political power with all the patronage and influence it implied was now exclusively in Congress hands, and there it would remain. True to its principles, the Congress would not deny a fair share of its appointments from ministerial office downwards to the Moslem minority, but it could not be expected to bestow them on any but Congress Moslems. For a

Moslem to stay in the League, therefore, was to condemn himself to a lifetime in the wilderness. Let him make the other choice, and make it at once while the door was still open. If he were unwilling to become an out-and-out Congressman, let him at least join one of the sectional Moslem parties, such as the Ahrars, which were at feud with the League and willing to work with the Congress.

Such aggressive tactics were, of course, impracticable in the Moslem-majority Provinces. All that the Congress could do there was to try to weaken the non-Congress Ministries by aiding their opponents and widening the fissures in their supporters' ranks. But, if the League could be broken in the Congress Provinces where it was strongest, it would lose all influence in the rest, and there was no other Moslem organisation capable of enlisting all Moslem India in a common front. Already the North-West Frontier Province had joined the Congress camp. If that was too much to expect of Bengal and the Punjab, surely their leaders could be persuaded, once they found themselves alone, to accept the safeguards offered by the Congress and acquiesce—what else could they do?—in the coming Congress Raj.

Meantime the 'high command' took occasion to assure the minorities once again that their interests were safe in Congress hands. At its meeting in Calcutta at the end of October 1937 the Working Committee, in reply to Mr. Jinnah's attack at Lucknow to be mentioned presently, passed the following resolution which was adopted in due course by the A.I.C.C. :

> The Congress has solemnly and repeatedly declared its policy in regard to the rights of the minorities in India and has stated that it considers it its duty to protect these rights and ensure the widest possible scope for the development of these minorities and their participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation. The objective of the Congress is an independent and united India where no class or group or majority or minority may exploit another to its own advantage and where all the elements in the nation may co-operate together for the common good and the advancement of the people of India.

The resolution went on to recite those clauses of the declaration on Fundamental Rights adopted at the annual Session of 1933 which guaranteed religious and cultural freedom and equality to all citizens of India.

At the outset the 'mass-contact' movement seemed to be going well. A substantial number of Moslems were induced to join the party. But,

as time went on, it became clear that the result of the Congress leaders' refusal to share their power with the League was not what they had hoped. Instead of losing heart and yielding to the force of numbers, the League was fast becoming stronger and more self-confident than it had been before. Both in the countryside and in the towns it was conducting a formidable campaign against the 'Congress Raj'. The 'mass contact' movement presently ceased to make headway. The Congress leaders had underestimated, it seemed, the strength of Moslem religious feeling and had failed to take account of the fact that a Moslem's religion pervades all his life, including his politics. As it was, the *mullahs* of the countryside were soon up in arms against the Congress propagandists, usually Hindus and often youngsters, which challenged their authority; it was blasphemy, they told their flocks, to say that politics was a purely secular affair, and they reawakened in them all their old suspicions of Hindu intentions towards their faith. With the townsmen and professional classes, too it seemed, the Congress leaders hadmade a mistake. It was natural, perhaps, to expect the Moslem intelligentsia to bow to the logic of numbers, and since they must always be a minority, to make the best and quickest settlement they could with the majority : but logic is not by any means the strongest force in life, and, instead of submitting to the victors, the leading Moslem politicians closed their ranks and defied them. When the League met in conference at Lucknow in October 1937, Mr. Jinnah at once denounced the Congress for pursuing an exclusively Hindu policy which was bound to intensify communal antagonism and thus to strengthen the hold of 'British imperialism' on India. 'Moslems', he declared, 'can expect neither justice nor fairplay under Congress government.' And that Mr. Jinnah was now speaking for Indian Moslems with greater authority than ever before was at once apparent. The Moslem leaders in the two chief Moslem-majority Provinces had decided to put their weight behind the League. On the day of Mr. Jinnah's speech Sir Sikander Hyat Khan announced that he was advising all the Moslem members of his Unionist Party in the Punjab to join the League, and shortly afterwards Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq and Sir Muhammad Saadulla made similar declarations in Bengal and Assam. The action of these Moslem Premiers did more than any speeches to put new life into the League. About this time a Congress *versus* League contest at a by-election in the United Provinces was won by the Congress, but the three similar contests which quickly followed were all won by the

League. Meanwhile the League was fighting the 'mass-contact' campaign on its own ground, building up at last a rival organisation in the rural areas, hoisting its green flag over against the Congress tricolor in the village street. Within two or three months after the Lucknow Conference over 170 new branches of the League had been established, 90 of them in the United Provinces and 40 in the Punjab. No less than 100,000 new members were said to have been enlisted in the United Provinces alone. Scarcely less important, since nowhere are politics more personal than in India and nowhere is leadership more eagerly desired and loyally respected, was the swift and striking growth of Mr. Jinnah's authority. Always in the forefront of Indian politics, he had hitherto failed to command the confidence of his community as a whole. He had been a sectional rather than a communal leader, a man of the Left, the exponent of a forceful anti British nationalism which had seemed to conservative-minded Moslems to show that he was dangerously 'Congress minded'. But now he was no longer one of several Moslem leaders: he was fast becoming *the* leader. Wherever he went he was greeted by great enthusiastic crowds as the personification of the communal pride and pugnacity which had been awakened by the Congress victory and the use of the victors had made of it.

The Congress leaders seemed slow to realise the full force of the reaction they had provoked. During the winter of 1937-8 they continued to preach the doctrine of single national movement in which patriotic minorities should fearlessly participate. In January Pandit Nehru repeated once more the Congress promise of fair-play—they were ready, he said, 'to go beyond justice to the minorities in order to inspire confidence'—and at the Session held at Haripura in February he moved and carried the following resolution.

"The Congress approves of and confirms the resolution of the Working Committee on Minority Rights passed in Calcutta in October 1937, and declares afresh that it regards it as its primary duty and fundamental policy to protect the religious, linguistic, cultural and other rights of the minorities in India so as to ensure for them in any scheme of government to which the Congress is a party the widest scope for their development and their participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation."

But the resolution went on to make it clear that the minorities were expected to seek their protection within the Congress fold.

"'The Congress welcomes the growth of anti-imperialist feeling among the Muslims and other minorities in India and the growing unity of all classes and communities in India in the struggle for India's independence which is essentially one and indivisible and can be carried on effectively on a united national basis. In particular the Congress welcomes the large numbers of members of the minority communities who have joined the Congress during the past year and given their mass support to the struggle for freedom and the ending of the exploitation of India's masses."

The new strength of the League, however, was not entirely ignored and an attempt was made in that spring to explore the possibilities of an agreement by means of the so-called 'unity-talks'. Mr. Jinnah corresponded with Pandit Nehru and had a long conversation with Mr. Gandhi. A discussion followed between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Subhas Bose who had now succeeded Pandit Nehru as President of the Congress. But nothing came of these personal contacts, and by the end of July the negotiations had broken down on a straight issue. Mr. Jinnah had made a claim which he would scarcely have ventured to make a year before. He had insisted that the Congress should recognise the League as the only organisation representing Indian Moslems. To that, it need hardly be said, Mr. Bose had not agreed. Thereafter the temperature of the dispute rose steadily. The attitude of the Congress leaders was restrained; their letters in the published correspondence were courteous and friendly; but Mr. Jinnah was more militant. 'Evidently', he told Mr. Gandhi, 'you have not been following the course of events'. 'You prefer talking at each other,' he wrote to Pandit Nehru, 'whereas I prefer talking to each other.'

As the year went on, the breach grew wider. At a Provincial League Conference at Karachi in October 1938, attended by Mr. Jinnah and the Moslem Premiers of the Punjab and Bengal, resolutions were carried applauding the achievements of the Provincial 'League Ministries' as they were now called, and condemning the 'nefarious propaganda' conducted by the Congress against them. The annual Session of the League at Patna in December was still more bellicose. It was a crowded and enthusiastic meeting—proof in itself of the vigour and self-confidence which the League had gained from its growing strength throughout the country—and, if its tone was nationalist in the sense that it was anti-British, it was still more anti-Congress. There was a worse enemy, it seemed, to India's progress than British 'imperial-

ism'. All hope of communal peace, said Mr. Jinnah, whose re-election as President was unopposed, had been wrecked 'on the rocks of Congress Fascism'.

The quarrel with the League destroyed any such chance as the Congress leaders may have had of convincing the Moslems that their rights and interests were safe in Congress hands. In any case there was bound to be communal trouble. It had been a constant feature of the Indian scene for a long time past. It would not be diminished by the virtually complete transfer of the control of law and order from British to Indian hands : on the contrary it was likely to increase. Time and again the Congress leaders had told the Moslems that they had nothing to fear from a Congress Raj, but there was small chance of such assurances being trusted unless the Moslem politicians trusted them and said so. Only if the men who possessed or could obtain the confidence of the Moslem masses were willing to work in unison with the Congress leaders in the cause of communal peace could the Congress Governments hope to convince the minorities that the Congress Raj was not in fact a Hindu Raj. Such hopes were doomed by the renewal of open warfare with the League, and it was fiercer warfare now and with a stronger League. In such an atmosphere it was useless for Ministers to reiterate their good intentions, especially when their policy in big things like the refusal of coalitions and the 'mass-contact' campaign and in small things like the hoisting of the Congress flag and the singing of the 'national anthem' were at the best so open to misinstruction. In such an atmosphere, too, the old contention that Moslems were unfairly treated—under-represented on local bodies, starved of educational opportunities, restricted in their use of Urdu and so forth—gained new force, and the symptoms of communal tension, the quarrelling and rioting and killing, put on a new complexion. No one under the old regime had seriously questioned the Government's neutrality in this perennial conflict. Now it was directly charged with favouring the Hindu side. Every instance of communal trouble was scrutinised and written up and put on record, and in due course they were all listed and published as a formal indictment of the Congress Governments.

The first of those publications was the *Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces*. It was published at the end of 1938 and became known as the *Pirpur Report* from the name of the chairman of the

committee, Raja Syed Mohammad Mahdi of Pirpur, a descendant of the old Mogul aristocracy in the United Provinces. It is a well-written and clearly argued statement of the Moslem case, the more effective because of its restraint. It includes a summary account of events in all the Congress Provinces except the North-West Frontier Province, based on personal inquiries made by the Committee; but this is relegated to the last part of the Report and the cases of alleged persecution or injustice are not described in sensational or provocative language. The main body of the Report takes wider ground. It attacks the Congress 'closed door' policy and cites it as proof that parliamentary government as practised in Britain is unworkable in India. 'The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority.' It is not only a question of their religious and cultural freedom : they must obtain their due share in the government of the country. The Congress has denied them this—it has tried, indeed, to break the political power of the Moslems by the old device of 'divide and rule'——and at the same time has shown that without it Moslems have no hope of justice. Their share of public appointments, provincial or local, is not in proportion to the size and importance of the community. If they cannot obtain fair treatment from the Ministers, still less can they obtain it from the 'parallel government' established by the Congress committees throughout the Provinces. The flag, the anthem, the reverence paid to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by the Mahatma himself on 'cow protection'——all these are evidence of a deliberate and far-reaching attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Moslem community, but its most insidious feature is the attempt to extend the use of Hindi at the expense of Urdu. 'When a small country like Switzerland can afford to impart education in three languages, surely more than one language can be taught in an Indian Province.'

Another indictment was the *Report of Enquiry Committee appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to enquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar*, published in March 1939 and known as the *Shareef Report* from the name of its draftsman, Mr. S. M. Shareef. The preface by Mr. S. A. Aziz, President of the Provincial League, maintains the temperate style of the Pirpur Report. 'The religious and fanatical outbursts of former days,' he writes, 'seem to have developed into a religious-political aggression on a wider and more dangerous scale', but he pleads that the situation can still be saved if the

leaders of both the Congress and the League will undertake a concerted campaign of preaching and propaganda to convince the ignorant masses of both communities that they must observe the principle of mutual toleration. The body of the Report sounds a different note. It consists for the most part of a full description of the 'atrocities' perpetrated by Hindus in various places in Bihar. Repulsive details are recounted, repeated and italicised with the deliberate object, it would almost seem, of infuriating any Moslem who might read them. Nor is it only Ministers or local Congress leaders who are charged with a policy of persecution. The administrative and judicial services are almost equally vilified: the police are accused of a persistent anti-Moslem bias and magistrates of passing absurdly lenient sentences on Hindu breakers of the peace. A casual reader of the pamphlet might be forgiven for supposing that something like a reign of terror had been established in Bihar. 'Muslims will have to decide soon whether they should migrate from this Province or face annihilation.'

A third formal indictment of the Congress Governments was made soon after their resignation in a statement issued to the press and republished in pamphlet form by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq in December 1939. It was entitled *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule* and furnished with a somewhat rhetorical introduction. Congress policy, wrote Mr. Huq, had set the stage:

> for the blatant arrogance of the militant Hindu to burst the bounds of restraint which non-partisan Governments had hitherto imposed.... They set about to impose their will on the Muslim minorities. And what was their will ?...'Mother cow' must be protected.... Muslims must not be allowed to eat beef.... The religion of Muslims must be humbled because was not this the land of the Hindus? Hence the forbidding of *azan* [the call to prayer], attacks on worshippers in mosques, the insistence on the triumphant passage of noisy processions before mosques at prayer time.... Was it strange, then, that tragedy followed tragedy?...

There followed a description of 72 incidents in Bihar and 33 in the United Provinces and a more summary account of similar events in the Central Provinces. Broadly speaking they illustrate the general charges made in the introduction. Cow-sacrifice is prevented in villages where it had long been customary. Moslem butchers are assaulted. Pigs are thrown into mosques. The *azan* is denounced and interrupted. Moslem shops are boycotted. Moslems are prevented

from using the village well. They are attacked irrespective of sex or age.... Two features of the record as a whole are worth noting. First, the 'sufferings' seem mostly to have been undergone by small and isolated groups of Moslems in remote villages. In the towns they were strong enough, it seems, to give as good as they got. Second, official intervention is again represented as biassed in favour of the Hindus. Several cases are cited of the restoration of peace by means of a so-called 'compromise' which in fact, it is alleged, was a pro-Hindu settlement imposed by the weight of authority on a helpless Moslem minority.

All these documents were brushed aside by the Hindu press with more or less contempt or ridicule. The official rejoinder was more carefully considered. On various occasions the Moslem allegations were denied or the incidents otherwise interpreted by Ministers in their legislatures. The Bihar Government published a reasoned reply to the *Pirpur Report*. After summarising the Government's attempts to further Moslem interests in the Province by nominating Moslems to official posts, by expenditure on Moslem education and by grants and other concessions to Moslem institutions, it answered the charges point by point. As regards cow-sacrifice Congress Ministers had 'made no change whatever in the traditional policy of previous Governments': they had permitted it where it was an established right—a number of cases were cited in which Hindus had been prosecuted for forcible attempts to prevent Moslems exercising this right—but they had discouraged it where it had not hitherto been customary. The same applied to processions and music. Like its predecessors, the Government had not interfered with traditional usage unless compelled by serious danger of disorder. The allegations of unfair conduct in the suppression of rioting were denied: the police had treated peace-breakers with strict impartiality. Statistics were given to show that Moslems were not inadequately represented on local bodies. The use of the 'national flag' and *Bande Mataram* was mainly ascribed to students who 'in the exuberance of enthusiasm' wanted 'to celebrate the dawn of what they thought a glorious day'. Government's action was purely permissive. It had removed the previous ban on the flag and the song, leaving local bodies and the managers of colleges and schools and other institutions to do what they chose. Lastly, so far from discouraging Urdu, the Government had extended the optional use of it in the Courts.

It would need a full inquiry on the spot by a neutral commission

to determine the rights and wrongs of the controversy. One thing, however, can be stated with some certainty. The Congress Governments as a whole wanted to be just to the minorities. There is high and impartial authority for that in the United Provinces where the quarrel was at least as bitter as in Bihar. Writing after his retirement at the end of 1939, the Governor (Sir Harry Haig) said :

> "In dealing with communal issues the Ministers, in my judgment, normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair. Indeed, towards the end of their time they were being seriously criticised by the Hindu Mahasabha on the ground that they were not being fair to the Hindus, though there was in fact no justification for such a criticism."

Similar comment has been made on other Congress Ministries, and there is nothing surprising in it. The Congress leaders, as has been seen, had repeatedly insisted on the non-communal character of the Congress, and they were bound to try to prove that communal neutrality was not an exclusively British virtue. It must be remembered, too, that there were Congress Moslem Ministers, who, whatever members of the League may have thought of them, could scarcely be credited with lending themselves to a deliberate policy of Moslem persecution. And, apart from all that, the new Governments, it is safe to say, did not want the worst and most dangerous of all the difficulties with which the old Governments had had to grapple to become still more difficult under their administration. Would the 'high command' have taken the quick decision it did take as to the League if it had forseen the consequences? As it was, the genuineness of the Congress Ministers' anxiety at the growth of communal antagonism during their period of office was unmistakable. The frankness with which in the end they faced it and the repressive measures they took against incendiaries in either camp have been recorded in Chapter XII.

So much is certain. It is also certain that, while Moslems may have been aggressive where they felt themselves strong enough, all the incidents complained of were not, as was sometimes suggested in Congress quarters, the result of provocation by agents of the League. It seems more probable that much of the trouble in out of the way places was caused by the behaviour of those irresponsible 'cocks of the walk' who regarded themselves as the local instruments of the Congress Raj. It seems probable, too, that Hindus in general felt more inclined to assert themselves, more ready to question Moslem rights, now that

the Government to which they would have to answer for their conduct was a mainly Hindu Government. But in any event the controversy is not of major importance because the incidents in dispute cannot by themselves account for the strength and scope of the Moslem revolt. They were not very numerous considering the vast areas concerned: many of them were of a relatively trivial character: and similar incidents had been occurring from time to time for many years past. Their importance lies mainly in the fact that the publicity given to them served still further to weaken the chances—a poor enough chance in any case—of the Congress Raj being generally credited with anything like the communal neutrality of the previous regime.

Among the Moslem intelligentsia it was not only the so-called 'atrocities' and the inferences drawn from them that inspired a new sense of danger and a new determination to resist it. Minority sentiment, as Europe well knows, is primarly a cultural matter: the battles it provokes are mostly fought in the field of education; and, while Moslems had always been aware of their weakness in this field, they seem to have become in those critical years more acutely conscious of it and more seriously alarmed as to what the ultimate upshot would be if the requisite counter-measures were not taken in time. A more significant document that any of those just reviewed was the report of the Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee. This Committee was not a political body : it owed no allegiance to the League: it was appointed by the All-India Moslem Educational Conference as its fifty-second session at Calcutta at the end of 1939, and it consisted mainly of distinguished Moslem educationalists with Nawab Kamal Yar Jung Bahadur in the chair. Its task was to survey the educational system throughout India and to frame a scheme for Moslem education with a view to 'the preservation of the distinctive features of their culture and social order'. In the course of the following year the various Provinces and the leading States were visited by a touring subcommittee, led by Sir Azizul Huque, Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly and Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University.

The *Report* was published in the spring of 1942. It drew a sombre picture of the position of Moslem education in all its branches. In the universities and colleges the proportion of Moslem students was too low, the place accorded to Moslem studies in the curriculum too small, and the opportunities for advanced research in Moslem history and culture quite inadequate. Moslem secondary schools were generally inferior:

their teaching suffered in particular from old-fashioned or unsuitable textbooks. But the most important stage of education is that at which the younger generation is most impressionable; and Moslem interests, it was alleged, were steadily losing ground in the field of primary education. Urdu schools were being closed or amalgamated with Hindi schools. When a group of schools was opened, far too small a proportion of them were Urdu. But more alarming than such maladministration of the old system was the character of its new development in the Congress Provinces. The most striking feature of the *Report* was its criticism of the 'Wardha Scheme' of elementary education which, as recorded in Chapter XIII, had been launched with so much energy and enthusiasm by Congress Governments.

In the eyes of the Committee the scheme appeared at its worst in the form adopted in the Central Provinces—the *Vidya Mandirs*. True, the author of the *Vidya Mandirs* was a Moslem, Dr. Zakir Husain, whose ability and integrity were not questioned, but he was a Congress Moslem and credited with a desire to submerge the specifically Moslem culture in a single Indian culture. The Moslem minority in the Province had opposed the plan from its outset, but they only numbered 3 per cent. and their protests had been overridden. When, at the very end of the Congress regime, a bill confirming and regulating the *Vidya Mandirs* was introduced in the Assembly it was opposed by every Moslem member in the house and by a few Hindus, including Dr. Khare : nevertheless it was triumphantly carried. The Moslems attacked it not only because it was, they declared, impracticable and uneconomic, but more bitterly because it was communal. The schools would be managed by committees chosen by joint electorates. No provision was yet made for separate Moslem schools, nor for the training of Urdu-speaking teachers in the new technique. But these were minor points compared with the essential character of the *Vidya Mandirs*, betrayed as it was by their name, 'Temples of Learning'—a name that had been adopted in the teeth of Moslem antagonism and against the advice of Dr. Husain himself. "It would be, said Congressmen, 'a source of inspiration to 99 per cent of the village population'. Was not this bound to be regarded as a deliberate challenge to the Moslem hatred of the Hindu temple as the quintescence of idolatry?

But the *Vidya Mandirs* were only a local branch of the 'Wardha Scheme' which the Congress Governments had introduced to a greater or less extent in all their Provinces, and that scheme as a whole stands

condemned in the *Report* as essentially communal. It was primarily Mr. Gandhi's creation, it is pointed out, and bears the impress of his personality and ideology. Its two main principles, as avowed by Mr. Gandhi himself, are the doctrine of non-violence and the romance of *takli*, the craft of spinning and weaving; and these ideas, however genuine and highminded, were certainly coloured by Hindu rather than by Moslem thought. Worse than that, religion was to be taught in the new schools only by the manifestation in the daily life of the teacher of the truths common to all religions. 'We have left out the teaching of religions from Wardha Scheme of education', Mr. Gandhi had said, 'because we are afraid that religions as they are taught and practised to-day lead to conflict rather than unity.' Educationalists in other countries may sympathise with that frank confession, but to orthodox Moslems education without direct religious teaching is no education at all; and this feature of the scheme seemed one more proof that the ulterior purpose of it all was gradually to wean the Moslem child from his faith. Once such suspicions were aroused, it was easy to detect, not so much in the exposition of the scheme or in the syllabus as in the conduct of the managers and teachers, the first intimations of something like a new religion of which Mr. Gandhi was to be the prophet. The Moslem school-children should be obliged to honour the Congress flag, to join 'with folded hands' in singing *Bande Mataram*, to wear 'Gandhi caps' and homespun clothes—all that was bad enough, but its significance might seem primarily political. Could the same be said of the children not merely celebrating Mr. Gandhi's birthday but doing *puja*—a ceremonial act of reverence or worship—before the Mahatma's portrait ?

The educational policy of the Congress Governments was, as has been said, the most enlightened and encouraging feature of the new regime, and it is somewhat ironical that it should have provoked the bitterest attack. Even the mass-literacy campaign did not escape suspicion : some of the books used for teaching adults to read were tinged, it was asserted, with anti-Moslem prejudice. This inquiry is not concerned to justify or to refute the charges made. The relevant point is that Moslems of character and influence believed them, and it is difficult to brush aside a statement of Moslem fears so earnest, yet so temperate, as that contained in the note appended to the *Kamal Yar Jung Report* by Sir Azizul Huque. From top to bottom of the educational field he sees the Moslem fighting a losing battle. The very

languages he speaks are steadily losing their Arabic and Persian words and being 'Sanskritised'. If he studies literature, his pabulum is mainly the philosophy and romance of Hinduism : 'he hardly has any opportunity to know anything about his Prophet, the Caliphs, the saints, the scholars, the philosophers, the poets or the heroes of Islam'. If he studies history, he is primed with all the merits and achievements of Hindu civilization from its earliest days, but with the Moslem conquest the scene changes to an unrelieved record of strife and bloodshed. There are 'two and only two alternatives'.

> Either the present system of school and university studies must have such syllabuses and themes that the Hindus, the Muslims and all other creeds and communities can meet on an essentially common platform with no influence, tendency or bias in favour of the one or the other. Or educational India must be a federation of two or more distinct types of educational organisations, each trying to develop its own culture and heredity, but in a spirit of catholicity and goodwill to others. I do hope and pray that wisdom and sense will prevail and there will be a common and unified plan and programme of education.

Thus in education as in government Moslem minds had begun to contemplate the division of India into Hindu and Moslem compartments.

There is no need to cite more evidence to demonstrate the suspicion and alarm which the advent of Congress rule had excited in the Moslem community. In the Hindu-majority Provinces they felt that a Hindu tide was rising which threatened in the long run to submerge their faith and culture and tradition, not only in the south where the Moslem minority had always been small and weak, but also in the north where it was more substantial and important and where so noble an array of monuments recalls to Moslems the grandeur of the Mogul age. Nor would they be safe even in the Moslem-majority Provinces ; for the Congress was bent on replacing the British Centre with a Congress Centre at least as much empowered as its predecessor to interfere with the autonomy of the Provinces and composed and conducted on the same totalitarian principles as the Congress Provincial Governments and under the same 'Wardha dictatorship'. No cool headed Moslem went so far as to assert that the professions and promises of the Congress leaders were insincere, that they were really looking forward to the day when Indian Islam, like Buddhism long ago, would be absorbed into

Hinduism. But there was one cardinal and undeniable fact. The Congress, however genuinely national and non-communal its intentions might be, was a Hindu organisation. It was not so much that its Moslem membership was relative by small and included few Moslems of outstanding ability and influence. The psychological and philosophical background of the Congress movement, its modes of thought and conduct, the quality of what was known as 'Congress-mindedness' were essentially Hindu, emphatically not Moslem. The doctrine of *ahimsa* in particular was as least as alien to Moslem as it is to most Western minds. And, if it was true that many Congressmen were not pacifists—Pandit Nehru, for example, the agnostic, who was certainly no communalist either—it was also true that at a crisis all of them, including Pandit Nehru, bowed to Mr. Gandhi's will. And, however all-embracing Mr. Gandhi's charity towards other races and creeds than his own, his personality and the power he wielded belonged to the Hindu tradition : he would be out of place among the heroes of Islam.

Moreover, did the rank and file of Congressmen, Moslems asked, accept in their hearts the non-communal precepts of the 'high command'? The conduct of many of them—schoolmasters, committee-men, local bosses—seemed to answer that question in the negative. Was their real attitude different from that of the Hindu Mahasabha? And was it not of ominous significance that at this time, while the membership of the Congress was falling, that of the Mahasabha was rising?

The Hindu Mahasabha was founded in 1928 as a purely cultural organisation for the conservation and purification of Hinduism; but it had now become primarily political and in 1937 its President was Veer V. D. Savarkar, a fiery nationalist who had been sentenced in 1909 to transportation for life on the charge of abetting a murderous terrorist crime. In 1938, when he was re-elected President as he has been each year since, he announced his intention of reorganising the Mahasabha and in a series of speeches in various parts of India he attacked the Congress for the opposite reason to that for which the League attacked it. So far from being anti-Moslem, the Congress was betraying the cause of Hinduism by pretending to be non-communal and pursuing a non-communal policy. 'Mr. Jinnah is quite correct in stating that the Congress has been since its inception down to this day a Hindu body . . . . The few Moslems . . . are kept there merely as figureheads to run the poor show of a

"United Indian Nation.' The idea that there could be one homogeneous all-India nationhood was a mirage. The Hindu-Moslem schism was an unpleasant fact. It could not be wished away or overcome by compromise. The only way to treat it was to recognise that all India was Hindustan, the land of the Hindus, at once their fatherland and holy land, and the only land with which Hindus, unlike Moslems, were concerned ; that there was only one nation in India, the Hindu nation; and that the Moslems were only a minority community and as such must take their place in a single Indian State. They would be treated justly, for no distinction would be made on grounds of race or faith. All citizens of the state would be equal: 'one man, one vote' would be the general rule; such matters as the nantional language would be settled as in other democratic countries by the will of the majority. . . . A straightforward creed, and it rapidly acquired converts. The Mahasabha, like the League, had adopted the Congress mechanism of an annual Session, as well as a Working Committee, Provincial Committees and so forth, and the Session at Nagpur in the winter of 1938 was attended by enormous crowds. One detachment consisted of 'volunteers' armed with swords and *lathis*, and the most disquieting resolution was that which demanded universal military training in order to counteract the Moslem preponderance in the Indian Army and to prepare the way for a fuil scale national militia.

The effect on Moslem feeling can be imagined, and the worst of it was the suspicion that many Congressmen agreed in their hearts with Mr. Savarkar. It was possible, no doubt, to exaggerate the importance of the Mahasabha. Fast growing though it was, it could scarcely hope to wrest the lead of Hindu nationalism from so mighty and wealthy an organisation as the Congress. But down at the roots was there any real division? The conduct of the Congress Governments, said the not immoderate *Pirpur Report*, seems 'to substantiate the theory that there is something like identity of purpose between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha . . . . The Muslims feel that, notwithstanding the non communal professions of the Congress and the desire of a few Congressmen to follow a truly national policy, a vast majority of the Congress members are Hindus who look forward, after many centuries of British and Muslim rule, to the re establishment of a purely Hindu Raj.'

Enough has been said to explain the rapid growth of Hindu-Moslem tension after 1937—the exacerbation of the wordy warfare on

the platform and in the press, the increase in rioting and bloodshed, and the emergence, as time went on, of a widespread feeling that the two communities were fast coming to the point at which the issue between them would have to be decided, peaceably it might be hoped, but conceivably by force. For, if the Moslems were alarmed, they were not, in the north at any rate, afraid. The coming of Congress Governments had stirred their pride and recalled the memories of their past. Two centuries ago the Moslems had long held most of India under Moslem rule by force of arms. By force of arms the British had replaced this Moslem Raj by a British Raj. Now, it seemed, the British were about to abdicate, but the heritage of power was not to revert to the descendants of the Moguls. The Raj was to be a Hindu Raj, and this time not by force of arms but by counting the votes of millions of ignorant peasants and drafting in accordance therewith a paper constitution.

What was the effect of the widening communal gulf on the constitutional problem?

Before 1937 Mr. Jinnah, it will be remembered, had differed from the more militant Congress leaders in wanting to work the new Provincial constitution 'for what it was worth'. By 1938 the position had been reversed. Congress Ministers were finding that there was some worth in the constitution. It was the League that now denounced it because it had made possible, it declared, the systematic persecution of the Moslems in the Congress Provinces; and it was the League now that threatened to combat it by the unconstitutional methods so often employed by the Congress but never by the League since the Caliphate agitation of 1920-1. 'The time has come', ran a resolution of the Patna Session in the winter of 1938, 'to authorise the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League to decide and resort to direct action if and when necessary.'

Those were ominous words, for they meant at the least that the League was prepared to adopt the Congress technique of 'civil disobediance'. And the danger of that was unmistakable. Mr. Gandhi himself had often admitted the difficulty of preventing the rule of 'non-violence' from being broken in the course of a Congress 'mass-disobedience' campaign. What then, was likely to happen with mobs of League 'volunteers' who had never subscribed to that rule or shared in the Hindu sentiment that had inspired it? Unfortunately, moreover, the means of 'direct action' were ready to hand. The establishment of quasi-military organisations by the Congress had naturally provoked a

counter-movement by the League. Two bodies were in existence by the end of 1938. The first was the 'Muslim League Volunteer Corps'. It was said to number 11,000 in the United Provinces and 4,000 in the North-West Frontier Province. The second body was the 'Muslim National Guard', equipped with uniform and flag, and said to be 3,000 strong in the United Provinces. Smaller 'guards' had been organised in Sind and Bengal. There were also the Khaksars, but it was not till the late summer of 1939 that this formidable body abandoned its peaceful methods, and, as has been told in previous chapters, took the path of violence and bloodshed.

Happily the threat of 'direct action' was not carried out. But the League continued to denounce the existing regime and in increasingly bitter terms. 'The Provincial part of the constitution', declared a resolution of the Working Committee in the spring of 1939, 'has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of the Muslim minorities in various Provinces'. By the summer Mr. Jinnah seemed to have turned his back on the whole course of constitutional development since 1919, in the discussion of which he had so often played a leading part. In a speech on August 5 he declared that the conduct of the Congress after the elections of 1937 had convinced him that 'a democratic system of parliamentary government', favoured by the Congress because it was 'a matter of counting heads', was an 'impossibility' in 'such a vast country with different nationalities'.

A resolution of the Working Committee on August 28 bitterly complained that the hopes once cherished by Moslems that their position would be secured by the 'safeguards' had proved a complete illusion in face of 'a permanent hostile communal majority', and it censured 'the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed Provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities'. Finally, when the Congress Ministries resigned, Mr. Jinnah declared that they must never come back, and the celebration of a day of deliverance and thanksgiving' was organised by the League throughout the country and observed on December 22, with more enthusiasm in the Congress Provinces than elsewhere, 'as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function'.

It might have seemed at this time as if Mr. Jinnah had no further use for the Provincial constitution, as if, indeed, he had discarded parliamentary or representative government altogether. But this was

apparently not the case. For when, towards the end of the year, one more abortive effort was made to bring about a communal settlement, the possibility of Congress-League coalitions in the Provinces was seriously reconsidered on both sides. It would seem, then, that Mr. Jinnah was prepared to contemplate a kind of parliamentary government provided it were not the normal British kind, *i.e.*, government by the majority party alone. 'Democratic systems', he wrote to a British journal, 'based on the concept of a homogeneous nation are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India, and this simple fact is the root cause of all of India's constitutional ills'.

Meantime the growing power of the League and of Mr. Jinnah's personal authority had begun to give the working of the existing constitution the same sort of twist as the Congress leaders had given it. The non-Congress Ministries were now, as has been seen, called 'League Ministries', and in the summer of 1939 the League Working Committee passed a resolution instructing Provincial branches of the League not to come to terms with the Congress on their own account but to refer all proposals for a settlement to the 'high command'. If this process were carried farther, if the leaders of the League could establish a unitary centre as effective as that which the leaders of the Congress had established, then the Ministers and the members of the legislatures in the non-Congress as well as the Congress Provinces would become responsible to external all-Indian authorities instead of to their Provincial electorates, and in the whole of British India the twin purposes of 1935—Provincial Autonomy and Responsible Govenment—would have been frustrated.

So much for the Provincial constitution. As regards the Centre Mr. Jinnah's opposition to the federal scheme of 1935 was now sharper and harder than it had been before 1937. Uncompromising condemnation of it had become a regular feature of League meetings. But the point of attack had shifted. Before 1937 the federal scheme had been denounced by the League for the same reason as by the Congress—because it fell short of full self-government at the Centre. After 1937 it was denounced because it would enable the Congress to obtain the same sort of ascendency at the Centre as it had obtained in the Provinces and to use it in the same way. A significant resolution was passed by the Executive Council of the League at the time of the Patna Session when the Congress campaign in the States described in the last chapter, was in full swing. It declared that the Congress'

main objective in championing the cause of the States' people

> is only to secure the establishment in the Indian States of an elective system enabling their representatives to be returned to the Federal Legislature, irrespective of anything else, in the hope that it might get a majority.

A second resolution warned the British Government that, if it were induced by Congress methods of 'coercion and intimidation' to acquiesce in the kind of Federation the Congress wanted, the Moslems 'will not hesitate to resort to the extremest measures' to protect their vital interests'.

Nor was the League's attitude to the constitutional problem at the Centre purely negative. They would have nothing to do, it is true, with the Congress plan of a Constituent Assembly, one more device, as they saw it, for imposing Hindu majority rule, but they did not leave the matter there. They began to think out a plan of their own. The Provincial Conference at Karachi in October 1938 passed the following resolution:

> This Conference, in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and unhampered cultural development, economic and social betterment, and *political self-determination* of the Hindus and Muslims, recommends to the All-India Muslim League to review the entire question of what should be a suitable constitution for India, which will secure an honourable and legitimate status due to the Muslims, and further devise a scheme of constitution under which *the Muslims may attain full independence.**

At the Patna Session in December Mr. Jinnah was authorised to take steps 'to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative [to the federal scheme of 1935] which would completely safeguard the interests of Mussulmans and other minorities in India'. In March 1939 the Working Committee appointed a sub committee, with Mr. Jinnah in the chair and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan among its members, 'to examine various schemes already propounded . . . and those that may be submitted hereafter to the President'.

The words italicised in the Karachi resolution suggest the nature of the startling change which a section of Moslem thought had now undergone. Before 1937 Indian Moslems had taken the political unity of India for granted. Now they were talking of Moslem self-determination and Moslem independence. Their future, it was argued, could not be

*Italics were added by Sir Reginald Coupland. (Editor)

effectively safeguarded by anything less drastic than Partition.

. . . .

Such in brief were the chief Moslem pronouncements on the constitutional problem at this critical time. The Hindu response was not encouraging. It was natural, no doubt, that the proposals for Partition should be treated by Congress newspapers with angry derision; but it might have been hoped that the more moderate suggestions of a loose federation would be carefully examined and reasonably discussed. But the Congress mind was not prepared, it seemed, to consider any alternative to the official plan of a Constituent Assembly ; and it is not, perhaps, to be wondered at if, during this period of increasing communal tension and strife, Moslem opinion hardened. At any rate it was the more drastic, not the more moderate policy, which ultimately prevailed with Mr. Jinnah and the leaders of the League. In September 1939 the Working Committee declared that Moslem India was

> irrevocably opposed to any 'federal objective' which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of this country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national State.

In Febuary 1940 Mr. Jinnah told the press that the constitutional settlement must be governed by the fact that India was not one nation but two, and that the Moslems of India would not accept the arbitrament of any body, Indian or British, but would determine their destiny themselves. In March the Session of the League at Lahore, attended, it was estimated, by as many as 100,000 members, passed the following resolution:

> Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Moslems unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign....

It was not clear exactly what this paragraph of the resolution

meant. It could scarcely mean that the constituent units of the independent States were really to be 'sovereign', but that it did mean that the States were to be really 'independent, was shown by a subsequent paragraph.

> This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.

This was Partition pure and simple. The Moslem reaction to the Congress policy had gone as far as it could go. Unitarianism had been met by separatism. Naturally Congressmen were up in arms. Mr. Gandhi wrote a long article condemning the proceedings at Lahore. The Congress press cried out against 'the vivisection of Mother India'. And in April an 'All India Independent Muslim Conference' was organised at Delhi, with Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, past and future Premier of Sind, in the chair and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had just been elected President of the Congress, in the background. The Conference denounced Partition and repudiated the League's claim to represent the Moslems of India. But, whatever the numerical proportions of the various Moslem bodies may have been, there could be no question that Mr. Jinnah was now the most popular and powerful Moslem in India, and he had behind him the premiers of the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam and the leaders of the Moslem minorities in the Congress Provinces. It was undeniable that a very substantial section of Moslem opinion, headed by almost all the best-known figures in Moslem politics, had decided—irrevocably or not remained to be seen—that they would rather split India into several sovereign states than submit to a Hindu Raj.

II

It is the Moslems, now numbering about 100 millions, who have always been the major crux [of the Indian problem]. But in 1937 the political organization of the community was still relatively backward. True, the great majority of the Moslem seats at the elections were won by non-Congress Moslems; but they were candidates of various local parties : there was no common Moslem front. The League was the strongest party in the Hindu-majority Provinces; but it was still mainly composed of upper-class politicians, its membership was relatively small, it had little contact with Moslem masses; and in the Moslem-majority Provinces its position was even weaker. It was little known in the Frontier. In the Punjab it was overshadowed by the Unionist Party. Neither in Bengal nor in Sind had it won a majority of Moslem votes. Nevertheless its mere existence invalidated the Congress claim to speak for all Indian Moslems who desired the freedom of India.

In this situation two choices were open to the Congress leaders after their victory at the polls. One was to take the League into partnership, to constitute Congress-League Coalition Ministries in the Congress-majority Provinces. This is what Jinnah had plainly suggested before the elections, and what was definitely expected in the U. P., where the League was strongest. To politicians schooled in the British parliamentary tradition this choice might well have seemed attractive : the morrow of a victory, it might have been thought, was the time for compromise and conciliation. But the Congress

Source : Reginald Coupland, *India : A Re-Statement*, Oxford University Press, London, 1945, pp. 180-187.

leaders took the other path. They decided not to come to terms with the League but to override it and try to absorb it. This was not because, as their critics said, they were 'drunk with victory'. There were substantial arguments in favour of a militant and uncompromising policy. In the first place Coalition Governments, even though the Congress might be the predominant partner, were not the 'Congress Raj' on which so many Congressmen had set their hearts. They would prohibit unitary control from the 'Congress 'Centre' both in the campaign for eliminating the British Raj and in the execution of the concerted programme of social reform. In both fields the Congress, it seemed, would be stronger if it stood alone. Secondly, the Congress had always denied the validity of communalism in politics. It held that these two great causes the liberation of India and the uplift of the masses, were not affected by differences of religion. If the League leaders were sincere in their support of them, why should they not join the Congress and work for them within its ranks? Why, on the other hand, should the Congress, with an overwhelming majority in the Legislatures, hamper itself by an alliance with so small, so weak, and, in its opinion, so reactionary a body as the League, merely because it was Moslem?

Such, it is safe to assume, were the main reasons why the Congress leaders, in that fateful summer of 1937, decided to reject the League's advances and to seek to get rid of its opposition not by partnership but by absorption. And they looked, no doubt, beyond the Hindu-majority Provinces in which their power seemed unassailable whatever the minorities might do. It was in those Provinces that the League was strongest. Its collapse there would mean its collapse everywhere. Already one of the four Moslem-majority Provinces had become a 'Congress Province'. The mass of Moslems in the N. W. F. P., though not formally members of the Congress, had identified themselves with its policy. Their Premier was a Congressman, soon to become a member of the Working Committee. And, if the peculiar situation in the N. W. F. P., could not be reproduced in the Punjab or Bengal or Sind. the Congress minorities in all those Provinces were active and influential; and, once the League, which, whatever its weakness, was the only party capable of organizing a common Moslem opposition throughout India, was out of the way, the local Moselm leaders might be expected to come to terms, to accept the safeguards offered by the Congress, and to acquiesce in its claim that

its electoral predominance in British India taken as a whole should be reflected in due course at the Centre.

With these arguments and purposes in mind the Congress leaders put into operation a twofold policy. First, the leaders of the League in the U. P.—and the decision made there applied to the other 'Congress Provinces'—were plainly told that there would be no Coalition. One or two of them might become Ministers, but only if they became Congressmen. The League group in the Legislature must 'cease to function as a separate group' : It must be merged in the Congress Party : and its members must accept the majority decisions of the Party like any other members. Since the Congress seemed assured of an electoral majority in most, if not all of these Provinces for an indefinite time to come the choice thus presented to the League leaders was hard. They must either dissolve the League and be absorbed in an organization which, though non-communal in principle, was overwhelmingly Hindu in personnel, or lose all chance of office in their Provincial Government for as long ahead as they could see.

Secondly, the Congress launched what was known as a 'mass-contact' movement among the scattered Moslem country-folk. They were told that the Congress victory implied no threat to their religion; for the Congress was non-communal and had repeatedly pledged itself to safeguard the rights of all communities. The real issue was not communal but economic, and the Congress, not the League, was the champion of the poor and had put in hand a drastic policy of agrarian reform which would benefit Moslem peasants equally with Hindu. Let them, therefore, strengthen the hands of the Congress in its task of social uplift by joining those many Moslems who had been members of the Party since its birth.

In contrast with the campaign in the States this attempt to coerce the League was an unqualified failure.

The leaders of the Moslem League rejected the Congress ultimatum. They chose to stay in the political wilderness, with no hope of sharing in the prestige and emoluments and opportunities of public service which could only be obtained by absorption in the Congress. Mr. Jinnah's personal reaction was especially significant. He had never acquired the reputation of an intransigent communalist. On the contrary he had once been spoken of in Congress circles as 'the ambassador of Hindu-Moslem unity', and a passage in Pandit Nehru's autobiography describes him as 'largely responsible in the past for

bringing the Moslem League nearer to the Congress'. That this was still his policy in 1937 was implicit in the League's electoral manifesto. Thus the rejection of its offer of co-operation was a direct rebuff to him, and he sharply retaliated. So far from acquiescing in the Congress' claim to represent them, 'the Moslems' he declared, 'can expect neither justice nor fair play under the Congress government'. And it was soon clear that he was not speaking only for himself or only for the Moslems in the Congress Provinces. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Premier of the Punjab, advised the Moslem members of the Unionist Party to join the League, and similar declarations of support were made by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, Premier of Bengal, and Sir Muhammad Saadullah, Premier of Assam. The League had thus suddenly acquired a prestige among Moslems throughout India such as it had never enjoyed before ; and Mr. Jinnah, who was to be re-elected as its President in each successive year, had no less suddenly acquired a new personal authority. Always in the forefront of Indian politics, he had hitherto failed to command the confidence of his community as a whole. He had been a sectional rather than a communal leader, an outspoken anti-British nationalist, who had seemed to conservative-minded Moslems too 'Congress-minded' to be regarded as a whole-hearted champion of Islam. But now he was no longer one of several leaders. Hailed by vociferous Moslem crowds as the personification of the communal pride and pugnacity awakened by Congress policy, he was fast becoming *the* leader.

In the face of these developments it was difficult for Congressmen to go on saying that the League did not count and that the bulk of Moslem opinion was really on the Congress side. And soon there was still clearer proof that these pretensions were untenable. At its outset the 'mass-contact' movement seemed to be going well : numbers of country-folk were enrolled in the Congress ranks; one or two by-elections to Moslem seats were won by Moslem Congressmen. But before long the tide began to turn. The village *mullahs* told their flocks that to say that politics had nothing to do with religion was blasphemy; and the League politicians, warned by the Congress' example, began to extend their party organization to the countryside and seek contact with the Moslem masses. The results were soon apparent in the record of by-elections. All over India a swing to the League set in which has continued ever since. Between the general elections of 1937

and the summer of 1943* there were 61 by-elections to Moslem seats in the Provincial Legislatures, filled by separate Moslem electorates. Of these, the League (reckoning Moslem voters for the Punjab Unionist Party in this period as also voters for the League) won 47, independent Moslems 10, Congress Moslems 4. Of the 14 by-elections to the Central Legislature between 1934 and 1943 the League won 7 and the Congress 2.**

In the course of the next twelve months the temperature of the dispute was raised still higher by the publication of two documents, known as the *Pirpur* and *Shareef Reports*, and a third which was the personal production of Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, purporting to describe the grievances of the Moslems in most of the Congress Provinces. The official rebuttal of the League's charges might be regarded as partisan, but it was broadly confirmed by neutral observers. The Governor of the U. P , for example, after his retirement at the end of 1939, recorded his opinion that 'in dealing with communal issues' Ministers had 'normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair.'***
But such an impartial judgment was not to be expected among the Moslem masses. The publicity given to the reports confirmed the belief of the Moslems in the 'Congress Provinces' that they were doomed to the fate of underdogs, and sent a wave of angry sympathy running beyond their borders.

Among the educated Moslems, it may safely be said, the so-called 'atrocities' were not the main reason for their recoil from the Congress Raj. They rejected its claim to be super-communal ; they regarded. it as tantamount to a Hindu Raj ; but they can hardly hve supposed that it directly or immediately threatened the maintenance of their religious rights and customs. More disquieting was the prospect that Hindu political power would mean the strengthening of the strangle-

*The returns from the Punjab and the Central Provinces are up to July 1942.

**The persuasive influence of Congress propaganda on some publicists in the United States is illustrated by the following passage in Miss Kate Mitchell's *India, An American View*, an English edition, published in 1943, of a book published in America in 1942. 'The record of the League shows that it has never represented more than a fraction of the Moslem community . . . . Nor is there evidence that the League has substantially increased its following since the adoption of its "Pakistan" programme in 1940' (p. 27). The evidence of the by-elections is surely decisive, and inquiry in India would have provided it.

***Sir Harry Haig, *Asiatic Review*, July 1940, p. 428.

hold of Hindu business men, from the big capitalist to the little money-lender, on Moslem economic life. And behind that lay something still more menacing, if more impalpable. Though many of its members might be genuinely non-communal, the mentality of the Congress was essentially Hindu. It was largely inspired by Mr. Gandhi, who, though a sympathetic student of many religions, was confessedly devoted to the old traditions of Hinduism. Thus all Congress policy seemed in Moslem eyes to be threaded with Hindu ideas or tendencies. Ironically enough, it was one of the best features of the Congress regime, its active interest in popular education, which excited most suspiction. It was not only Mr. Gandhi's notorious enthusiasm for the teaching of basic handicrafts: Hindu schoolmasters in many schools required their pupils, whatever their faith, to accord a ceremonial, almost a religious reverence to the Mahatma. Some of the text-books, too, seemed to glorify Hinduism at the expense of Islam. Were not Moslem children being insensibly and insidiously indoctrinated with Hindu ways of thought? And the prospects in higher education seemed equally alarming. Moslem backwardness in this field was undeniable. Would the balance ever be redressed if political power was a permanent Hindu monopoly?

This exacerbation of the communal conflict could not be confined to the politicians. It was reflected in the vernacular newspapers. It excited the workers in the towns and created an atmosphere of suspense and alarm throughout the countryside. And inevitably the tension came to a head in a new outbreak of rioting and bloodshed. In the two years from October 1937, there were 85 serious riots, about 2,000 casualties and 170 deaths in British India. Such a record was unhappily no novelty, but there was a newfeature in this recrudescence of communal strife. It seemed to be less spontaneous, more deliberate, more persistent than before. Indian observers agreed with British officials that Hindu-Moslem relations had never in their experience been so bad. By the end of 1939 it was widely believed that, if the Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal fighting would have broken out on an unprecedented scale. The idea of a 'civil war' had been an almost inconceivable idea as long as British rule was still unquestioned, but now many Indians were saying it was coming.

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"THE ECONOMIST" ON THE EFFECT OF CONGRESS RULE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM SEPARATISM: 22 MARCH 1947

The adoption of territorial separatism as a policy by the Moslem League and the sweeping successes of the League [in the 1945-46 general elections] in getting the mass support of Moslems (which it had not previously had) were direct consequences of the attitude and behaviour of Congress after the elections of 1937. In the provinces where Congress Governments were formed there were various forms of discrimination against the Moslem community which the Moslem element in the Congress membership was unable to prevent, and the fear that Congress ascendancy at the centre would produce similar results for India as a whole led to a rapid spread of the belief that the interests of the Moslems would only be safe if they had a territory of their own of which they would be masters without interference.

Source: *The Economist*, London, 22 March 1947, p. 406.

PART XII

The Impact of Congress Rule on the Muslims

113

SIND PROVINCIAL MUSLIM LEAGUE CONFERENCE RESOLUTION : KARACHI : 7-9 OCTOBER 1938

Whereas the refusal on the part of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress to negotiate a communal settlement with the All India Muslim League, on the plea that the All India Muslim League is not the sole representative body of the Mussalmans of India, indicates the Congress resolve to perpetually divide and rule the Muslim Community, and thus once more mar the prospects of an amicable and peaceful solution of the Indian minorities problem, for which the League has tried in vain for more than 15 years.

Whereas the Congress has, by means of its powerful press and purse, launched a campaign of Muslim Mass Contact to cause disruption and division in the Muslim community with the object of deceiving the world into the belief that it is the sole representative organisation of entire India.

Where it has deliberately established purely Hindu rule in certain provinces by forming ministries either without Muslim ministers or with Muslim ministers having no following among Muslim Members, in direct and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Government of India Act 1935 and the Instrument of Instructions.

Whereas the ministries so formed have established a sort of rule which has for its aim the intimidation and demoralisation of Muslims, the extermination of healthy and nation-building influences of Muslim culture, the suppression of Muslim religious customs and their religious

Source: *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from October 1937 to December 1938*, All India Muslim League Office, Delhi, n.d., Annexture, Resolution no. 5, pp. 65-68.

obligations and elimination of their political rights as a separate community.

Whereas it has in open defiance of the democratic principles persistently endeavoured to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and impotent in the North Western Provinces *sic.*, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind by trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslim members and the Muslim masses of those provinces.

Whereas the Congress has superimposed the authority of its High Command. a sort of fascist dictatorship, over the working of the Congress ministries to prevent the healthy growth of parliamentary conventions and establishment of constitutional traditions, to deprive the Muslims of their due share and have refused to reconstitute ministries in consonance with the constitution, having due regard to the rights and interests of Muslims.

Whereas the Congress have decided :—

(*a*) to enforce Vidya Mandir Scheme in the teeth of Muslim opposition ;

(*b*) to foist the Bande-Matram on Muslims and others as a national anthem in callous disregard of the feelings of Muslims who consider the song not only as idolatrous but it is in origin and conception a hymn of hatred to Muslims ;

(*c*) to make Hindi with Devangiri [*sic.*] script as the Lingua Franca of India in total defiance of the protests and wishes of the minorities with a view to inculcate *sic.* Hindu religious ideas, philosophy and culture and establish dominance of Brahmanic culture in India;

(*d*) to introduce and enforce joint electorates in local bodies with the strength of their majority and thus deprive Muslims of securing their true representation ;

(*e*) to close Urdu Schools wherever possible and discourage the teaching of the Urdu language, and thus ultimately wipe it off ;

(*f*) to suppress freedom of press and freedom of speech and legitimate action under the pretext of preventing incitement to violance [*sic.*] and maintenance of law and order ;

(*g*) to interfere with the age-long religious privileges and usages of the Muslim community by force of arm and resort to repressive measures.

Whereas the majority community of India has fostered and maintained since thousands of years a rigid caste system of theirs which is a negative *sic.* of nationalism, equality, democracy and all the noble ideals that the modern world aspires to and stands for and which system has further superimposed social and economic inequalities upon a vast body of the people of this country and reduced millions of them to the position of irredeemable helots.

And whereas the evolution of a single united India and united Indian nation inspired by common inspirations and common ideals being impossible of realisation on account of the caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim policy of the majority community, and also on account of acute differences of religion, language, script, culture, social laws and outlook on life of the two major communities and even of race in certain parts.

This Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to All India Muslim League to review and revise the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status due to them, and that this conference therefore recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence.

Further this conference records its emphatic disapproval of the scheme of the All India Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 and is opposed to its introduction and urges upon the British Government to refrain from its enforcement as it considers the scheme to be detrimental to the interests of the people of India generally and those of the Muslims in particular.

That this conference further declares that no constitution by whomsoever framed will be acceptable to the Muslims of India unless it conforms to the principle enunciated above and is prepared in consultation with and accepted by All India Muslim League.

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ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE WORKING COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON SCHEMES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIA : MEERUT : 26 MARCH 1939

Whereas the All India Muslim League is opposed to the Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act 1935 and whereas the working of the provincial part of the Constitution has created grave apprehensions amongst Muslims and other minorities regarding their future, because the Provincial scheme has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of the Muslim minorities in various provinces, and whereas by a resolution passed at the Patna Session in December 1938 the President of the All India Muslim League was authorised to adopt such course as was necessary with a view to explore [*sic.*] the possibility of a suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities, the President with the concurrence of the Working Committee hereby appoints a committee of the following gentlemen to examine various schemes already propounded by those who are fully versed in the Constitutional developments of India and other countries and those that may be submitted hereafter to the President and report to the Working Committee their conclusions at an early date :—

1. Mr. M. A. Jinnah (President)
2. The Hon. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan
3. Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan Saheb
4. Syed Abdul Aziz Saheb
5. Sir Abdoola Haroon

Source : *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, All India Muslim League Office, Delhi, n.d., Resolution No. 4, pp. 1-2.

6. The Hon. Sir Kh. Nazimuddin
7. Abdul Matin Choudhri Saheb
8. Sardar Aurangzeb Khan Saheb
9. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan Saheb (Convener).

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EXTRACTS FROM M. A. JINNAH'S STATEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA : OCTOBER-NOVEMBER (?) 1939

But, since the inauguration of the new provincial constitution, it has been established beyond doubt particularly by the way in which the Congress High Command has pursued its policies and programmes, that the sole aim and object of the Congress is to annihilate every other organisation in the country, and to set itself up as a fascist and authoritarian organisation of the worst type.

Having regard to the 35 millions of voters, the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate and untutored, living in centuries-old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other, culturally and socially, the working of this constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India. It has definitely resulted in a permanent communal majority government ruling over minorities, exercising its powers and functions and utilising the machinery of Government to establish the domination and supremacy of the majority communal rule over the minorities.

Therefore, in my judgment, apart from other reasons into which I need not go in detail, democracy can only mean Hindu raj all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never submit. Besides, there are 60 million untouchables and other minorities, such as six million Christians, Jews, Parsis and the domiciled British. Therefore, the Muslim League, after very careful consideration, has come to the

Source : *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (ed. by Jamiluddin Ahmad), Lahore, 5th. ed. October 1952, Vol. I, pp. 99-101.

conclusion that the entire problem of India's future constitution must be considered *de novo*; and that no declaration or commitment should be made by His Majesty's Government without the approval and consen, of the Muslim League which is the only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India.

The British public may be misled by certain propaganda that the Muslims are against the freedom of India. We want freedom and liberty, but the question is, whose freedom and liberty? Muslim India wants to be free and enjoy liberty to the fullest extent and develop its own political, economic, social and cultural institutions according to its own genius, and not to be dominated and crushed, while wishing Hindu India well and giving it fullest scope to do likewise.

The Congress insistence that they, and they alone, represent the peoples of India is not only without any foundation but is highly detrimental to the progress and advancement of India. They know that they do not represent the whole of India—not even all the Hindus, and certainly not the Muslims, who are often wrongly described as a minority in the ordinary sense as understood in the West. They are in a majority in the North-West and in Bengal, all along the corridor stretching from Karachi to Calcutta. That part of the Indian continent alone has double the population of Great Britain and is more than 10 times in area. Until the Congress come down to earth and face realities, they will be wholly responsible for blocking the progress of India, and unless they give up the fascist and authoritarian basis of their policy and programme which they are vigorously following, there cannot be any peace in India.

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EXTRACTS FROM M. A. JINNAH'S ARTICLE IN THE "TIME AND TIDE" (LONDON) ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL MALADIES OF INDIA : 19 JANUARY (?) 1940

Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is the disease in the body politic. Let us now consider the inevitable symptoms.

Led by an astute Hindu politician of the first rank, Mr. Gandhi, the Congress (which is mainly a Hindu body) had long foreseen that in the Western form of democracy lay the fulfilment of their hopes of permanent all-India dominance. All their efforts and energies had, therefore, been bent towards securing for India a completely democratic form of government and they realised that the new constitution would bring their goal immeasurably nearer if it could be worked on lines chalked out by their leader and the Working Committee.

Therefore, while crying that the new constitution was thoroughly unsatisfactory and totally unacceptable, the Congress decided to contest the elections held before the inauguration and, as was inevitable, secured complete majority in the six Hindu provinces of India, namely, Bombay, Madras, U.P., C.P., Bihar and Orissa. The Congress, however, was as completely defeated in the five Muslim provinces, namely, Bengal, Punjab, Sind, N. W. F. [*sic.*] and Assam and even in the Hindu provinces failed to capture any appreciable number of seats in non-Hindu costituencies, particularly Muslim electorates.

This, undoubtedly, was an unsatisfactory situation for a self-styled "national" party and exposure of its communal character seemed

Source: *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (ed. by Jamiluddin Ahmad), Lahore, 5th. ed. 1952, Vol. I, pp. 131-137.

imminent. Rushing to Wardha for guidance, the Working Committee took stock. What was the position? In five provinces they had been defeated and while they held a complete majority in six, the oppositions, weak in numbers though they were, were led by the small but solid blocks of Muslim League members.

This situation had two very unsatisfactory aspects. First it brought out the completely Hindu composition of the Congress and secondly, it would be difficult to ignore and override Muslim-led oppositions as long as [the] Governors of the Provinces were in possession of special powers granted to safeguard minority interests. Realising at once that such circumstances would considerably hinder their plans the Congress played its trump card. It refused to accept office. To the consternation of the Muslims and other minorities, overnight, the Viceroy and the Governors became the suppliants. What would the Congress have them do? What assurances did the Congress need? The answer was ready. Give us the undertaking that you will not exercise your special powers and we will accept office. Hastily, the constitutional guardians of minority and other rights jettisoned their trust and, amidst much mutual appreciation of each other's "statesmanship", the Congress and the British Government came into political alliance. Victory number one.

But there was still that troublesome first point. The whole game would be up if purely Hindu Governments took office and in at least three of the six provinces not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket and not more than one or two in the others. But what of it? Surely there must be at least one amongst the Muslim members who would be unable to resist the bait of a ministership. They would offer the ministership provided he signed the Congress pledge.

But would the Governor agree to this camouflage? What did his Instrument of Instructions advise? "In making appointments to his Council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavour to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, in consultation with the person who in his judgment is likely to command a stable majority in the legislature to appoint those persons (including, so far as practicable, members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature. But in so acting he shall bear in mind the need of fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers."

Anxiously the Working Committee analysed the implication. The instructions seemed to be in two parts. In the first the Governor was instructed to use "his best endeavour to select as ministers . . . persons (including as far as practicable members of important minority communities . . .". The spirit underlying these words was clear. It was to secure important minorities a Minister who commanded their confidence and since there was no difference in the political programmes of the Congress and Muslim League parties in the legislatures, there was no reason why it was not "practicable" for a Muslim League member to be appointed a Minister.

But what about the last words: "But in so acting he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among the Ministers"? This fortunately could be turned to suit their purpose if the Governor was prepared to allow this second part, advisory and subsidiary to the main instruction, to overrule the first.

They had but to claim that joint responsibility was impossible unless the Muslim Minister was prepared to abide by the decisions of the Working Committee and their point was won. Meekly the Governors acquiesced and in order to allow the Congress to deceive the public by making it appear that it was "national" and looking after the interests of the minorities by including a "representative" of them in the Council of Ministers, accepted as Muslim Ministers individuals who by no stretch of imagination could be regarded as representatives of the Muslim community and who, by signing the Congress pledge, were responsible to the Working Committee alone. Victory number two.

Surprised by such victories, the Congress became intoxicated with power. The Working Committee arrogated to itself the position of a parallel central government to whom the provincial governments were responsible. Regional dictators were appointed, and the Ministers were entirely subject to their orders generally, and no provincial legislation could be enacted without their approval. They then proceeded to stifle even the little opposition that existed. Having dealt with the British, they now dealt with the Muslims.

An India-wide attack on the Muslims was launched. In the five Muslim provinces every attempt was made to defeat the Muslim-led coalition ministries and by offering local political leaders ministerships and other inducements, Congress ministries came into power in the two other provinces, N. W. F., and Assam. In the six Hindu Provinces a

"kulturkampf" was inaugurated. Attempts were made to have *Bande Matram*, the Congress party song, recognised as the "National Anthem"; the party flag recognised as the national flag, and the real national language Urdu supplanted by *Hindi*. Everywhere oppression commenced and complaints poured in such force into the Muslim League's Central Office that the Pirpur Committee, whose report is available, was appointed to investigate those grievances. Such overwhelming evidence was collected that the Muslims, despairing of the Vicroy and the Governors ever taking action to protect them have lately been forced to ask for a Royal Commission to investigate into their grievances.

Such was the position on the eve of the resignations of the Congress ministries, a position over which the British people might well ponder. Is it their desire that India should become a totalitarian Hindu State with the Central and all the Provincial Governments responsible not to their legislatures or to the electorate but to a caucus, unknown to the constitution, the Working Committee of the Congress? They may rest assured that such will be the inevitable result if the Congress demand for the right of framing India's constitution through a constituent assembly is conceded.

Let us consider briefly the implications of this nebulous and impracticable Constituent Assembly. To commence with, the question arises why is this demand made at this particular time. The answer is obvious. The War is to the Working Committee a heaven-sent means to increasing its rule from over eight provinces to over the whole of India, States and Provinces. If the British Government are stampeded and fall into the trap under the stress of the critical situation created by the War, India will face a crisis the result of which no man could prophesy, and I feel certain that Muslim India will never submit to such a position and will be forced to resist it with every means in their power.

And of what type of constitutionalists will this Constituent Assembly consist? There are in India roughly 400,000,000 souls who, through no fault of their own, are hopelessly illiterate and consequently priest and caste-ridden. They have no real conception of how they are being governed even today and it is proposed that to the elected representatives of such should India's future constitution be entrusted. Is it too much to say that, since the vast majority of the elected representatives will be illiterate Hindus, the Constituent Assembly will be

under the influence of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders and the constitution that will emerge will be as the Working Committee direct?

Thus, through the Constituent Assembly, will the Working Committee gain its ends. British control and commerce will disappear, the Indian States will be abolished; minority opposi tion will be stifled and a great Hindu nation will emerge governed by its beloved leader, Mr. Gandhi, and the Congress Working Committee !

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EXTRACT FROM M.A. JINNAH'S SPEECH BEFORE THE ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE COUNCIL: DELHI: 25 FEBRUARY, 1940

The last demand of the League related to the Muslim grievances in the Congress-governed provinces. It was true that the Governor-General could not intervene when the Congress ministries did not exist. The question, however, had two aspects. Firstly, we made it abundantly clear that the Muslims had been oppressed in the Congress-governed provinces, and members of the League were made special targets. The Congress High Command characterised these statements as false, but was willing to set up a judicial tribunal. The proposal was absurd for reasons already given. On the other hand I offered to accept a Royal Commission consisting of two judges of the English High Court, and presided over by a Lord of the Privy Council. Such a tribunal, completely detached from the poisoned atmosphere of the country, and equipped with the necessary powers to examine witnesses on oath and compel the production of documents, was the only one that could have done justice. But that proposal was treated by the Congress with derision on the ground that we were invoking foreign aid in our domestic affairs, as if Sir Maurice Gwyer, proposed by them, was a *swadeshi* or born in Wardha !

Source : *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (ed. by Jamiluddin Ahmad), Lahore, 5th. ed. October 1952, Vol. I, p. 151.

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ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE FAILURE OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY: DELHI 25 FEBRUARY 1940

In view of the fact that the Muslims of India as well as some other classes of people living in the country have clearly demonstrated by their observance of the Day of Deliverance on December 22, 1939, that the scheme of provincial autonomy as worked in the Congress-governed provinces was a complete failure and detrimental to the interests of the Muslims and the country as a whole, the Council of the All India Muslim League expresses its dissatisfaction with the speech of H.E. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, delivered on January 10, 1940, at the Orient Club, Bombay, wherein he speaks of the success of the scheme of provincial autonomy in the Bombay Presidency.

This meeting of the Council of the Muslim League further places on record its sense of bitter resentment at the statement of the Under Secretary of State for India, wherein he gave the reasons of His Majesty's Government for not accepting the proposal for a Royal Commission of Inquiry, put forward by the President of the League, to inquire into complaints of oppression in Congress-governed provinces and deeply deplores the colossal ignorance of conditions prevailing in India on the part of the Under Secretary of State.

Source : *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, published by Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary, All India Muslim League, Delhi, n.d., p. 40, Resolution no. 9.

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RESULTS OF BY-ELECTIONS IN MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES TO THE CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES: 1 JANUARY 1938—12 SEPTEMBER 1942

		Number of by-elections	*Candidates elected*		
			Moslem League	Congress	Independents etc.
Central Legislature	Upper House	1	..	..	1
	Lower House	5	4	1	..
Madras	Upper House	..	..	..	..
	Lower House	1	1	..	..
Bombay	Upper House	1	1	..	..
	Lower House	3	2	..	1
Bengal	Upper House	6	5	..	1
	Lower House	7	7	..	..
United Provinces	Upper House	5	3	..	2
	Lower House	2	1	..	1

Source: R. Coupland: *Indian Politics 1936-1942: The Second Part of a Report on the Constitutional Problem in India submitted to the Warden and Fellows of Nuffield College*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, London, 1943, p. 333 (Appendix VI).

		Number of by-elections	*Candiates elected*		
			Moslem League	Congress	Independents etc.
Punjab	.. .. ..	12	12*	..	..
Bihar	Upper House	1	1	..	..
	Lower House	3	3	..	..
Central Provinces	.. ..	2	2	..	..
Assam	Upper House	1	..	..	1
	Lower House	..	..	..	..
North-West Frontier Province		4	3	1	..
Orissa	.. .. ..	..	..	..	..
Sind	.. .. ..	2	1	1	..
Total	..	56	46	3	7

*These seats were won by the Unionist Party in alliance with the Moslem League.

APPENDICES AND NOTES

APPENDIX I

Hindu Mahasaba Policy 1936-1939

A

EXTRACTS FROM SANKARA-CHARYA'S (DR. KURKROTI) PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: LAHORE: 21 OCTOBER 1936

I affirm that in Hindusthan the national race, religion and language ought to be that of the Hindus. With this as the basic principle of our national constitution joint electorates without any reservation of seats for particular groups or communities offer the right solution of the problem of minority representation. It will be in conformity with the highest ideals of democracy and also in keeping with the principles of equality and other tenets for which Hinduism stands. But if any guarantee or safeguard for the protection of any minorities is needed, the Minority Guarantee Treaties of the League of Nations provide it most effectively.

Let us see that our Muslim friends get all the protection that is necessary in the three spheres of religion, race and language wherever it is administratively feasible. Again, it must be remembered that the minority question in Hindusthan is one single Muslim question. It cannot be divided into provincial minority questions. Let us thoroughly realize the fact that according to the scheme the League has devised the religion, race and language of the majority community of a state (of Hindus in Hindusthan) shall be the national religion, race and language in every part, and in every province of the state even if the majority community of the state happens to be in minority in a particular province (e.g. the Punjab, Bengal, etc). This, I believe, is the fullest implication of the minority guarantee treaties and their logical application to the minority problems in Hindustan.

Source: *The Indian Annual Register 1936*. Calcutta, 1937, Vol. II, p. 256.

B

EXTRACTS FROM V.D. SAVARKAR'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: NAGPUR: 28 DECEMBER 1938

19. Knowing it then for certain that the Indian Moslems, for reasons some of which are referred to above, are about the last people to join the Hindus in forming any common political Nation on equal footing in India based on the only common bond of our territorial unity, out of a merely territorial Indian Patriotism, let us Hindu sanghatanists first correct the original mistake, the original political sin which our Hindu Congressites most unwillingly committed at the beginning of the Indian National Congress movement and are persistentlyc ommitting still of running after the mirage of a territorial Indian Nation and of seeking to kill as an impediment in that fruitless pursuit the lovegrowth [*sic.*] of an organic Hindu Nation. Let us Hindus resume the thread of our national life where, as I have shown in section 7 of this address our grandfather [*sic*]. left it at the fall of our Maratha and Sikh Hindu Empires. The life and organic growth of the self-conscious Hindu Nation that was suddenly struck with an atrophy of self-forgetfulness must again be revived, resurrected. Let us therefore boldly reproclaim even in the words of Govindrao Kale who wrote them so early as in 1793 in his letter quoted in section 6 above that the land which extends from the Indus to the Southern seas is Hindusthan—the land of the Hindus and we Hindus are the Nation that owns it. If you call it an Indian Nation it is merely an English synonym for the Hindu Nation. To us Hindus Hindusthan and India mean one and the same thing. We are Indians because we are Hindus and vice versa.

Yes, we Hindus are a Nation by ourselves. Because, religious, racial, cultural, historical affinities bind us intimately into an homogen-

Source: *The Indian Annual Register, 1938,* Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, pp. 328-329.

ous nation and added to it we are most pre-eminently gifted with a territorial unity as well. Our racial being is identified with India—Our beloved Fatherland and our Holy land, above all and irrespective of it all we Hindus will be a Nation and therefore we are a Nation. None has a right to challenge or demand a proof of our common nationality when some thirty crores of us are with it.

It is absurd to call us a community in India. The Germans are the nation in Germany and the Jews a community. The Turks are the Nation in Turkey and the Arab or the Armenian minority community. Even so the Hindus are the nation in India, in Hindusthan, and the Moslem minorities a community.

Referring to the Sudetan Germans the leaders of the Moslem League threatened us the other day at their Karachi Session that if their demands in overriding the Hindus are not granted in India they would play the part of the Sudetan Germans and call in their Moslem coreligionist powers across the border inside India to their help as the Sudetan Germans called the Germans in Sudetan. To that threat I retort that our friends in the Moslem League should not cry till they are out of the woods. They should remember that their illustration cuts both ways. If they grow stronger they can play the part of the Sudetan Germans alright [*sic.*]. But if we Hindus in India grow stronger in time Moslem friends of the League type will have to play the part of German Jews instead. We Hindus have taught the Shakas and the Huns already to play that part pretty well. So it is no use bandying words till the test comes. The taste of the pudding lies in the eating.

C

MAHASABHA RESOLUTION ON MUSIC BEFORE MOSQUES : NAGPUR : 29-30 DECEMBER 1938

The Hindu Mahasabha declares that it is the social and religious as also the civic right of the Hindus to carry without let or hindrance their processions accompanied by music along all public roads at all times. This right has also been, from time to time, upheld by Courts of Law.

The Hindu Mahasabha, therefore, strongly resents the unwarrantable demands made by the Muslim community for stopping music on public roads, in temples and even in private places before and near the mosques in utter disregard of the religious, civic and legal rights of the Hindus and condemns the action of Government in restricting these rights in response to this demand.

The Mahasabha therefore calls upon the Hindus to assert and maintain this right in face of all opposition, whether private or official, ignoring all risks involved.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 338.

D

MAHASABHA RESOLUTION ON THE SHUDDHI MOVEMENT : NAGPUR : 29-30 DECEMBER 1938

With a view to secure [*sic.*] the benefits of the noble teachings of the Hindu Religion and Culture to non-Hindus, and in view of the serious inroads that are being systematically made by other religions and cultures upon the Hindudom the Hindu Mahasabha calls upon all sections of the Hindu Nation to organise and consolidate themselves by whole heartedly supporting the Shuddhi Movement by offering all reasonable opportunities to those who desire to be converted or reconverted to Hinduism, by extending to them all the rights and privileges which the other Hindus enjoy.

The Sabha impresses the political significance of the Shuddhi Movement and is of opinion that when political strength of a community depends on the number of the representatives in proportion to its population, the decrease in the numerical strength of the Hindus caused by conversion to non-Hindu Faiths has told and must tell upon their political strength in the Legislatures as well—therefore the Shuddhi Movement constitutes not only a cultural and religious but a political necessity too.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 339.

E

MAHASABHA RESOLUTION ON NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND SCRIPT: NAGPUR: 29-30 DECEMBER 1938

The Hindu Mahasabha declares that Hindi (not Hindusthani—rather 'Sanskrit nistha' Hindi) that is based on and drawing its nourishment from Sanskrit vocabulary is and rightfully deserves to be the National Language and Devnagri as the National Script of Hindusthan. The Mahasabha strongly condemns the overt attempts made by the Indian National Congress in general and the Congress Governments in particular to make Hindusthani as the Lingua Franca of this country in craven fear of, and with a view to placate [*sic.*], the Moslem opinion in this behalf. The Mahasabha calls upon the Hindu community to resist stoutly by all means in its power all such attempts to recognise and encourage Hindusthani in perference to Hindi.

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1939, Vol. II, p. 339.

APPENDIX II

List of Muslim Legislators 1937-1939

A

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

The Council of State

Official:

S. A. Hydari

Non-Official:

Sir Rahimtoola Chinoy
Sir Muhammad Yakub
Kunwar Hajee Ismail Alikhan
Nawabzada Khurshid Ali Khan
Khan Bahadur Shams-ud-Din Haidar
Lieut.-Col. Sir S. Hissam-ud-Din Bahadur

Elected Non-Official:

Saiyad Muhammad Padshah
Sirdar Saheb Sir Suleman Cassum
Khan Bahadur Ali Buksh [*sic.*] Muhammad Hussain
Khan Bahadur Syed Ihtisham Hyder Chaudhury
Abdool Razak Hajee Abdul Sattar
Haji Syed Muhammad Hussain
Chaudhri Niamatullah
Choudhri Ataullah Khan Tarar
Hossain Imam
Maulavi Ali Asgar [*sic.*] Khan

Source : *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Calcutta, 1938, Vol. I, pp. 78-80, 127-129, 145-147, 164-166. 177-179, 202-203, 226-227, 234-235, 248, 260, 271, 279; *Return showing the Results of the General Election to the Legislative Assembly in India, 1934*, London, 1935, Cmd. 4939, pp. 7-14; *Return showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, Cmd. 5589, pp. 17-117.

The Legislative Assembly

President :

The Hon'ble Sir Abdur Rahim

Elected Non-Officials :

Umar Aly Shah (Madras)
Maulvi Syed Murtaza Sahib Bahadur (Madras)
H. A. Sathar [*sic.*] H. Essak Sait (Madras)

Hooseinbhoy A. Lalljee (Bombay)
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Bombay)
Nabi Baksh Illahi Bakhsh Bhutto (Bombay)
Seth Haji Abdoola Haroon (Bombay)
Mian Ghulamkadir Muhammad Shahban (Bombay)

Sir Abdur Rahim (Bengal)
Hajee Chowdhury Muhammad Ismail Khan (Bengal)
Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi (Bengal)
Chowdhury Sekandar Ali (Bengal)
K. Ahmad (Bengal)

Maulana Shaukat Ali (United Provinces)
Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi (United Provinces)
Sir Muhammad Yamin Khan (United Provinces)
Maulvi Abdul Wazid (United Provinces)
Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad (United Provinces)
Muhammad Azhar Ali (United Provinces)

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Punjab)
H. M. Abdullah (Punjab)
Nawab Sahibzada Sayad Sir Muhammad Mehr Shah (Punjab)
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Fazl-i-Haq Piracha (Punjab)
Khan Bahadur Nawab Mukdum Murid Hossain Qureshi (Punjab)

M. Ghiasuddin

Muhammad Ahsan (Bihar and Orissa)
Maulvi Muhammad Abdul Ghani (Bihar and Orissa)

Khan Sahib Nawab Siddique Ali Khan (Central Provinces and Berar)

Abdur Rasheed Choudhury (Assam)

M. Asaf Ali (Delhi)

Abdul Qaiyum (North-West Frontier Province)

Nominated Officials:

Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan
Khan Sahib Shaikh Fazl-i-Elahi

Nominated Non-Officialls:

Captain Sardar Sir Sher Nawab Muhammad Khan
Major Nawab Sir Ahmad Nawaz Khan
Khan Bahadur Sir Abdul Hamid
Lieut.-Col. M. A. Rahman
Shams-ul-Ulama Kamaluddin Ahmad

Secretary: Mian Muhammad Rafi

B

MEMBERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

The Bombay Legislative Council

Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim, Bart.
Dr. K. A. Hamied
Khan Saheb Abdul Kadir Abdul Aziz
Khan Saheb Muhammad Ibrahim Makan
Muhammad Amin Wazeer Muhammad Tambe

The Bombay Legislative Assembly

Abdul Latif Haji Hajrat Khan Bahadur
Ali Bahadur Bahadur Khan
Husein Abubaker Begmuhammad
Khan Saheb Abdullah Haji Isa Bhagat
Sir Ali Muhammad Khan Dehlavi
Khan Saheb Faiz Muhammad Khan Mohabat Khan
Abdulmajeed Abdulkader Gheewale
Khan Saheb Abdurrahim Buboo Hakeem
Abdul Karim Aminsab Hanagi
Shaikh Muhammad Hassan
Khaleelulla Abasaheb Janvekar
Kazi Khwaja Bashiruddin Khwaja Moinuddin
Aziz Ghafur Kazi
Muhammad Musa Killedar
Akhtar Hasan Mirza
Muhammad Sulaiman Cassum Mitha
Muhammadali Allabux
Muhammad Yasin Nuri
Ismail Musa Patel

Musaji Eusufji Patel
Khan Bahadur Sardr Haji Rais
Sardar Mahboobali Khan Akbarkhan Savanur
Shaikh Jan Muhammad Haji Shaikh Kalla Khan
Ismail Hassan Siddiqui
Ahmad Ebrahim Singapori
Mrs. Fazi B. Tyabji
Khan Bahadur Yusuf Abdula

The Bengal Legislative Council

Khan Bahadur M. Shamsuzzoha
Mesbahuddin Ahmad
Khan Bahadur Subid Ali Molla
Muhammad Hussain
Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan
Humayun Kabir
Kader Bukhsh
Nawabzada Kamruddin Haider
Hamidul Chowdhury
Khan Bahadur Syed Muazzamuddin Hosain

The Bengal Legislative Assembly

Khan Bahadur M. Azizul Haq (*Speaker*)
M. Ashrafali (*Deputy Speaker*)
A. K. Fazlul Haq
Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin
Nawab Khwaja Habibullah Bahadur of Dacca
H. S. Suhrawardy
Nawab Mosharraf Hossain Khan Bahadur
M. A. H. Ispahani
Khwaja Nooruddin
Khan Saheb Maulvi Muhammad Solaiman
Maulvi Abul Hashim
Maulvi Muhammad Abdur Rasheed
Dr. Syed Muhammad Siddique
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Alfazuddin Ahmad
Maulvi Abul Quassem
Khan Saheb Maulvi S. Abdur Rauf
Jasimuddin Ahmad

Yousuf Mirza
Khan Bahadur A. F. M. Abdur Rahman
Shamsuddin Ahmad
Muhammad Mohsin Ali
Maulvi Aftab Hossain Joardar
Maulvi Abdul Bari
Sahibzada Kawan Jah Syed Kazem Ali Mirza
Mr. Farhad Raza Chowdhury
Syed Nausher Ali
Maulvi Waliur Rahman
Serajul Islam
Khan Bahadur Maulana Ahmed Ali Enayetpuri
Abdul Hakeem
Syed Jalaluddin Hashemy
Syed Mustagawsal Haque
Maulvi Maniruddin Akhand
Maulvi Muhammad Amir Ali Mia
Maulvi Moslem Ali Molla
Maulvi Hafizuddin Choudhury
Maulvi Mafizuddin Choudhury
Maulvi Abdul Jabbar
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Mahtabuddin Ahmed
Khan Bahadur A. M. L. Rahaman
Haji Safiruddin Ahmad
Shah Abdur Rauf
Kazi Emdadul Haque
Mia Abdul Hafiz
Maulvi Abu Hossein Sarkar
Ahmed Hossain
Maulvi Rajibuddin Tarafdar
Maulvi Muhammad Ishaque
Dr. Mafizuddin Ahmed
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ali
Maulvi Azhar Ali
A. M. Abdul Hamid
Abdur Raschid Mahmood
Abdulla Al-Mahmood
Muhammad Barat Ali

Maulvi Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury
Maulvi Idrees Ahmed Mia
Khwaja Shahabuddin
Maulana Muhammad Abdul Aziz
S. A. Salim
Maulvi Muhammad Abdul Hakim Vikrampure
Razaur Rahman Khan
Maulvi Aulad Hossain Khan
Maulvi Abdul Latif Biswas
Maulvi Muhammad Abdus Shaheed
Khan Bahadur Syed Abdul Hafiz
Fazlur
Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Palwan
Giasuddin Ahmed
Abdul Karim
Maulvi Abdul Majid
Maulvi Abdul Wahed
Maulana Shamsul Huda
Maulvi Abdul Hakim
Maulvi Masud Ali Khan Panni
Mirza Abdul Hafiz
Syed Hasan Ali Choudhury
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Kabiruddin Khan
Abul Hossain Ahmed
Maulvi Muhammad Israil
Maulvi Abdul Hamid Shah
Khan Saheb Hamiduddin Ahmed
Shamsuddin Ahmed Khandaker
Maulvi Ahmed Ali Mridha
Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan
Yusuf Ali Choudhury
Muhammad Abul Fazl
Al-Hadj Gyasuddin Ahmed Chaudhury
Abdul Kader alias Al Meah
Khan Saheb Maulvi Hatemally Jamada
Khan Saheb Maulvi Syed Muhammad Afzal
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Hashem Ali Khan
Sadaruddin Ahmed

Abdul Wahab Khan
Maulvi Muhammad Mazammel Huq
Haji Maulvi Tofel Ahmed Choudhury
Maulvi Mustafa Ali Dewan
Nawabzada K. Nasarullah
Maqbul Hosain
Maulvi Mafizuddin Ahmed
Ramizuddin Ahmed
Asimuddin Ahmed
Maulvi Muhammad Hasanuzemman
Maulvi Jenab Ali Majumdar
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Abidur Reza Choudhury
Shabedali
Maulvi Muhammad Ibrahim
Maulvi Aminullah
Shah Syed Golam Sarwar Hosaini
Syed Ahmed Khan
Syed Abdul Majid
Maulvi Abdur Razzak
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Jalaluddin Ahmed
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Anwarul Azim
Maulana Muhammad Maniruzzaman Islamabadi
Al-Haj Maulana Dr. Sanaullah
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Fazlul Qadir
Mrs. Hasina Murshed
Begum Farhat Bano Khanam
Abdur Rahman Siddiqui
Aftab Ali
A. M. A. Zaman
Fazlur Rahaman

The Madras Legislative Council

Munshi Abdul Wahab
Syed Abdul Wahab Bukhari
S.K. Ahmed Meeran
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Ghulam Jilani Quraishi
Khan Bahadur Hamid Sultan Marakkayar
Khan Bahadur T. M. Moidu
Khan Bahadur Sir Muhammad Usman

The Madras Legislative Assembly

Abdul Hamid Khan
Arakal Sultan Abdur Rahman Ali Rajah
K. Abdur Rahman Khan
D. Abdur Rawoof
Ahmed Thambi Muhammad Mohideen Maracair
Ahmed Badsha Sahib
Khan Bahadur P. M. Attakoya Thangal
Bashir Ahmad Sayeed
S. Ghouse Mohideen
H. S. Hussain
Mrs. Khadija Yakub Hassan
Khan Bahadur P. Khalif-ul-Lah
Mahboob Ali Baig
Mir Akram Ali
K. S. Muhammad Abdul Kadir Ravuttar
Muhammad Abdur Rahman
Dr. Muhammad Abdus Salam
Muhammad Schamnad Khan Bahadur
K. Muhammad Rahmatullah
D. Saiyed Ibrahim
Khan Sahib K. A. Sheik Dawood
Sheik Mansoor Tharaganar
Yakub Hassan

The United Provinces Legislative Council

Begum Aizaz Rasul (*Deputy President*)
Nawab Ismail Ahmed Khan
Muhammad Faiyaz Khan
Dr. Mahmud Ullah Jung
Khan Bahadur Syed Ahmad Husain Rizvi
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Zaki
Syed Agha Haider
Khan Bahadur Syed Ali Akbar Ali Khan
Muhammad Abid Khan Sherwani
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Massod-uz-Zaman
Hafiz Ahmed Husain
Waheed Ahmad
Muhammad Faruq

Khan Bahadur Haji Maulvi Muhammad Nisarullah
Syed Kalbe Abbas
Choudhury Akhtar Husain
Izhar Ahmad Faruqi
Risaldar Major and Honorary Captain Amir Muhammad Khan
Lady Wazir Hasan

The United Provinces Legislative Assembly

Abdul Hakeem (*Deputy Speaker*)
Rafi Ahmad Kidwai
Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim
Muhammad Suleman Ansari
Muhammad Ismail Khan
Shaikh Ghalib Rasul
Khan Bahadur Hafiz Ghazanfarullah
Aziz Ahmad Khan
Maulvi Karimul Raza Khan
Khan Bahadur Akhtar Adil
Captain Haji Nawab Bahadur Muhammad Abdus Sami Khan
Dr. Abdus Samad
Zahur Ahmad
Muhammad Ekram Khan
S. M. Rizwan Allah
Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman
Muhammad Wasim
Qazi Abdul Wali
Maulvi Munfait Ali
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Muhammad Ziaul Haq
Sahibzada Sayed Hasan Ali Khan
Nawabzada Muhammad Liaquat Ali Khan
Tahir Hussain
Captain Nawab Muhammad Jamshed Ali Khan
Muhammad Shaukat Ali Khan
Nawab Dr. Sir Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan (of Chchattari)
Khan Bahadur Haji Muhammad Obaidur Rahman Khan
Khan Bahadur Badruddin
Muhammad Jan Khan
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Khaliluddin Ahmad

Khan Bahadur Muhammad Raja Khan
Chaudhri Islam Ullah Khan
Akhtar Hasan Khan
Maulana Muhammad Ismail
Shaikh Zainul Abedin
Khan Bahadur Maulvi Muhammad Fasihuddin
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Fazlur Rahman Khan
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Muhammad Imtiaz Ahmad
Khan Bahadur Lieutenant M. Sultan Alam Khan
Nafisul Hasan
Mahmud Hussain Khan
Nawab Sir Muhammad Yusuf
Rafiuddin Ahmad
Khan Sahib Maulvi Muhammad Hasan
Muhammad Athar
Muhammad Farooq
Zahirul Hasnain Lari
Qazi Muhammad Adil Abbasi
Muhammad Ishaq Khan
Maulvi Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Shaikh Zahiruddin Faruki
Raja Saiyid Ahmad Ali Khan Alvi
Chaudhri Hyder Husain
Mubashir Husain Kidwai
Saiyid Aizaz Rasul
Raja Syed Sajid Husain
Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi
Mirza Mahmud Beg
Ghulam Hasan
Raja Syed Muhammad Sa'adat Ali Khan
Raja Muhammad Ahmad Ali Khan
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Saiduddin Ahmad
Raja Sir Muhammad Ejaz Rasul Khan
Begum Habibullah
Begum Shahid Hussain
Shaikh Muhammad Habibullah
Dr. Syed Husain Zaheer

The Bihar Legislative Council

Saiyid Naqi Imam (*Deputy President*)
Khan Bahadur Saiyid Muhammad Ismail
Jamilur Rahman
Saiyid Mobarak Ali
Abdul Ahad Muhammad Noor
Saiyid Muhammad Hafeez
Khan Bahadur Nawab Saiyid Shah Wajid Husain

The Bihar Legislative Assembly

Abdul Bari (*Deputy Speaker*)
Siyid Abdul Aziz
Hafiz Zafar Hasan
Abdul Jalil
Khan Bahadur Nawab Abdul Wahab Khan
S. Mohiuddin Ahmad
Muhammad Yunus
Sharfuddin Hasan
Saiyid Najmul Hasan
Muhammad Latifur Rahman
Choudhuri Sharafat Husain
Nur Hasan
Muhammad Qasim
Khan Bahadur Saghir-ul-Haq
Dr. Saiyid Mahmud
Muhammad Abdul Majeed
Hafiz Shaikh Muhammad Shani
Khan Sahib Muhammad Yakub
Badrul Hasan
Tajamul Hussain
Muhammad Shafi
Ahmad Ghafoor
Sayeedul Haq
Muhammad Salim
Chaudhri Muhammad Nazirul Hasan
Muhammad Saiyid Rafiuddin Ahmad Rizvi
Muhammad Mahmud
Saiyid Muhammad Minnatullah
Shaikh Ziaur Rahman

Zaimuddin Husain Meerza
Shaikh Fazlur Rahman
Muhammad Islamuddin
Shaikh Shafiqul Haq
Muhammad Tahir
Saiyid Ali Manzar
Abdul Majeed
Shaikh Rahaman Ali
Shaikh Muhammad Husain
Qazi Muhammad Ilyas
Lady Anise Imam

The Punjab Legislative Assembly

Chaudhuri Sir Shahabuddin (*Speaker*)
Khan Bahadur Major Sardar Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan
Nawabzada Major Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana
Mian Abdul Hayee
Khan Bahadur Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana
Mir Maqbool Mahmud
Mrs. Jahanara Shahnawaz
Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan
Shaikh Faiz Muhammad
Sayed Amjad Ali Shah
Nawabzada Muhammad Faiyaz Ali Khan
Khan Bahadur Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani
Mian Abdul Aziz
Sufi Abdul Hamid Khan
Mian Abdur Rab
Chaudhri Abdur Rahim
Chaudhuri Abdur Rahim
Syed Afzaal Ali Hasnie
Chaudhri Ahmad Yar Khan
Chaudhri Ali Akbar
Pir Akbar Ali
Khan Bahadur Nawab Malik Allah Bakhsh Khan
Captain Ashiq Husain
Mian Badr Mohayyudin Qadri
Malik Barkat Ali
Rai Faiz Muhammad Khan

Chaudhri Faqir Husain Khan
Subedar Major Raja Farman Ali Khan
Khan Sahib Raja Fateh Khan
Mian Fateh Muhammad
Malik Fateh Sher Khan
Khan Bahadur Nawab Chaudhri Fazal Ali Khan
Khan Sahib Chaudhri Fazal Din
Mian Fazal Karim Bakhsh
Maulvi Ghulam Mohayuddin
Khan Bahadur Ghulam Qadir Khan
Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul
Khwaja Ghulam Samad
Malik Habibullah Khan
Khan Haibat Khan Daha
M. Jafar Ali Khan
Chaudhri Jalaluddin Amber
Shaikh Karamat Ali
Khalid Latif Gauba
Maulvi Mazhar Ali Azhar
Syed Mohayuddin Lal Badshah
Syed Mubarak Ali Shah
Chaudhri Muhammad Abdul Rahman Khan
Khan Bahadur Raja Muhammad Akram Khan
Dr. Shaikh Muhammad Alam
Chaudhri Muhammad Ashraf
Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan
Chaudhri Muhammad Hasan
Khan Bahadur Sardar Muhammad Hasan Khan Churchani
Khan Bahadur Makhdum Syed Muhammad Hasan
Nawab Sir Malik Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon
Sardar Muhammad Husain
Chaudhri Muhammad Husain
Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin
Khan Bahadur Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamaal Khan Leghari
Major Sardar Muhammad Nawaz Khan
Mian Muhammad Nurullah
Makhdumzada Haji Syed Muhammad Raza Shah Jilani
Khan Sahib Khan Muhammad Saadat Ali Khan

Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq
Khan Muhammad Sarfraz
Raja Muhammad Sarfraz Khan
Khan Sahib Chaudhri Muhammad Sharif Ali
Makhdumzada Haji Syed Muhammad Wilayat Husain Jilani
Chaudhri Muhammad Yasin Khan
Khan Muhammad Yusuf Khan
Sardar Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash
Khan Bahadur Captain Malik Muzaffar Khan
Chaudhri Nasiruddin
Pir Nasiruddin Shah
Rana Nasrullah Khan
Syed Nawazish Ali Shah
Khan Sahib Mian Nur Ahmad Khan
Khan Sahib Chaudhri Pir Muhammad Khan
Begum Rashida Latif Baji
Khan Bahadur Chaudhri Riasat Ali Khan
Chaudhri Sahib Dad Khan
Khan Sahib Rai Shahadat Khan
Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan
Mian Sultan Mahmud Hotiana
Khan Talib Hosain Khan
Sardar Wali Muhammad Sayyal Hiraj

The Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly

Khan Sahib Syed Muzaffar Hussain
Muhammad Mohibbul Haq
Muhammad Yusuf Shareef
Khan Sahib Syed Yasin
Abdul Razak Khan
Iftikhar Ali
Majiduddin Ahmad
Khan Bahadur Syed Hifazat Ali
S. W. A. Rizvi
Mohiuddin Khan
Hidayat Ali
Khan Bahadur Mirza Rahman Beg
Syed Abdul Rauf Shah
Khan Sahib Abdur Rahman Khan

The Orissa Legislative Assembly

Maulvi Muhammad Latifur Rahman
Saiyid Fazle Huque
Maulvi Abdus Sobhan Khan
Khan Bahadur Saiyid Ahmad Bakhsh

The Sind Legislative Assembly

Abdul Majid Lilaram
Abdul Satar Abdul Rahman
Khan Sahib Allah Bakhsh Khudadad Khan Gabole
Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh Muhammad Umar
Sardar Bahadur Mir Allahdad Khan Imam Bakhsh Khan Talpur
Khan Bahadur Haji Amir Ali Tharu
Arbab Togachi Mir Muhammad
Mir Bane Ali Khan Mir Haji Muhammad Hossain Khan Talpur
Mir Ghulam Ali Khan Bundeh Ali Khan Talpur
Mir Ghulam Allah Khan Mir Haji Husain Bakhsh Khan Talpur
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah
Makhdum Ghulam Hyder Makhdum Zahiruddin
Pir Ghulam Hyder Shah Sahibdino Shah Bulri
Ghulam Muhammad Abdullah Khan Isran
Sayed Ghulam Murtaza Shah
Khan Bahadur Syed Ghulam Nabi Shah Moujali Shah
Pir Illahi Bakhsh Nawaz Ali
Khan Sahib Jaffer Khan Gul Muhammad Khan Burdi
Jam Jan Muhammad Khan Muhammad Sharif Juneje
Mrs. Jenubai Ghulam Ali
Khan Bahadur Kaiser Khan Ghulam Muhammad Khan
Sayed Khair Shah Imam Ali Shah
Miran Muhammad Shah Zainulabedin Shah
Sayed Muhammad Ali Shah Allahando Shah
Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayub Khan Shah Muhammad Khan Khuro
Muhammad Hashim Faiz Muhammad Gazdar
Mir Muhammad Khan Nawab Ghaibi Khan Chandio
Muhammad Usman Muhammad Khan Sumro
Muhammad Yusif Khan Bahadur Khan Muhammad Khan
Sayed Nur Muhammad Shah Murad Ali Shah

Rasul Bakhsh Khan Muhammad Bakhsh Khan Uner
Khan Sahib Rasul Bakhsh Shah Mahbub Shah
Shamsuddin Khan Abdul Kabir Khan
Khan Sahib Sohrab Khan Sahibdino Sarki
Mir Zenuddin Khan Sunder Khan Sunderani

The North-West Frontier Province Legislative Assembly

Malik Khuda Bakhsh Khan (*Speaker*)
Abdul Rashid (*Deputy Speaker*)
Dr. Khan Sahib
Qazi Ataullah Khan
Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan
Khan Abdullah Khan
Khan Abdul Aziz Khan
Khan Abdul Ghafoor Khan
Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan
Raja Manochehar Khan
Abdul Rab Khan Nishtar
Khan Sahib Raja Abdur Rahman Khan
Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan
Khan Sahib Abdul Majid Khan
Khan Akbar Ali Khan
Nawabzada Allah Khan
Khan Amir Muhammad Khan
Khan Sahib Sardar Asadullah
K. Allahdad Khan
Captain Nawab Baz Muhammad Khan
Khan Faizullah Ghazni Khel
Faqira Khan
Mian Jaffar Shah
Pir Syed Jalal Shah
Khan Malik-ur-Rahman Khan
Khan Muhammad Afzal Khan
Khan Sahib Muhammad Attai Khan
Sardar Muhammad Aurungzeb Khan
Pir Muhammad Kamran
Nawabzada Muhammad Said Khan
Khan Muhammad Samin Jan
Nawab Muhammad Zaffar Khan Waliwal

Lieutenant M. Muhammad Zaman Khan
Khan Nasrullah Khan
M. Pir Bakhsh Khan
Khan Bahadur Sadullah Khan
Khan Zarin Khan
M. Kamdar Khan

APPENDIX III

The Congress Establishment: 1936-40

A

CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEES: 1936-37

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (*President*)
B. J. Kripalani (*General Secretary*)
Seth Jamnalal Bajaj (*Treasurer*)
Abul Kalam Azad
Rajendra Prasad
Sardar Vallabhai Patel
Abdul Ghaffar Khan*
C. Rajagopalachariar
Sarat Chandra Bose
Narendra Dev
Jairamdas Daulatram
S. D. Deo
Jai Prakash Narain
Bhulabhai Desai
Achut Patwardhan

*As long as he was in prison, Dr. Khan Sahib was to act for him.

1937-38

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (*President*)
Abul Kalam Azad
Mrs. Sarojini Naidu
Sardar Vallabhai Patel
Rajendra Prasad
Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Seth Jamnalal Bajaj
Bhulabhai Desai
Govind Bhallabh Pant

Acharya J. B. Kripalani
Narendra Dev
Dhankar Rao Deo
Achut Patwardhan

1938-39

Subhas Chandra Bose (*President*)
Abul Kalam Azad
Mrs. Sarojini Naidu
Jawaharlal Nehru
Vallabhai Patel
Rajendra Prasad
Jairamdas Daulatram
Bhulabhai Desai
P. Sitaramayya
Shankerrao Deo
Harekrishna Mehtab
J. B. Kripalani
Seth Jamanalal Bajaj

1939-40

Abul Kalam Azad (*President*)
Mrs. Sarojini Naidu
Sardar Vallabhai Patel
Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Seth Jamnalal Bajaj
P. Sitaramayya
J. B. Kripalani
Jairamdas Daulatram
Bhulabhai Desai
B. C. Roy
Shankerrao Deo
Harekrishna Mehtab
P. C. Ghosh

B

ALL INDIA CONGRESS PARLIAMENTARY SUB-COMMITTEE : 1937

Sardar Vallabhai Patel	(Bombay Presidency, Madras Presidency, Central Provinces, Sindh).
Abul Kalam Azad	(Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province)
Rajendra Prasad	(Bihar, Orissa, Assam)

C

CONGRESS PROVINCIAL MINISTRIES, 1937-39

Bombay

B. G. Kher (Chief Minister)	Education, General
K. M. Munshi	Home, Law and Order
A. B. Lathe	Finance
M. D. Gilder	Excise, Public Health
L. M. Patil	Local Self-Government
M. V. Noori	Public Works

Madras

C. Rajagopalachariar (Chief Minister)	Finance
P. Subbaroyan	Education
T. Prakasam	Revenue
V. I. Muniswami Pillai	Agriculture
K. Raman Memon	Courts and Prisons
S. Ramanathan	Public Information
V. V. Giri	Labour
B. Gopal Reddy	Local Administration
Yakub Hasan	Public Works
T. S. S. Rajan	Public Health

United Provinces

G. B. Pant (Chief Minister)	Home, Law and Order, Finance
Rafi Ahmad Kidwai	Revenue, Agriculture, Jails
K. N. Katju	Development, Justice
Mrs. V. L. Pandit	Local Self-Government, Health
Pyare Lal Sharma	Education
Muhammad Ibrahim	Communications, Irrigation

Bihar

Sri Krishna Sinha (Chief Minister)	Home, Revenue, Jails
A. N. Sinha	Finance, Local Government
Sayyid Mahmud	Education
Jaglal Chaudhri	Excise, Public Health

Central Provinces

N. B. Khare (Chief Minister)	Home
R. S. Shukla	Education
D. P. Misra	Local Self-Government
R. M. Deshmukh	Public Works
Y. M. Shareef	Law
D. K. Mehta	Finance
P. B. Gole	Revenue, Excise

Orissa

Biswanath Das (Chief Minister)	Home, Finance, Education
N. Kanungo	Revenue, Public Health
B. Dubey	Law, Public Works, Local Self-Government

N.-W. F. P.

Dr. Khan Sahib (Chief Minister)	Political, Home, Public Works
B. Gandhi	Finance, Legislation
Kazi Ataullah	Education, Revenue, Agriculture
Muhammad Abbas Khan	Industries

Note—On 30 July, 1938, N. B. Khare was replaced by R. S. Shukla as chief minister of the Central Provinces.

APPENDIX IV

The Imperial Establishment: 1937-39

Prime Minister	Neville Chamberlain (Conservative)
Secretary of State for India	Marquess of Zetland (Conservative)
Viceroy of India	Marquess of Linlithgow
Governor of Bengal	Sir John Anderson (till 26 November 1937)
	Lord Brabourne
Governor of Bombay	Lord Brabourne (till 25 November, 1937)
	Sir Roger Lawrence Lumley
Governor of Madras	Lord Erskine
Governor of U. P.	Sir Harry Graham Haig
Governor of Bihar	Sir James David Sifton
	Sir Maurice Garnier Hallet
Governor of C. P.	Sir Hyde Clarendon Gowan (till 2 March, 1938)
	Hugh Bomford (3 March-27 May 1938)
	Sir Francis Verner Wylie
Governor of Orissa	Sir John Austen Hubback
Governor of N.-W.F.P.	Sir Ralph Griffith
	Sir George Cunningham

1

The appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission, popularly known as the Simon Commission, had created a schism in the All India Muslim League. One group, headed by Jinnah, favoured a boycott of the enquiring body, while the other, led by Sir Muhammad Shafi, was prepared to co-operate with the Commission. The Jinnah group held its 1927 session at Calcutta on 30 and 31 December, 1927 and 1 January 1928 under the presidentship of Maulvi Muhammad Yakub, and passed the following resolution on the Simon Commission:

"That the All India Muslim League emphatically declares that the Statuory [*sic.*] Commission and the procedure as announced are unacceptable to the people of India. It, therefore, resolves that Musalmans throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form." It was moved by Sir Ali Imam, seconded by Seth Yakub Hasan of Madras, and supported by Maulana Muhammad Ali, Malik Barkat Ali, M. C. Chagla, Shamsuddin Ahmad and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan.[1]

The Shafi group convened its session at Lahore on 31 December, 1927 and 1 January 1928. It met in the Habibia Hall of the Islamia College. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan was the Chairman of the Reception Committee. Sir Muhammad Shafi delivered a long address, surveying the current political and constitutional situation in the country.[2]

1. *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936*, All India Muslim League Office (Delhi, n. d.), Resolution no. 3, p. 36. For summaries of speeches made on this resolution see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan : All India Muslim League Documents : 1906-1947, volume II : 1924-1947* (Karachi, 1970), pp. 114-118 ; hereafter cited merely as *Foundations*.

2. *Presidential Address by Dr. Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., LL. D., D. Lit., Barrister-at-Law, delivered at the Annual Session of All-India Muslim League held at Lahore on the 30th and 31st December, 1927*, Lahore, 1927. The dates of the session as

[continued on page 158]

Eleven resolutions were passed.[1]

The memorandum of the Shafi group of the Muslim League, a part of which is reproduced here; was handed over to the Statutory Commission at Lahore on 5 November, 1928. Members of the League who saw the Commission were : Sir Muhammad Shafi, Sir Abdul Qadir, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, A. H. Ghuznavi, S. M. Abdullah, Nawab Ahmad Nawaz Khan, Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan Qizilbash, Khan Saadat Ali Khan, Sayyid Mohsin Shah, Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Sardar Habibullah Khan, Maulvi Ghulam Mohayyuddin Qasuri, S. Azimullah, Khalifa Shujauddin, Shaikh Din Muhammad, Seth Adamjee Mamoonji, Maulvi Muhammad Ali, Mirza Yakub Beg, A. R. Dard, Mirza Bashir Ahmad, Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, Shaikh Hafizullah, Chaudhary Abdul Ghani, and Maulvi Mahbub Alam.

[continued from page 157]
given on the title page of Shafi's address are different from those given by Pirzada (*op. cit.,*) vol. II, pp. 128-138) who mentions 31 December, 1927 and 1 January, 1928, presumably on the strength of *The Indian Quarterly Register 1927*, vol. II, pp. 369-376. Shafi' s dates are obviously wrong for there is no doubt tbat the session had its last meeting on 1 January; see *The Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore, 4 January 1928). Pirzada gives only a 2-page summary of Shafi's address.

1. For text of these resolutions and summaries of speeches on them see Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol II, pp. 131-138. The official records of the Muslim League do not recognize the Lahore session as a legitimate meeting and therefore omit its proceedings and decisions from their publications.

2

This resolution is of great significance as it became the Muslim charter by which Muslim India judged the Simon Report, the Round Table Conference decisions, the White Paper, the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, and the 1935 Act. Therefore, it is important to see how the resolution came to be drafted and approved by the Conference.

The All India Muslim Conference session had its first meeting in the morning of 31 December 1928. This was taken up by the address of Hakim Muhammad Jameel Khan, chairman of the Reception Committee, the statement of the Secretary of the Conference, Fazal Ibrahim Rahmatullah, the reading out of the telegraphic messages of support received by the Secretary from all over India, the speeches of Maulana Muhammad Shafee Daoodi, president of the Central Khilafat Committee, and Maulvi Muhammad Yakub, president of the 1927 Calcutta session of the Muslim League and deputy president of the Indian Legislative Assembly, proposing the Aga Khan's name as president of the Conference, and, finally, the presidential address by the Aga Khan himself.

In the evening of the same day, at 6.30 p.m., a consultation meeting was held at the Jamnagar House, attended by Sir Muhammad Shafi, Sir Ibrahim Rahmatullah, Maulana Muhammad Shafee Daoodi, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, Dr. L. K. Hyder, Shaikh Abdullah, Nawab Muhammad Yusuf, Fazal Ibrahim Rahmatullah, Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, and Zahur Ahmad. At this meeting Shafi read out a resolution which he had drafted and which he wanted to move in the open session. This draft was discussed clause by clause by the meeting.

Next morning, on the new year day of 1929, at 10 a. m., another informal meeting of these leaders was held near the Conference *pandal*

in a separate *shamiana*. This was done to enable Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali and some other leaders, who had arrived from Calcutta that morning, to be informed of what had been done on the previous day and what was planned for the open session of that day. Shafi once again explained the contents and motives of his resolution. Those who were opposed to the resolution as it stood found their leader in Muhammad Ali; Maulana Mufti Kifayatullah gave this group his support. After a long and heated discussion the meeting determined the principles on which the resolution was to be redrafted.

An hour later, at 11 a. m., the Subjects Committee of the Conference met in the *pandal* under the presidentship of the Aga Khan. The main resolution was again examined and its provisions fully debated. The major point of contention was whether the Conference should demand separate electorates without reservations and conditions or ask for them with the proviso that if certain conditions, like those embodied in the proposals put forward by some Muslim leaders at Delhi in March 1927, were fulfilled Muslims would give up separate electorates and accept a joint electorate. Shafi argued for the former proposition while Muhammad Ali and Shafee Daoodi urged the adoption of the latter.

We have no record of the proceedings of the consultation committee and the Subjects Committee. It is, therefore, impossible to say what arguments were brought forth by the two schools of thought. Apparently, however, some compromise was reached, because the resolution as it finally emerged from these two discussions was unanimously passed by the open session.

The open session began at 5 p.m., and after a recitation from the Quran and the adoption of a resolution, moved from the chair, condoling the deaths of Sayyid Ameer Ali and Hakim Ajmal Khan, Shafi delivered a speech explaining the background of the Conference and emphasizing its importance for the future of Indian Muslims. Then he moved his resolution and read out its full text. Muhammad Ali seconded it without a speech, reserving his comments for a later hour. Sir Abdul Karim Ghaznavi supported the resolution in a short speech. Shafee Daoodi defended it in strong words, making it clear (and this was significant, because he had opposed the original draft of Shafi) that the resolution was not being put forward "by a person, body or an Anjaman but by all the Muslims of India." He was followed by Sir Muhammad Iqbal. After a short adjournment for the *maghrib*

prayer. the session was resumed at 6·15 p.m. A short witty speech by Sharfuddin of the Central Provinces put the audience in a relaxed mood. Then came Hafiz Hidayat Husain, Maulvi Muhammad Yakub, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Abdul Aziz of Peshawar, Daoodbhoy Salehbboy Tayebji, Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon, Maulana Abdul Majid Badayuni, Maulana Kifayatullah, Nawab Mehdi Husain, Maulana Azad Sobhani and Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq. Maulana Muhammad Ali was the last speaker, and in his characteristic oratory, which combined strong language with humour, described the Nehru Report's treatment of Muslims in two graphic sentences. "The Hindus wanted to keep Muslims in the position of a dirty fly which sat on the food and polluted it and, after having its wings besmeared with it, died. Maulana Muhammad Ali declared, on behalf of the Indian Muslims, that they were not ready to accept the position of the dirty fly." After the Maulana's speech, the President put the resolution to vote. "It elicited such a surprising and wonderfully unanimous support from the audience that a great part of them sprang up on their feet in the heat of enthusiasm and acclaimed that they fully accepted the resolution. There was not one dissentient in an audience of over 5,000 people who said that he was opposed to the resolution. It was, therefore, passed unanimously amidst the most remarkable and vocal acclamation demonstrated through thunderous cheers which rent the very Conference Pandal."[1]

Sir Reginald Coupland has called this resolution "a full-scale manifesto of Moslem claims".[2] It was the Muslim answer to the Nehru Report, rejecting the Congress, and Hindu-inspired constitutional blueprint with finality, unanimity and clarity.

1. For this account I have relied on *Report of the All India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st December, 1928, and 1st January 1929, under the Presidentship of His Highness Sir Agha Sultan Muhammad Shah, Agha Khan,* by authority compiled and published by Hafizur Rahman, n.p.p., 1929, pp., 23-5. All quotations are from this source.

2. R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833—1935 : Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part I* (London, 1942), p. 96.

3

It will be recalled that the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission had created a split in the Muslim League and rent the organization into a Jinnah wing and a Shafi wing. Consequently, the Jinnah group had refused to attend the first session of the All-Parties Muslim Conference (soon to be called the all India Muslim Conference) held at Delhi. This disunity might have persisted longer had it not been for the uncompromising stance taken by the makers and supporters of the Nehru Report.

While announcing the appointment of the Statutory Commission the Earl of Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, had justified the all-British personnel of the Commission by pointing to the endemic state of Indian disunity and declaring that an Indian Commission would have produced a Muslim report or a Hindu report but not an Indian report. Stung by this exposure of their real weakness—a weakness, however, which the Congress and its allies were not then, or ever afterwards, prepared to admit—the "nationalists" of India set out to prove the India Office wrong. In its Madras session of December 1927, the Congress asked all other political organizations to join hands with it in preparing a constitution for a free India. The appeal resulted in an All-Parties Conference which had its first meeting at Delhi in February-March 1928. The Jinnah group of the Muslim League attended ; the Shafi group did not. Within the first few days it became apparent that there were serious differences of opinion on major issues between the Hindu Mahasabha members and the Muslim participants. Nor did the Congress itself agree with all that the Muslims wanted. As is usual in such cases, the Conference found a way out in appointing two sub-committees: one to study the financial aspect of the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency (which was being strongly demanded by the Muslims), and the second to examine the problem of representation in elected bodies. The sub-committees were ordered to report their

findings to the Conference in its next meeting at Bombay in May 1928.

But when this Bombay meeting opened on 19 May it was found that the sub-committees had nothing to report. It was felt by several observers that that would be the end of the "nationalist" effort. But in a desperate attempt to avoid a confession of complete failure the Conference, after a long discussion, decided to appoint a small committee to view "the communal problem as a whole and its relation to the whole constitution". Several close-door parleys produced the following membership of the committee : Pandit Motilal Nehru (Chairman), Sir Ali Imam and Shoaib Qureshi (Muslims), M. S. Aney and M.R. Jayakar (Hindu Mahasabha), G.R. Pradhan (non-Brahman), Sardar Mangal Singh (Sikh League), Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (Liberals), and N.M. Joshi (Labour). The Chairman's son, Jawaharlal, was asked to serve as secretary. The major term of reference of the Committee was "to consider and determine the principles of the Constitution of India before 1st July next."[1]

The report of this committee, generally known as Nehru Report after the Chairman's name was published in August 1928. The recommendations clearly showed the Congress Mahashbha determination to rule the country on behalf of the HIndu nation without any thought for the minorities. A fully responsible system of government was prescribed. The majority was to be sovereign. Muslim electorates were to disappear. Provinces were to be stripped of all powers.[2]

Before going further the representative character of the members of the Nehru committee ought to be examined. The two Muslim members, Ali Imam and Shoaib Qureshi, could hardly claim to represent Muslim opinion. A large majority of their own community had long ago repudiated them. The Sikh member of the body was soon disowned by the Sikh League which had named him to the body. The Indian Christian Conference (incidentally, the Christian community was not represented in the committee) dissociated itself from the principles adopted by the committee on the protection of minorities.[3] One Hindu Mahasabha

1. All-Parties Conference, *Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine the Principles of the Constitution for India*, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee (Allahabad, 1928), pp. 17-23. This is commonly known as the *Nehru Report*.

2. For full details see *ibid.*, pp. 27-124.

3. See K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1967), p. 41.

member, Jayakar, had declined to serve. The single Labour spokesman, Joshi, first declared that he would participate in the proceedings only when the rights of the labour were under consideration; in fact, he did not attend any meeting of the Committee. Sir Ali Imam was present at only one meeting. Shoaib Qureshi refused to put his signature to the final draft of the report.[1]

By a simple process of elimination it is obvious that the report was the handiwork, and represented the views, of only four of its members : Nehru, Aney, Pradhan and Sapru. Among these Pradhan was neither a frontrank politician nor enjoyed much of a reputation. It is, therefore, quite legitimate to claim that the final report was written by Nehru, Aney and Sapru. The nature and political content of the recommendations show that Sapru's liberalism was not an influencing factor in the making of the report. Evidently, therefore, the report was a Congress-Mahasabha co-operative effort and a purely Hindu blue-print of a future India. The significance of this point will emerge later in our narrative.

The Conference met again at Lucknow on 28-31 August 1928 to consider the report.[2] An All-Parties Convention was called to meet at Calcutta in December with a view to eliciting public opinion on the report. The Muslim League appointed a strong delegation of twenty-three members to attend the Calcutta Convention and "endeavour to bring about an adjustment of the various outstanding questions between Hindus and Mussalmans arising out of the Nehru Report."[3] The delegation comprised the Maharajah of Mahmudabad, Jinnah, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, M.C. Chagla, Malik Barkat Ali, Maulvi Abdul Hamid, Maulvi Mujeebur Rahman, Dr. Mahmood, Hisamuddin, Maulvi Muhammad Akram Khan, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Seth Yakub Hasan, Ghazi Abdur Rahman, Abdullah Barelvi, Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Liaquat Ali Khan, Maulvi Mazhar Ali, Shah M. Zubair, Maulvi Abdul Karim, Maulvi M. Aslam, Maulvi

1. Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan* (Lahore, 1964 p. 40), and p. 43 fn. 5.

2. For proceedings of this meeting see All Parties Conference, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-168.

3. *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936*, All India Muslim League Office (Delhi, n.d.), Resolution no. 3 of the Calcutta annual session (26-30 December 1928), p. 43. It was proposed by M.C. Chagla (Bombay) seconded by Muhammad Ismail (Bihar), and supported by Malik Barkat Ali (Punjab). For a summary of discussion on this resolution see Pirzada, *Foundations*, Vol. II, pp. 145-148.

Azizul Haq and Maulvi Faiznoor Ali.[1] The Central Khilafat Committee also decided to attend the Convention and press the Muslim point of view, and for this purpose chose a delegation of forty-five members.

The Convention appointed a sub-committee of thirty-seven members (including Gandhi, M. A. Ansari, A. K. Azad, Sapru and Jayakar) to meet the Muslim League and Khilafat representatives. All the four amendments moved by Jinnah were rejected by the sub-committee. Then he decided to fight his case before the open session of the Convention. This he did in a long and well-argued speech on 28 December. Sapru did not support him but still made a plea for some kind of agreement and a final decision. But it was Jayakar of the Hindu Mahasabha who blocked all avenues leading to compromise. His views prevailed and the Convention, which now really meant the Congress under the strong influence of the Mahasabha. rejected all the arguments, appeals and proposals of Muslim spokesmen.[2] The following morning Jinnah left Calcutta, and standing before his compartment at the railway station, with tears in his eyes, he told a Parsi friend, Jamshed Nusserwanjee, "Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways".[3] Never again was Jinnah to plead before the Hindus for safeguards and protection. In future he would state his demands, specify exactly what he wanted, and not wait on the pleasure of the Hindus or the British. In the end he got what he set out to get because his will was strong, his people were behind him, and his cause was righteous. The important point is that he succeeded not because the Hindus were open-hearted and just but because by their stubborn and narrow-minded opposition to every Muslim want they strengthened the fibre of Muslim nationalism.

But we are anticipating events. Let us go back to see Muslim

1. *Ibid.*, p. 44. The last three names were added to the resolution after a long discussion. One of these three creates some confusion. In the officially printed text of the resolution, which is quoted here, we find the name of Maulvi M. Aslam. But Pirzada (*op. cit.*, p. 148) says that in the original account of the proceedings the name of Aslam does not appear: in its place we have that of Syed Kayam Shah of the N.W.F.P.; and in this he is supported by *The Indian Quarterly Register 1928*, vol. II, p. 401.

2. For a complete record of the Convention proceedings see All-Parties Conference, *The Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, Secretary, All-Parties National Convention (Allahabad, 1929). The important speeches of the open session are on pp. 78-94.

3. Quoted in Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), p. 95.

reaction to the Nehru Report, for that is essential for understanding the Fourteen Points of Jinnah.

The Muslims were shocked into unity. Members of the Central and provincial assemblies passed resolutions expressing their opposition to the Nehru Report and declaring that they found it impossible to accept it.[1] The Aga Khan spoke from London, doubting if any serious-minded person could imagine the Muslims accepting such "degrading" proposals.[2] The United Provinces All-Parties Muslim Conference repudiated Sir Ali Imam and Shoaib Qureshi who had collaborated with the Hindus in the making of the report.[3] The Shafi group of the Muslim League, which had kept away from the All-Parties Conference and its Calcutta Convention, naturally condemned it. Maulana Shaukat Ali, Gandhi's close associate of the Khilafat days and a staunch nationalist, commented that "as a young man he had been a keen owner of greyhounds but had never seen greyhounds deal with a hare as the Hindus proposed to deal with the Muslims."[4] His brother, Muhammad Ali, castigated the Hindus for their "bania" mentality in his presidential address to the Khilafat Conference at Calcutta in December 1928: "You make compromises in your constitution every day with false doctrines, immoral conceptions and wrong ideals, but you make no compromise with our communalists—with separate electorates and reserved seats. Twenty-five per cent is our proportion of population, and yet you will not give us 33 per cent in the Assembly. You are a Jew, a bania. But to the British you give the status of your dominion."[5] The height of Congress ignominy was reflected in the complete rejection of the report by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, a body which had, ever since its inception, stoutly sided with the Congress and vociferously attacked the Muslim League

1. Resolution of the Indian Legislative Assembly Muslim members, 7 September 1928, in *The Times*, 8 September, 1928. Resolution of the provincial legislative assemblies' Muslim members, 10 September 1928, in *ibid.*, 11 September, 1928.

2. Aga Khan, "A Constitution for India : The Nehru Scheme", *ibid.*, 12 October, 1928.

3. *The Times*, 7 November, 1928.

4. Quoted in John Coatman, *Years of Destiny*: *India 1926-1932* (London, 1932), p. 214.

5. *The Indian Quarterly Register 1928*, vol. II, p. 403. In the East a Jew is a household word indicating extreme miserliness. The reference to dominion status is a dig at the Congress' objective of that status and its rejection of complete independence for India.

and other Muslim organizations which did not support the Congress.[1] On 12 March, 1929, the Indian Legislatrue Assembly debated the Nehru Report. All the Muslim members, including Jinnah, who had in 1927 chosen to go along with the Congress in boycotting the Simon Commission, rejected it so strongly and decidedly that *The Times*' India correspondent reported: "The solidity of Muslim feeling in the Assembly was not unexpected, but certainly disturbine to those trying to represent the Nehru Report as a demand of a united India. Henceforth such a claim must be manifestly absurd."[2]

It is pertinent to remember here that the Congress did not take the slightest notice of this Muslim reaction. Immume to all criticism and indifferent to what others thought of its handiwork, on 3 November 1928, it congratulated the Nehru committee on "their patriotism and their farsightedness"[3], and on 31 December served a notice on the British Government that if they did not accept the report by December 1929 the Congress would launch a non-co-operation movement.[4] The Congress was doing everything in its power to make its rift with the Muslims stark and irrevocable.

One result of the Nehru Report was the holding of an All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi under the Aga Khan's presidentship. It was the most representative gathering of Muslim India, though Jinnah's Muslim League group stayed out. Another result was the coming together of the two wings into which the Muslim League had been split since 1927. Now that Jinnah's amendments to the Nehru Report had been thrown out by the All-Parties Convention and he had no more hopes of a *rapprochement* with the Congress, there was no longer any difference of opinion between him and the Shafi group. Accordingly, in March 1929 an agreement between the two groups was reached, and it was decided that they would meet at Delhi at the end of the month and pass identical resolutions in favour of a joint sitting. Jinnah drafted a comprehensive resolution for this joint meeting. This resolution later came to be known as his Fourteen Points.

The projected meeting was held in Delhi in the last week of March 1929. There are different versions of what happened. According to a

1. For the Jamiat's criticism of the Nehru Report see Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hay* (Delhi, 1946), Part II, pp. 147-160.

2. *The Times*, 13 March, 1929.

3. Resolution of 3 November, 1928; text in *The Times*, 5 November, 1928.

4. Resolution of 31 December, 1928; text in *ibid.*, 1 January, 1929.

report of the Government of India, by 28 March the delegates from the two wings of the Muslim League had assembled in Delhi. But Sir Muhammad Shafi was unable to be present on account of illness. Jinnah issued a statement addressed to the Council of the All India Muslim League, summing up the recent history of the Hindu-Muslim controversy, announcing that the Muslim League had rejected the Nehru Report, and calling upon the Muslim League to state the safeguards which its members wished to see incorporated in the future constitution of India. He put these safeguards in the text of a resolution which he intended to move in the open meeting of the League. This open meeting did not go according to plan. Delegates from Shafi's wing of the Muslim League refused to join in the meeting, alleging that certain conditions under which they had agreed to join had not been fulfilled. Some members of Jinnah's own group declared their readiness to accept the Nehru Report. Moreover, "certain rowdy elements had given proof that they intended to turn the affair into a fiasco". Jinnah, therefore, dissolved the meeting.[1]

It may be mentioned in parentheses that the pro-report group in Jinnah's wing soon dissociated itself from the Muslim League and, in July 1929, at a meeting in Allahabad, formed itself into an All India Nationalist Muslim Party. The major figures of this group were Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Sir Ali Imam and Dr. Muhammad Alam. The new party had a very short life and nothing was heard of it after 1931.[2]

Another version of the Delhi meeting goes like this: "The adjourned session of the Muslim League was reconvened at Delhi in the last week of March 1929. It was largely attended by leaders of different schools of thought. Mr. Jinnah was trying to bring about a consensus of opinion among various groups. He was holding consultations at the house of Hakim Jamil Khan. In the meantime the Congressite leaders who had mustered strong made a crude attempt to capture the dais in the hall where the members and delegates had assembled and get a resolution passed in favour

1. J. Coatman, *India in 1928-29* (a Government of India official report, Calcutta, 1930), pp. 42-45. The Fourteen (or rather fifteen) Points are reproduced on pp. 43-44.

2. For some details of this party see Tufail Ahmad Manglori, *Musalmanon Ka Roshan Mustaqbil* (Delhi, 1945), pp. 439-440, and W. R. Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India* (New Haven, 1938), pp. 363-364.

of the Nehru Report. Mr. Yusuf Imam proposed and Mr. Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani seconded the name of Dr. Alam to preside over the meeting. Dr. Alam hurriedly occupied the chair and called upon Ghazi Abdur Rahman to move the resolution for acceptance of the Nehru Report, and declared it passed without putting it to vote. The vast majority of the audience protested and there was pandemonium. Just at this moment Mr. Jinnah arrived. So great was his prestige that there was pin-drop silence as soon as he entered the hall. Mr. Jinnah strongly reprimanded those who had adopted disorderly tactics, declared the proceedings null and void and in view of the disturbed situation, adjourned the session.

In consultation with leaders of various groups Mr. Jinnah had drafted a resolution which represented a broad consensus. It was to be placed before the League session if it had continued. However, the terms of the resolution were published and were welcomed and supported by the Muslim public throughout the subcontinent, barring the handful of diehard Muslim Congressites, like Mr. Asif Ali, Mr. Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Dr. Syed Mahmud, Mr. Khaliquzzaman, Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Alam.[1]

The correct position seems to be that the Delhi meeting was a continuation of the adjourned Calcutta session of the All India Muslim League (Jinnah wing), for the last resolution passed by the Calcutta session decided that the session "do stand adjourned and the Council of the League be instructed to summon the Session at such place and time that they may consider suitable before the end of May 1929".[2] Obviously, this was done to await the result of the coming All-Parties Convention where Jinnah and his delegation were going to press for the acceptance of their amendments to the Nehru Report.[3]

1. Jamiluddin Ahmad, *Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement* (Lahore, 1969), pp. 100-101.

2. *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936* (Delhi, n.d.), Resolution no. 7, p. 45.

3. Pirzada, *Foundations* (vol. II, p. 152), does not mention anything about the Delhi meeting, and rightly so because, in spite of Jamiluddin Ahmad's account given above, it is difficult to call the Delhi meeting a session. Technically, therefore, the adjourned 1928 Calcutta session never met. The next session, at Allahabad in December 1930, was the twenty-first regular annual session.

4

The Government of India Act, 1919, which had emerged from the Montagu-Chelmsford recommendations, had stipulated that "at the expiration of ten years after the passing" of that Act, the British Government would again go into the question of Indian constitutional reform. This promised inquiry was to investigate "the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions, in British India, and matters connected therewith", and to report "as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing therein".[1] Had this timetable been followed, the inquiry should have been instituted in late 1929 or early 1930. But Indian leaders of all shades of opinion began to demand for the appointment of this commission before the set date on the ground that a ten-year period of probation was too long. They felt that India was fit to receive the next instalment of reforms.

By 1927 this demand for the revision of the constitution had become so insistent that the British Parliament amended the relevant section of the 1919 Act so that the words "at the expiration of" ten years were substituted by the word "within" ten years.[2] Accordingly, on 8 November 1927, the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, announced in the House of Commons that the Government had decided to appoint the commission.[3] The appointment was officially gazetted on 26 November.

The Indian Statutory Commission, as it was officially named,

1. *The Government of India Act*, 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 101, 23 December 1919, Article XLI (2).

2. Government of India (Statutory Commission) Act, 1927.

3. See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 210, 8 November 1927, Cols. 19-21, for Baldwin's speech.

or the Simon Commission, as it soon came to be popularly known after the name of its chairman, consisted of seven members: Sir John Simon, Viscount Burnham, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, Edward Cadogan, Stephen Walsh, Richard Lane-Fox, and Major Clement Attlee. All the members, except Cadogan and Attlee, were Privy Councillors. Within a month Stephen Walsh resigned for reasons of ill health and was replaced by Vernon Hartshorn, another Privy Councillor.

The Commission paid two visits to India; the first lasting from 3 February to 31 March 1928, and the second from 11 October 1928 to 13 April 1929. The report was published in May 1930.[1] Although British historians and writers have by and large overestimated the importance and merit of the report, yet there is no doubt that it was the most thorough, detailed and extensive study of the Indian problem ever undertaken and executed by the British Government. The first volume examined the Indian political, communal, constitutional, administrative, financial and educational systems, along with the problems facing the country. The second set forth the proposals for constitutional reform.

In Britain, the quality press paid the report glowing tributes, employing such complimentary phrases as "impressive" and "great",[2] "sound and safe" and "inspired by a strong sense of realism",[3] "workable and flexible",[4] and "a great essay in constitution making" and "a State document of historic importance."[5] The discordant note in this symphony of praise was struck by the Labour newspaper, *Daily Herald*, which bemoaned its failure to offer self-government to India.[6]

In the opinion of a perceptive British writer, who had had long Indian experience, the Simon Commission, apart from doing its official duty, made an invaluable contribution to the Indian problem.

"It acted", wrote Professor John Coatman, "as a spectroscope,

1. The Indian Statutory Commission, *Report*, London, 1930, Vol. I (Cmd. 3568) entitled "Survey", Vol. II (Cmd. 3569) entitled "Recommendations." A fortnight intervened between the publication of the two volumes.

2. *Daily Telegraph*, 10 and 24 June, 1930.

3. *Time and Tide*, 28 June, 1930.

4. *Manchester Guardian*, 24 June, 1930.

5. *New Statesman*, 28 June, 1930.

6. *Daily Herald*, 24 June, 1930.

splitting Indian politics into its component parts, distinguishing one element from another and enabling the outside observer of Indian politics to see the composition of the subject which he was studying. In its character of spectroscope, the Commission was to show how interests, communities, and sections of political opinion ranged themselves, and, also, how the Indian provinces came into the many-coloured life, because their policies and views are factors of great and growing importance in the general politics of India."[1]

1. John Coatman, *Years of Destiny: India 1926-1932* (London, 1932), pp. 164-165.

5

Developments between the appearance of the Simon Report and the report of the Joint Select Committee may be indicated here. A conference of British and Indian statesmen was called in London to discuss and shape the principles of a future constitution. The first sessions opened on 10 November, 1930. The Congress party was absent, for it had declined to participate until the British Government first conceded the principle of "complete independence" for India. All other parties were present. The Muslim delegation consisted of: The Aga Khan, Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Ghulam Murtaza Khan Bhutto, Fazl-ul-Haq, A.H. Ghuznavi, Hidayat Husain, M.A. Jinnah, Nawab Sir Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan of Chhitari, Maulana Muhammad Ali, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Begum Shah Nawaz, Raja Sher Muhammad Khan, Sir Saiyid Sultan Ahmad, and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. There were four Muslims among the Indian States' representatives: Nawab of Bhopal, Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan of Gwalior, Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Hydari, and Sir Mirza Muhammad Ismail.[1]

A major achievement of this session was the evolution of a federal system of government for India and the acceptance of it by the native States. This was the work of the Federal Structure Sub-Committee. Eight other sub-committees were appointed to study and report on the problems relating to the provincial constitutions, minority safeguards, separation of Burma from India, separation of Sind from Bombay, constitutional status of the North-West Frontier Province, franchise, defence, and the imperial services. The greatest issue behind all constitutional and political devices was that of Hindu-Muslim relationship. The first session did nothing to bring it any nearer the solution. In fact, Muslims had come away from London with the strong suspicion that the

1. Full list in *The Times*, 11 September 1930.

British Government was more interested in satisfying Hindu ambitions than allaying Muslim fears of Hindu rule. They felt that enough attention had not been give to their problems and apprehensions perhaps because their power as an important factor in Indian politics was not appreciated.[1] This impression was heightened by the speech of the prime minister, J. R. MacDonald, at the close of the session, on 19 January, 1931. Muslim opinion was unanimous in considering it as an unwanted, unnecessary and undesirable slur on their community.[2]

The second session of the Round Table Conference opened in the autumn of 1931. In the spring an agreement had been reached between the Government of India and the Congress (popularly known as Gandhi-Irwin or Delhi Pact) by which Gandhi had agreed to attend the conference as the sole spokesman of the Congress.[3] Muslim delegates to this session were: The Aga Khan, Sir Ali Imam, Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto, Nawab Sir Ahmad Said Khan of Chhitari, Maulvi Muhammad Shafi Daoodi, Raja Sher Muhammad Khan, Fazl ul-Haq, A. H. Ghuznavi, Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Hafiz Hidayat Husain, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, M.A. Jinnah, Nawab Sir Syed Muhammad Mehr Shah, Syed Muhammad Padshah, Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Begum Shah Nawaz, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. The Indian States delegation contained four Muslims: Nawab of Bhopal, Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan of Gwalior, Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Hydari, and Sir Mirza Muhammad Ismail.[4] A serious effort was made by this session to bring about a Hindu-Muslim settlement. The Aga Khan, as the chief Muslim spokesman, argued with Gandhi for long hours, but to no effect. Gandhi claimed to represent all India and stipulated a Muslim acceptance of

1. See L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "India between the Confernces", *Foreign Affairs* (Washington), July 1931, p. 626.

2. This was conveyed in a resolution of the All India Muslim Conference Working Committee dated 7 February 1931, reproduced in the *The Times*, 9 February 1931; see also *ibid.*, 27 February 1931.

3. This agreement caused much resentment among the Muslims. See *The Times*, 27 February 1931; *India in 1930-31* (Calcutta, 1932), p. 119; Sir J. S. Wardlaw-Milner in the *Asiatic Review*, April 1931, p. 206; and Patric Lacey in the *Nineteenth Century and After* (London), May 1936, pp. 595-596; and for its appalling result at Cawnpore, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Cawnpore Riots*, (London, 1931), Cmd. 3891.

4. Full list in *The Times*, 5 August 1931.

the Nehru Report as a prior condition of any agreement. As this was impossible, nothing happened. Muslim demands at the Conference were based on the resolutions of the All India Muslim Conference adopted between January 1929 and April 1931.[1]

As no communal settlement had been reached in the session, it was left to the Prime Minister to give an award. This he did on 10 August, 1932 in what is known as the Communal Award.[2] The last session of the conference met on 17 November, 1932 and ended on 24 December of the same year. There were fewer delegates from all sides to this session. There were seven Muslims in the total British Indian delegation of twenty-two : The Aga Khan, A. H. Ghuznavi, Hafiz Hidayat Husain, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Begum Shah Nawaz, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, and Muhammad Zufrulla Khan. Out of the 11-man delegation from the Indian States there were four Muslims: Nawab Liaquat Hayat Khan from Patiala, Wajahat Husain from Kashmir, Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Hydari from Hyderabad and Rewa, and Sir Mirza Muhammad Ismail from Mysore.[3] The session was brief, unfruitful and unimportant. The Congress was again absent. The recommendations of the three sessions of the Round Table Conference were published as a White Paper in March 1933.[4] The British Parliament debated it on 17 March and the Government won a three-to-one victory.

The next stage was the consideration of the White Paper by a Joint Select Committee of both houses of Parliament. Each chamber nominated sixteen members. The Commons' representatives were: C.R. Attlee, R. A. Butler, Edward Cadogan, Austin Chamberlain, Cocks, Reginald Craddock, J. C. C. Davidson, Isaac Foot, Samual Hoare, Morgan Jones, Joseph Wall, Lord Eustace Percy, Miss Pickford, John Simon, John Wardlaw-Milner, and Earl Winterton. The House of Lords elected the following : Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, and Lords Salisbury, Zetland, Linlithgow, Reading, Derby, Lytton, Peel, Burnham (later succeeded by Middleton), Lothian, Hardinge, Snell, Halifax, Hutchinson, and Rankeillour.

1. For details see *The Times*, 7 April 1931, where Muslim demands are clearly summarized.

2. See Cmd. 4147 of 1932.

3. *Indian Round Table Conference (Third Session)*, London, 1933, Cmd. 4238, pp. 6-7.

4. Cmd. 4268 of 1933.

Constitutionally this was a Parliamentary committee and could be composed only of members of Parliament, but with a view to associating Indian politicions with its work twenty-one representatives from British India and seven from the States were appointed as assessors to the Committee. The British Indian assessors were the Aga Khan, Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Sir Hubert Carr, A.H. Ghuznavi, Sir Henry Gidney, Sir Hari Singh Gour, A. Rangaswami Iyengar, M. R. Jayakar, N. M. Joshi, N.C. Kelkar, Begum Shah Nawaz, Sir A. P. Patro, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Phiroze Sethna, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Sardar Buta Singh, Sir Nripendra Nath Sircar, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan. The States delegates were Sir V. T. Krishnama Chari, Nawab Sir Liaqat Hayat Khan, Nawab Sir Mohammad Akbar Hydari, Sir Mirza Muhammad Ismail, Sir Manubhai Nandshanker Mehta, Sir P.D. Pattani, and Y. Thombare.

The committee sat under the Marquess of Linlithgow (later to be the Viceroy of India) from April 1933 to November 1934, holding a total of 159 meetings and examining 120 witnesses. It reported to the Parliament on 22 November, 1934.[1] The whole of the introductory chapter and some passages in later chapters were written by Lord Eustace Percy.[2] The report was carried by 19 members to 9, the minority being made up of five diehards and four Labourites. The House of Commons debated it on 10, 11 and 12 December 1934, and the Government won a four-to-one victory. On 18 December the House of Lords also approved it by 239 votes to 62, the largest voting since December 1927 when the Prayer Book measure had been adopted by 241 to 88 votes. In terms of peerage ranks the voting in the upper chamber showed the following interesting picture:

Peers	*For the Amendment*	*Against the Amendment*
Archbishops	—	2
Dukes	3	1
Marquesses	1	12
Earls	15	43
Viscounts	6	27
Bishops	1	11
Barons	36	143

1. The *Report* was issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, as a Parliamentary Paper [H.L. 6 (I Part I) and H.C. 5 (I Part I) of 1934].

2. See his *Some Memories* (London, 1955), p. 155.

The Ecclesiastical Lords voted overwhelmingly for the Government. So did the Marquesses. The Dukes sprang a surprise; their Graces voted for what would have been the Labour Party stand had it not abstained.[1]

1. These figures are taken from *The Times*, 19 December 1934.

6

This was the twenty-fourth sesssion of the All-India Muslim League. The chairman of the Reception Committee was Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim.[1]

Sir Saiyid Wazir Hasan was born on 14 May, 1874, and was educated at Government High School, Balia, Muir Central College, Allahabad, and the M.A.O. College, Aligarh. He joined the Lucknow Bar in 1903. Served as secretary of the All-India Muslim League from 1912 to 1919. Appointed Additional Judicial Commissioner of Oudh in 1920, Judge of the Chief Court of Oudh in 1925, and Chief Judge of Oudh in February 1930. Retired in 1934. Knighted in 1932. Lived in Lucknow on a road named after him.[2]

Abdul Hamid Khan, a prominent Muslim Leaguer, and at this time the Mayor of Madras, made a speech "at a meeting of the members of the Muslim Parliament" in Madras on 26 April 1936, giving his impressions of the Bombay session which he had recently attended.[3] As there was no "Muslim Parliament" in Madras, probably the reference means a meeting of Muslim members of the Madras legislature.

1. For his address at the session see Pirzada, *Foundations* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 234-239. Full text of the presidential address is also reproduced here, pp. 239-259.

2. *Who's Who 1941* (London, n.d.).

3. See *The Indian Annual Register 1936* (Calcutta, n.d.), Vol I, pp. 297-298.

7

The resolution was proposed by M. A. Jinnah and seconded by Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim of Bombay. Speeches in support of it were made by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of the Punjab, Husain Imam of Patna, Atia Begum of Bombay, Mullah Noorbhai Dadanwalla of Bombay, I. I. Chundrigar of Ahmadabad, and Akhtar Hasan of the Central Provinces.[1] These names are mentioned in the Muslim League official records (from where the text of the resolution has been taken); but the *Indian Annual Register* reported that similar speeches were also made by Haji Rashid Ahmad of Delhi, Liaquat Ali Khan of the United Provinces, Abdul Hamid Khan of Madras, and Maulana Irfan of Bombay.[2]

1. For a resume of the speeches of Jinnah, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Husain Imam see Pirzada, *Foundations*, Vol. II, pp. 261-263.

2. *The Indian Annual Register 1936* (Calcutta, n. d.), Vol. I, p. 297.

8

This was the forty-ninth session of the Indian National Congress. The chairman of the Reception Committee was Sri Prakash. Nehru's address was in Hindi and took two and a half hours to deliver.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1936* (Calcutta, n. d.), Vol. I, pp. 260-261.

9

This resolution had been prepared by the Working Committee and approved by the Subjects Committee. It was moved in the open session by Rajendra Prasad and attracted a large number of speakers, some of whom offered their own amendments. Among those who spoke were T. Prakasam, Sardar Sardul Singh Caveesher, S. Sampurnananda, Seth Govind Das, D. C. Chakravarty, G. B. Pant, Yusuf Meherally, Acharya Kripalani, Satyamurthi, Madan Mohan Malaviya, and Vallabhai Patel.[1] Finally the resolution was carried without a division.

1. For summaries of some of the speeches see *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. I, pp. 279-284.

10

This was the fiftieth regular session of the Indian National Congress. It was held at Faizpur in the Maharashtra. The chairman of the Reception Committee was Shankerrao Deo, who took forty minutes to deliver his address which was in Marhatti. "The President took an hour and forty-five minutes to deliver his address in Hindi. He had the English version by his side and spoke extempore. He ended the address with 'Vandemataram'."[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. II, p. 214.

11

The Lucknow session of the All India Muslim League was the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the party. It met in the Lalbagh. This resolution was moved by Maulana Hasrat Mohani of the United Provinces, and seconded by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan of the Punjab. Speeches in support of it were made by Shamsul Hasan.[1] of Bengal, Maulana Mazheruddin of Delhi, Abdul Waheed of the North-West Frontier Province, Syed Murtaza Bahadur of Madras, Syed Abdur Rauf of the Central Provinces, Syed Husain Imam of Bihar, Mian Ghiasuddin of the Punjab, Abdur Rahman Siddiqi of Bengal, I. I. Chundrigar of Bombay, Munshi Azhar Ali and Choudhri Khaliquzzaman of the United Provinces. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada mentions another speaker, Begum Muhammad Ali, who does not find a place in the official list of speakers.[2] The resolution was passed unanimously.[3]

1. The Muslim League publication gives his name as "Shamsul Hasan" (*Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from October 1937 to December 1938*, Delhi, n. d., p. 5), and Pirzada (*Foundations*, Vol. II, p. 275) as Shamsul Husain.

2. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

3. For short summaries of some of the speeches see *ibid.*, pp. 274-277.

12

This resolution was passed in the fourth sitting of the open session on 18 October. It was moved by Husain Imam of Bihar, seconded by Maulana Hasrat Mohani of the United Provinces, and I. I. Chundrigar of Bombay spoke in support of it.[1]

1. For brief summaries of these speeches see *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, pp, 407-408.

13

It was passed on the second day of the nineteenth annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha at Ahmedabad. Speaking on it, Dr. B. S. Moonje said that the attempt to divide India into Hindu India and Muslim India would be frustrated by the acceptance of the Federation. Sir Gokal Chand Narang pointed out that their "power of resistance" would be increased by doing this. Karandikar also spoke.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, p. 421.

14

The Haripura (in Gujarat) session was the fifty-first Congress session. The chairman of the Reception Committee was Sardar Darbar Gopaldas, and the year's president Subhas Chandra Bose.

15

This was No. 6 of the 27 resolutions passed at the twentieth annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur. The chairman of the Reception Committee for this session was M. G. Chitnavis, and the year's president Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. The resolutions were passed on 29-30 December; the 28th was entirely taken up by the addresses.

16

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of the Punjab moved this resolution, saying that it was an essential corollary to Jinnah's resolution on the Constitution Act. Haji Rashid Ahmad of Delhi seconded it. Speeches in support of it were made by Maulana Ahmad Saeed of Delhi, Muhammad Yusuf, Husain Imam of Bihar, Muhammad Sulaiman Cassim Mitha of Bombay, Abdul Hamid Khan of Madras, Liaquat Ali Khan of the United Provinces, and Maulana Irfan of Bombay. The resolution was carried unanimously.[1]

1. *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936* (Delhi, n.d.), p. 68, and *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. I, pp. 296-297.

17

According to one source, the Muslim League Parliamentary Board had discussions "lasting over four days" before it adopted the Manifesto It was issued from Lahore on 11 June 1936.[1] It appears that the appointment of the Parliamentary Board was authorized by a resolution passed at the annual session of the League held at Bombay on 11 and 12 April 1936, though this resolution does not mention a Parliamentary Board, but directs "Mr. M. A. Jinnah to form a Central Election Board under his presidentship, consisting of not less than 35 members, with powers to constitute and affiliate provincial election boards in various provinces." The resolution was proposed by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and seconded by Haji Rashid Ahmad of Delhi.[2] It has not been possible to find the official list of names which made up the Parliamentary Board. However, one source gives us the names of the "prominent" members of this body as Fazlul Haq, Maulana Akram Khan, M.A.H. Ispahani and Abdur Rahman Siddiqi (Bengal), Sayyid Murtaza Sahib and Abdul Hamid Khan (Madras), Nawab M. Ismail Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan, Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Raja of Mahmudabad and Maulana Husain Ahmad (United Provinces), Sayyid Abdur Rauf and Yusuf Sharif (Central Provinces), Abdul Matin Chaudhri (Assam) Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and Hashim Gazdar (Sind), Allah Bakhsh Yusufi and Malik Khuda Bakhsh (N.W.F.P.), Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Mian Abdul Aziz, Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Shaikh Hisamuddin and Chaudhri Afzal Haq (Punjab), Maulana Ahmad Said (Delhi), Sir Sulaiman Cassim Mitha, Abu Bakr Beg Muhammad and I. I. Chundri-

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. I, p. 299.

2. *Resolution of the All-India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936*, All-India Muslim League Office, Delhi n.d., Resolution No. 9, pp. 67-68.

gar (Bombay).[1]

As later the Indian National Congress leaders declined to form coalition ministries in the provinces on the ground that the League was a "reactionary" body and its programme was so different from the "progressive" Congress, it is pertinent to recall the comments of some non-Muslim League observers on the nature and character of the Muslim League manifesto.

In the opinion of Professor Muhammad Mujeeb, a staunch Nationalist Muslim, "the manifesto issued by the League showed as much awareness of the peoples needs as that of the Congress".[2] Sir Reginald Coupland, who made a most detailed study of this period, believed that "to all appearances the social policy it [the League manifesto] advocated was much the same as the Congress policy",[3] and "whatever its precise implications, the League manifesto was clearly on offer of co-operation."[4] Another British observer thinks that the manifesto "had been studiously conciliatory to Congress, and was clearly a bid to revive the co-operation of the period which had opened with the Lucknow Pact of 1916."[5]

1. Jamiluddin Ahmad, *Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement* (Lahore, 1969), p. 160.
2. M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims* (London, 1967) p. 439.
3. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 13.
4. *Ibid.*. p. 15.
5. E.W.R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47* (London, 1954), p. 21.

18

This manifesto was drafted by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress,[1] and the draft placed beforet he All India Congress Committee at Bombay on 22-23 August 1936. Dr. Rajendra Prasad moved for its adoption and Narendra Rao seconded the motion. Several amendments were moved. Two of them were accepted. Then the manifesto was put to vote and unanimously carried.[2]

The comment on this document of the Bombay correspondent of *The Times* is interesting: "It declares that the purpose of sending Congressmen to Legislatures under the New Act is not to co-operate with the Act but to combat it and seek to end it. An attempt has been made to placate the Congress Nationalist Group by unreserved condemnation of the Communal Award.... It is remarkable that the long manifesto gives no details of the party's programme, except platitudes about independence and a Constituent Assembly. The sole assurance given to voters is that pending the formation of a fuller programme, the Congress Party reiterates its declaration that there should be reform of the land tenure system, giving immediate relief to the smaller peasantry while striving to improve conditions of life for the industrial workers.... What was described two years ago the Communal Award is now termed the 'Communal Decision' in order to please Hindu Nationalists, for if it is only a decision it is open to challenge.... In one and the same breath the manifesto wants to wreck the Constitution and use it for ameliorating the conditions of agriculturists and

1. At this time the Working Committee consisted of the following: Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel, C. Rajagopalacharia, Jamnalal Bajaj, Jairamdas Daulatram, Bhulabhbhai J. Desai, Shankerrao Deo, Jaiprakash Narayan, Achut Patwardhan, J.B. Kripalani, and Jawaharlal Nehru(president) ; *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. II, p. 179.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 188. The manifesto is reproduced on pp. 188-191.

industrial workers.[1]

Two days later, the journal's Simla correspondent wrote: "Criticism [against the Congress manifesto] is directed chiefly against the Party's attitude to the Communal Award and the question of acceptance of office. The manifesto, in disapproving of the Award, recommends an intensification of the campaign for independence as the best means of eliminating it from the Constitution. This finds no favour among the Congressmen of Bengal and Punjab....The idea that a Constituent Assembly may yet evolve an alternative constitution is still hinted at, but this overlooks divergent elements within the country that would oppose such an Assembly for the same reasons for which the Communal Award was opposed—fear of a Hindu oligarchy being established."[2]

1. Bombay Correspondent's Dispatch, *The Times*, 24 August 1936.
2. Simla Correspondent's Dispatch, *ibid.*, 26 August 1936.

19

The President of the Indian National Congress sent a circular letter to all the provincial Congress Committees in which he wrote the following about this resolution: "This resolution, as embodying the Congress policy in regard to the elections, should be clearly explained and the implications of the Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution for a free India pointed out. It should be stated that this Constituent Assembly is very different from an All Party [*sic.*] Conference. It will be a Grand Panchayat of the nation, elected on an adult franchise, meeting when the reality of power has already shifted to the people so that they can give effect to their decisions without any interference from outside authority. It will be the only proper method of establishing a free democratic state for which the Congress stands."[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. II, pp. 211-212.

20

This table has been reproduced here because it shows the results partywise. The more detailed results were given in the White Paper on the elections: *Return showing the Results of Elections in India 1937* (London, 1937, Cmd. 5589); but it does not indicate the party of the successful candidate, only his community. For a complete list of Muslim members elected to the provincial legislatures (councils and assemblies) see Appendix II of the present volume.

What did the election results show? Let us analyse them and see what we find. In six of the eleven British Indian provinces a bicameral legislature was created by the 1935 Act. The Congress performance in the Legislative Councils (upper chambers) of these six provinces was:[1]

Province	*Total Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
Madras	46	33	26
Bihar	26	12	8
Bombay	26	15	13
U. P.	52	19	8
Bengal	57	12	9
Assam	23	1	—
Total	229	92	64

Thus in the upper houses of six provinces (five of which were overwhelmingly Hindu provinces) the Congress contested only 92 out of a total of 230 seats and could win only 64, i.e., a little more than a quarter.

It could be claimed that performance in election to the upper chambers was not a fair standard of judgment, because franchise for this

1. All India Congress Committee figures given in *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 168. The total in the first column is incorrect; it should be 230.

election was severely restricted and only the well-to-do qualified for a vote. Let us, therefore, now look at the elections to the lower houses, Legislative Assemblies, of all the eleven provinces to discover the support given to the Congress by the enfranchised citizenry[1]:

Province	*Total Leg. Ass. Seats*	*Seats won by Congress*	*Percentage of Congress Seats*	*Percentage of Congress Votes*
Madras	215	159	74	65
Bihar	152	98	65	75
Bengal	250	56[2]	22	25
C. P. and Berar	112	70	62.5	61
Bombay	175	86	49	56
U. P.	228	134	59	65
Punjab	175	18	10.5	13
N.W.F.P.	50	19	38[3]	—
Sind	60	7	11.5	12
Assam	108	33	31	—
Orissa	60	36	60	—
	1585	716	43.5 approx.	46.5 approx.

This all-India performance does not make out the Congress to be a party with popular mass support. In fact, on this showing, it does not even come out as the representative of a majority of the people. In all the lower houses of British India it won less than half the total number of seats, and more significantly, less than half of all the votes cast.

To what extent the Congress represented the Muslims of India is a question to which we will shortly turn. Excluding the Muslim seats, let us next find out the state of Congress success in the non-Muslim or

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 42.

2. In the table prepared by the All India Congress Committee this figure appears as 54; see *ibid.*, p. 168, a.

3. In the table prepared by the All India Congress Committee this figure appears as 37; *see ibid.*, p. 168,o.

general seats. The official figures issued by the Congress itself are[1]:

Province		*Total Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
Madras	L. A.	116	114	111
	L. C.	35	33	26
Bihar	L. A.	78	77	73
	L. C.	9	6	—
Bombay	L. A.	92	84	69
	L. C.	20	15	13
U. P.	L. A.	124	123	114
	L. C.	34	19	8
Bengal	L. A.	48	48	43
	L. C.	10	6	3
C. P.	L. A.	65	64	58
Punjab	L. A.	42	?	10
N.W.F.P.	L. A.	9	8	4
Sind	L. A.	18	11	5
Orissa	L. A.	?[45]	?	?[33]
Assam	L. A.	?[47]	?	?[33]

Except in the Bengal Legislative Assembly the Congress nowhere contested all the general seats, and of course did not win all that it contested. Thus it could not even be accepted as the spokesman of all non-Muslim India.

Did the Congress win all, or most of, the Scheduled Castes seats? Gandhi had threatened to die by fasting if separate representation given to the Scheduled Castes on their insistence by the Communal Award was not withdrawn. The following table shows the Congress performance

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 168, f-168, p. The figures in square brackets are taken from the official results as given in Cmd. 5589. The All-India Congress Committee left the Orissa and Assam columns blank.

in the Schedule Castes seats[1]:

Province	*Total Scheduled Caste Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
Madras	30	26	26
Bihar	15	15	14
Bombay	15	8	4
U. P.	20	17	16
Bengal	30	17	6
C. P.	19	9	5
Total	129	92	71

In Bombay, Bengal and the Central Provinces the Congress failed badly. Across the board, it won a little more than half of the total untouchable seats—hardly evidence enough to claim that the Congress spoke for this group.

What about the Sikhs? Did they vote for the Congress? A great majority of them were to be found in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. In these two provinces the Congress performance, or rather the lack of it, in Sikh seats was[2]:

Province	*Total Sikh Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
Punjab	31	—	4
N.W.F.P.	3	—	—
Total	34	—	4

The figures need no comment.

Did the Congress enjoy greater support among the Indian Christians? Congress official figures show the following result[3]:

Province	*Total Christian Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
Madras L.A.	8	7	3
L.C.	3	—	—
Bihar L.A.	1	—	—
Bombay L.A.	3	1	—
U.P. L.A.	2	—	—
Bengal L.A.	2	—	—
Punjab L.A.	2	—	—
Total	21	8	3

1. These are the All India Congress Committee figures as reproduced in *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 168, f-168, m. All these are for the Legislative Assemblies.

2. The All-India Congress Committee figures as given in *ibid.*, pp. 168, n-168,o.

3. The All-India Congress Committee figures reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 168, f-168, n.

The Congress had no right to claim that it spoke for the nearly five million Indian Christians.[1]

As for the Muslim seats, the Congress contes'ed only 58 of them: 9 in Madras. 7 in Bihar, 2 in Bombay, 9 in the U.P., 2 in the C. P., and 29 in the N.W.F.P. Out of these 58 it won only 26: 4 in Madras, 5 in Bihar, 2 in the Punjab, and 15 in the N.W.F.P.[2]

In sum, on the Congress's own reckoning the over-all picture emerges like this[3]:

Category	*Total Seats*	*Seats contested by Congress*	*Seats won by Congress*
General	792	608	603
Scheduled Castes	129	92	71
Sikh	34	—	4
Christian	21	8	3
Muslim	482	58	26
Labour	38	20	18
Landholders	37	8	4
Commerce and Industry	56	8	3

With these figures before us, as they must have been before the Congress leaders, it is remarkable that the Congress went wild with joy at its own performance and its leaders issued statements congratulating one another and arguing that the election results had put a seal on their claim to speak for all India. In a resolution of 27 February 1937, passed at Wardha, the Congress Working Committee congratulated "the nation on its wonderful response to the call of the Congress during the recent elections, demonstrating the adherence of the masses to Congress policy".[4] Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru talked of election results in such terms as our success has been overwhelm-

1. According to the 1921 census there were 4,464,000 Christians in British India (excluding Europeans and Anglo-Indians); *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (London, 1930, Vol. I, Cmd. 3568), table on p. 109. By 1937 their number would have been near the five million mark.

2. These are official Congress figures as given in *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 168, f-168, p. All these were in the Legislative Assemblies.

3. Foregoing tables and the one given in *ibid.*, p. 168b. All these are All-India Congress Committee figures.

4. Congress Working Committee Resolution No. 1, Wardha, 27 February 1937, *The Indian Annual Register, 1937*, Vol. I, p. 174.

ing" and "this tremendous success".[1] The All India National Convention put its official opinion on record that "the electorate has, in overwhelming measure, set its seal on the Congress objective".[2] Vallabhai J. Patel, a front-rank Congress leader, declared that "we have more than achieved our object" and "the Congress has come out with flying colours in the election".[3] A recent Hindu historian has called the Congress performance a "spectacular victory"[4].

As for the Congress failure to win Muslim seats and votes, two explanations of this may be juxtaposed without commentary. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress president of that year and the author of the Congress-Muslim mass contact campaign, declared: "Only in regard to Muslim seats did we lack success. But our very failure on this occasion has demonstrated that success is easily in our grasp and Muslim masses are increasingly turning to the Congress. We failed because we had long neglected working among the Muslim masses and we could not reach them in time. But where we reached, especially in the rural areas, we found almost the same response, the same anti-imperialist spirit, as in others. The communal problem, of which we hear so much, seemed to be utterly non-existent, when we talked to the peasant, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. We failed also among the Muslims because of their much smaller electorate, which could easily be manipulated and coerced by authority and vested interests. But I am convinced that even so, we would have had a much larger measure of success if we had paid more attention to the Muslim masses"[5].

A Congress official had this to say of the party's failure to succeed among the Muslims: "The Congress Parliamentary Board displayed a highly deplorable vacillation and lack of self-confidence in putting up Congress candidates for Muslim constituencies. The question of contest-

1. Nehru's presidential address to the All-India National Convention, Delhi, 19 March 1937, *ibid.*, pp. 207, 208.

2. All-India National Convention Resolution No. 1, Delhi, 19-20 March 1937, *ibid.*, p. 182.

3. Patel's speech on the eve of the National Convention, quoted in P. Sitaramyya, *The History of the Indian National Congress* (Bombay, 1947), Vol. II, p. 43.

4. S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi* (Calcutta, 1966), p. xiii.

5. Jawaharlal Nehru's presidential address to the All-India National Convention, Delhi, 19 March 1937, *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 207-208. See also Jawaharlal Nehru, *Eighteen months in India, 1936-1937: being further Essays and Writings* (Allahabad, 1938), pp. 111-113.

ing Muslim seats was never considered seriously by the Parliamentary Board, and the field was left entirely open to communal and reactionary individuals and organizations....It was virtually decided by the Congress not to approach the Muslim masses directly except in the N.W.F.P. This was nothing short of a betrayal of those millions of Muslims—peasants, workers, poor artisans and shopkeepers, etc.—who could have been easily won over by the Congress provided a direct appeal was made to their economic interests which are identical with those of the Hindu masses. The defeatist policy of the Congress leadership threw the Muslim masses entirely into the arms of the reactionaries".[1]

Unfortunately for the Congress, outside testimony and impartial evidence do not bear out the truth of its statements and claims. According to one calculation, the Congress polled about 15,000,000 out of a total of 35,000,000 votes, and was thus a minority party in India.[2] During the campaign *The Times* had commented that "only a very small section" of Muslims had at any time identified itself with the Congress.[3] One contemporary observer recorded that election results confirmed that the Congress "held Hindustan only, with an unfortunate stress on the first two syllables".[4]

The *Economist* summarized the election results in one sentence, "With the exception of Assam, with its peculiar racial and economic make-up, the provinces may be divided into two simple groups Moslem India (the Punjab, Sind, Bengal, and the North-West Frontier) and Congress India".[5]

The Congress, reported Patrick Lacey, "had difficulty in finding Moslem candidates for the provincial elections....Several, however, were put up in the United Provinces. Only one of them succeeded, and he was returned from the special University constituency, where there is a big Hindu majority in a joint electorate. Among the victims was the Moslem President of the Provincial Congress Committee". And he continued: "The course of the elections suggests that the jargon of today

1. Dr. Z. A. Ahmad (of the Economic and Political Department of the Indian National Congress headquarters), "Some Lessons of the Elections," *Congress Socialist*, 30 March 1937.

2. A.R. Barbour, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 23 September 1942.

3. *The Times* (leader), 31 December 1936.

4. Patrick Lacey, "Deadlock in India", *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1937, p. 105.

5. *Economist*, 27 February 1937, p 461.

might credit the Congress and the Moslems with different ideologies; and something more. Look at their political geography. The Indian annexe of an Islamic *bloc*, stretching away to Constantinople and Cairo, is a group of Moslem territories: the tribal Frontier, the N.W.F.P., the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, to say nothing of an eighty per cent Moslem Kashmir....With all these facts brought home by the result of their own party's efforts, men on the Right of the Congress naturally disliked the risk of intensifying the cleavage by wide differences of constitutional method....If certain Provinces want to go ahead with the new *regime*, they may incline to independent impatience of handicaps caused by deadlock and obstruction elsewhere; and that impatience may embarrass Federalism or any Central Government of the future. It is inconsistent with nationalist dreams, and cannot suit the Congress book, that this tendency should be most pronounced in the Moslem *bloc* of Provinces, give them special favour in the eyes of the outside world, perhaps widen the communal gulf, and even possibly revive thoughts of Pakistan, remote though these may be just now".[1] This is perceptive, indeed.

This note may well be concluded with a contemporary first-hand report of how and why the Congress succeeded in capturing more seats than any other single party. "The general success", wrote *The Times*' India correspondent, "was largely due to sentimental regard left for a movement which has focussed and fostered the national aims, to an intensive and thorough party organization, and to the obvious dissatisfaction of the poorest voters and the unemployed....There was a widespread tendency to interpret the elections as a contest between the candidates and the Government, which was not in the electoral field at all. There appeared to be little realization, except perhaps in the Punjab, that the campaigners themselves would have to form the new Governments..Mr. Gandhi unconsiously brought thousands of votes into the Congress ballot boxes. Many illiterate voters informed the returing officers, particularly in Bihar, that they wanted to vote for the Mahatma; many of them made *puja* (worship) to the Congress ballot-boxes in the belief that they enshrined the Mahatma's spirit. Others believed that the Congress boxes were Government boxes, showing how deeply the idea of Congress as an alternative government has taken root"[2] .

1 Patrick Lacey, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-107.

2. India Correspondent, "India after the Elections: Jubilant Congress: Advantage of a Party Machine", *The Times*, 15 March 1937.

21

See Note on Document 5

22

This White Paper contained the recommendations of the Round Table Conference. On its publication *The Times* had given it a rather unenthusiastic welcome by declaring that it only faithfully translated the measure of agreement reached at the Conference and that its workability would depend upon a common readiness to work it.[1] But later, when the Joint Committee on Reform had heard its witnesses for and against the document, the journal dared to bestow on it a more warm-hearted approval, mainly because, as the newspaper confessed, none of the opponents could produce a workable alternative and because the defence was remarkably able.[2] The *Manchester Guardian* was much pleased with the White Paper proposals, chiefly because they created a strong federal centre which, said the journal, was the demand of the "nationalists"—a collective noun adopted by it for the Hindus only.[3]

1. *The Times* (leader), 18 March 1933.
2. *Ibid.* (leader), 22 November 1933.
3. *Manchester Guardian*, 18 March 1933.

23

See Note on Document 6.

24

This extract is given here to show that the provincial governors were expressly charged with the duty of protecting the minorities living in their area, and, for the proper discharge of this duty, were clothed with special powers. These special powers were the safeguards of the minorities' rights and liberties. The Congress party refused to take office unless the governors promised not to exercise these special powers.

25

These instructions supplement the contents of the previous document. In order to remove a not uncommon misconception, it may be pointed out that the Instrument of Instructions was not a sort of an informal, private communication between the Sovereign and the Governor, without legal implications or constitutional status. It was a document issued by the Crown after its draft had been approved by both houses of Parliament. Constitutionally it was as difficult for a governor to forswear the instructions he had received from the person who had appointed him as it was impossible for him to renounce the exercise of powers without which he could not discharge his statutory duty of protecting the minorities of his province.

26

The All India Congress Committee met at Ansari Nagar at Delhi. According to one report, 215 members were present. Jawaharlal Nehru was in the chair. Rajendra Prasad moved this resolution on "The New Constitution and Congress Policy" and Vallabhai Patel seconded it. Previously the Working Committee of the Congress had discussed and recommended it. The principal amendment, moved by Jaiprakash Narain "advised non-acceptance of ministerial offices in the provinces in place of the conditional acceptance recommended by the Working Committee." The debate was spread over two days and about thirty members participated in it. Narain's amendment was defeated by 78 votes to 135. Other amendments were lost by overwhelming majorities. The resolution was finally passed by 127 votes to 70.[1]

The earlier meeting of the Working Committee, at which the resolution had been discussed and then recommended to the All India Congress Committee, was held at Wardha on 27 and 28 February and 1 March, 1937, under Nehru's presidentship.

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 177. The resolution is also reproduced here on pp. 177-178.

27

The Indian National Congress had decided, at its Faizpur annual session in December 1936, to summon, after the provincial elections, an all-India National Convention ' consisting of Congress members of the various provincial and central legislatures, the members of the All India Congress Committee, and such other persons as the Working Committee might decide upon." The Convention "shall put the demand for the Constituent Assembly in the forefront, shall determine all feasible methods for ending the constitution in the provinces and for opposing the introduction of the Federal Structure of the new Act, and will consider what other steps should be taken in the legislatures to give effect to the policy laid down in the Congress Election Manifesto, Congress resolutions, and the decisions of the All India Congress Committee".[1]

This Convention met at Delhi on 19 and 20 March 1937. It was attended by 215 members of the All India Congress Committee and about 500 members of the different assemblies. Jawaharlal Nehru presided. Besides the address of the chairman of the reception committee, the presidential address and the resolutions, the Convention also made all the participants take the following pledge: "I, a member of this All-India Convention, pledge myself to the service of India and to work in the legislatures and outside for the independence of India and the ending of the exploitation and poverty of her people. I pledge myself to work under the discipline of the Congress for the furtherance of Congress ideals and objectives to the end that India may be free and independent and her millions freed from the heavy burdens they suffer."[2] This pledge was taken from all members on the opening day. The resolutions were passed on the

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1936*, Vol. II, pp. 205-206.
2. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 181-182.

second day, *i.e.*, 20 March, 1937. Apart from the resolution reproduced here, two others were passed dealing, respectively, with Congress policy in the legislatures and extra-parliamentary activities of the members of the legislatures.

28

On 25 March the Governor of Bombay had invited B. G. Kher to form a ministry. Kher had refused to do so unless the Governor could give him a definite assurance in these terms : "That his Excellency would not use, in regard to the constitutional activities of the Cabinet, his special powers of interference, or set aside the advice of his Ministers." On 27 March another meeting took place. The governor again extended the invitation, Kher again demanded the same undertaking, and the governor again told him that he could not do so under the constitution. After this meeting the Government of Bombay issued a communique saying, in part, "The terms of the Act are unambiguous and as the demand put forward by the Congress party is constitutionally impossible, the responsibility adhering thereto must rest with the Congress party. . .there can be no question of any undertaking from him [the Governor of Bombay] in regard to restrictions or limitations of the obligations imposed on the Governors under the terms of the Act."[1]

The Governor of Orissa held two similar meetings with the leader of the Congress Party in the Orissa Legislative Assembly, Bishwanath Das, with similar results. These were on 24 and 26 March. This drill was repeated in Bihar, Madras, the Central Provinces and the United Provinces.[2] In each case the Governor made it plain that what the Congress was asking him to do clearly amounted to an undertaking on his part to break the constitution and disregard the Instrument of Instructions.

1. For full text of the communique see *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 238.

2. For the text of the communiques by the governments of these provinces see *ibid.*, pp. 238-242.

29

Marquess of Zetland; Lawrence John Lumley Dundas (1876-1961). Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912-14. Governor of Bengal, 1917-22. Secretary of State for India, 1935-40. President, Royal India Society, 1923-50, and Royal Asiatic Society, 1928-31. Member of the Indian Round Table Conference, 1930-31. Member, Joint Select Committee on India, 1933-34. Author of *India: A Bird's-Eye View* (1924), *The Heart of Aryavarta* (1925), *The Life of Lord Curzon* (1928), *The Life of Lord Cromer* (1932), and *Steps Towards Indian Home Rule* (1935).

On him see his own '*Essayez*' : *The Memoirs of Lawrence, second Marquess of Zetland*, London, 1956.

30

The Working Committee met at Allahabad on 26, 27 and 28 April and, it is reported, spent a total of 28 hours on discussing this resolution. At this time the Committee consisted of Abul Kalam Azad, Sarojini Naidu, Vallabhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Jamnalal Bajaj, Subhas Chandra Bose, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Jairamdas Daulatram, Bhulabhai Desai, G. B. Pant, Narendra Dev, Shankarrao D. Deo, Achchut Patwardhan, and J. B. Kripalani. Jawaharlal Nehru presided. This meeting was not attended by two members: Ghaffar Khan and Shankarrao Deo. M. K. Gandhi, Rajagopalacharia, Mirdula Sarabhai and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai were present by special invitation. Leaders of the Congress parliamentary parties in provincial assemblies were also invited to be present for consultation. Those who attended were B. G. Kher, S. K. Sinha, N. B. Khare, Khan Sahib, and Bishwanath Das. Harkrishana Mahtab was also present.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 184.

31

See Note on Document 30.

32

Marquess of Salisbury; James Edward Hubert Gascoyne-Cecil (1861-1947). Member of Parliament, Conservative, 1885-92, 1893-1902. Lord Privy Seal, 1903-05, 1924-29. Lord President of the Council, 1922-24. Leader of the House of Lords, 1925-29.

33

Lord Lloyd; George Ambrose (1882-1941). Member of Parliament, Unionist, 1910-18, 1924-25. Governor of Bombay, 1918-23. High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, 1925-29. Secretary of State for Colonies, 1940-41. Travelled extensively in India, Burma, Tibet, the Himalayas, Egypt, Morocco and Asia Minor. Author of *The Great Opportunity* (1919), *Egypt Since Cromer* (2 Vols., 1933-34), and *The British Case* (1940).

On him see C.F. Adam, *Life of Lord Lloyd*, London, 1948.

34

Marquess of Linlithgow; Victor Alexander John Hope (1887). Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1922-24. Deputy chairman of the Unionist Party Organization, 1924-26. Chairman, Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture, 1926-28. Chairman, Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1933-34. Appointed Viceroy of India, 1936. Retired in 1943.

For a study of his viceroyalty of India, written by one of his sons, see John Glendevon, *The Viceroy at Bay*, London, 1970.

35

The members of the Working Committee present at this meeting were: Abul Kalam Azad, Sarojini Naidu, Vallabhai Patel, Rajindra Prasad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Jamnalal Bajaj, Bhulabhai Desai, G. B. Pant, Narendra Dev, Shankarro Deo, Achchut Patwardhan and J. B. Kripalani. Jawaharlal Nehru was in the chair. Rajagopalacharia and Sarat Chandra Bose attended by special invitation. B. G. Kher, N. B. Khare and Bishwanath Das were present for some time on 6 and 7 July.[1]

This resolution appears to have been passed on 7 July.[2]

The account of the Congress's official historian should be noted: "Yet, be it noted, these powers were statutory in their origin and are marked *special* after grave and solid deliberation. How were the Governors to wash their hands once for all of these very safeguards and reservations which were vested in them by law and which the vested interests of the ruling nation demanded and decreed as the real correctives to the misuse of democracy by a subject country? A battle-royal took place over the legality and the constitutional propriety of demanding such assurances. Legal or illegal, constitutional or unconstitutional was not the issue before the nation. Here was a constitution to which India was no party, which did not carry with it any traces of *self*-determination or joint deliberation but was the result of *other* determination or of external imposition. If the Indians should work such a constitution it could be only on their terms".[3] And again, "It was the contention of the British Ministers that it was not competent

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, pp. 215-216.

2. P. Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, (Bombay, 1948), Vol. II, p. 51.

3. P. Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 45.

[*sic.*] for the Governors without amendment of the Act to give the assurances required by the Congress for enabling the Congress leaders to form ministries. The Working Committee on the contrary was advised by eminent jurists that such assurances could be given strictly within the constitution."[1]

Gandhi himself admitted that he was the author of the Congress formula about office acceptance which was declared to be the sole pre-condition of Congress consent to form ministries. But Gandhi, it is reliably reported, had, at least by then, not even read the Government of India Act of 1935. He had told the Viceroy that he had never read it.[2] In the *Harijan* of 4 September 1937—the date is important, for the entire controversy about office acceptance and special safeguards had disappeared in July—Gandhi wrote, "I had not studied the Act when I advised office acceptance. I have since been studying *Provincial Autonomy* by Professor K. T. Shah.[3] This confession makes nonsense of the whole Congress stand. The Congress had fully accepted Gandhi's lead in this matter. But if Gandhi had not read the Act, how did he know that these special powers and safeguards would vitiate the working of a democratic system? How did he even know of the existence of these powers and safeguards?

The Congress was not supported by any other political party in making this demand. The Liberals opposed it.[4]

It is significant that in the whole of this controversy the Congress did not even once pause to think that its demand was bound to create serious apprehensions in the mind of the minorities. The minorities, and specially the Muslims, had acquiesced in the 1935 constitution on the strength of those of its provisions which promised them protection and saved them from an unrestricted and permanent rule of a communal majority. But it never occurred to the Congress that by refusing to work the constitution without such an undertaking, it was exposing itself to

1. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 47. A similar stand was taken by Congress in 1946-47, on the question of the interpretation of the "group clause" of the Cabinet Mission plan. Here, too, the Congress was wrong and was told this by the British Government.

2. V. B. Kulkarni, *British Statesmen in India* (Bombay, 1961), p. 385.

3. M. K. Gandhi, in *Harijan*, 4 September, 1937, quoted in B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi* (London, 1958), p. 389.

4. See the resolution, passed on 31 March, 1937 by the Council of the Western India Liberal Association under the chairmanship of Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, quoted *in extenso* in V. N. Naik, *Indian Liberalism—A Study* (Bombay, 1945), pp. 286-287.

the charge of wanting to rule in the interest and for the good of only the Hindu majority.

If in India the Congress demand was opposed by all other parties and, in fact, dreaded by the minorities, in Britain it was severely criticized by a large majority of those who took an intelligent interest in Indian developments.

The Times castigated the Congress for repudiating the authority of the Parliament and believed that the real reason behind the demand was that the Congress found itself unequal to the occasion.[1] The *Observer* wrote two strong-worded editorials. In the first, it declared: "The safeguards embedded in the Constitution are devised against the risk of freedom proving the gateway of anarchy. To dispose with them, at this stage, will be to jeopardise the whole edifice of security, prosperity, and betterment which British Government has created and to threaten India with a return to the welter of her past centuries. That we will not do so, the Congress leaders would be wise to assure themselves sooner rather than later. How much they have to learn is shown by their naive request that the Provincial Governors should bargain away the powers with which they have been explicitly entrusted against the contingency of political default."[2] In the second leader, it wrote: "The Congress wirepullers must be very ingenuous to imagine that the diplomacy of Mr. Gandhi, or anyone else, could thus dispose of one of the most vital safeguards for the Indian minorities. It is only upon the strength of such guarantees that the 80,000,000 Moslems and the other large communities which distrust Congress rule have accepted the Constitution. Their apprehensions can scarcely be diminished by witnessing this attempt to turn an important sefeguard into a 'scrap of paper' at the very opening of the new regime."[3]

These opinions were shared by several other circles. A former member of Parliament with Indian experience justified a rejection of such a demand on ground of political principles. Pure democracy, he said, postulated that minorities bowed to the will of the majority because they had faith in its moderation. Since this postulate was absent in India, these powers had been given to the Governors to protect the minorities from oppressive majorities. Since Hindus were

1. *The Times* (leader), 20 March, 1937.
2. *Observer* (leader), 4 April, 1937.
3. *Ibid.*, 11 April, 1937.

in a majority in all but four provinces, it was natural that they disliked the safeguards; it was equally natural for the Muslims to insist on them, since they were in a minority in most of the provinces.[1] In the words of a former editor of the *Statesman*, the Congress wanted the Governors to give a pledge that, despite the terms of the Act and the terms of the instructions from the Crown issued with it, they would not act except as purely constitutional rulers.[2] "It was obvious", wrote another observer, "that no Governor could lawfully contract himself out of statutory provisions which gave him no power of dispensation. The demand was, therefore, unconstitutional. To concede it would, moreover, have been a betrayal of interests for the protection of which, in the main, these powers had, in the general settlement, been reserved."[3] Similar views were expressed by the Marquess of Dufferin.[4]

Portions of the House of Lords debate on this question have already been reproduced in the body of this book.[5] In the House of Commons, in answer to a question by Major Attlee, Butler, the Under Secretary of State for India, made this statement on 8 April, 1937: "I feel sure that no doubt will be felt in any quarter of the House that it was impossible for any Governor to give the undertakings sought from him. Had he done so, he would have had to divest himself of the responsibilities specifically placed upon him by Parliament through the Act and the Instrument of Instructions, and also

1. Hugh Molson, "The Present Position in India", *United Empire*, January 1938, pp. 6-7. Arthur Hugh Elsdale Molson (b. 1903) had been the Political Secretary of the Associated Chamber of Commerce in India from 1926 to 1929. From 1931 to 1935 and again from 1939 onwards he was a Unionist member of Parliament. He was a privy councillor.

2. A. H. Watson, *Political Advance in India* (London, 1940), pp. 8-9. Sir Alfred Henry Watson (b. 1874) was a distinguished journalist. After working on the staff of the *Westminster Gazette* from 1902 to 1922, and editing the weekly *Westminster* from 1922 to 1924, he came to India in 1925 to edit the *Statesman*, and did that till 1933.

3. Sir James Crerar, "India and her Future", *Fortnightly Review*, March 1940, p. 246.

4. See his "The Congress Dances", *Empire Review*, June 1937, pp. 336-339. He had been a member of the Indian Franchise Committee of 1932, and at this time was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Colonies. He died in 1945.

5. See *supra*, documents 33A, 45C and 45D and notes on them.

in so doing to have ignored the pledges given to minorities and others".[1]

After all these equivocal, positive and firm declarations, it is difficult to explain the sudden capitulation of the Viceroy and his statement on the strength of which the Congress decided to form the provincial ministries. Was a secret understanding reached between him and the Congress? Did he receive peremptory instructions from the British Government to surrender with as much grace as he could muster? The Muslims suspected this, and a modern Pakistani historian has ample justification when he writes: "Consequently Congress ministries took office in eight provinces, and the interim Governments resigned. The question arises in what way the Governor-General's statement altered the position. *Prima facie* it seems that the Congress was assured that the Governor's special responsibilities would not be made a pretext for interfering in the working of provincial autonomy. However, the attitude of the Congress was so rigid before the Governor-General's statement that it seems unlikely that a mere reiteration of the obvious would have changed it. Subsequent history shows that in spite of loud complaints from the Muslims their interests were not safeguarded even once. There were strong rumours even when the Congress decided to accept office that secret assurances had been given to the Congress by the Governor-General. As time passed this suspicion became a certainty in the minds of the Muslims".[2]

Some hint of this is contained in a passage in N. B. Khare's memoirs. "In the summer of 1937," he wrote, "C. Rajagopalacharia had a secret interview with Lord Erskine, the Governor of Madras, in which he assured the Governor that the Congress would not wreck or combat the Act but would work it just like the Liberals. After this interview C. R. went and saw Gandhi and Teethal and secured his consent to this assurance. When this assurance was conveyed to the Viceroy he issued a statement in June, as a result of which the Congress Government deadlock was solved".[3]

In the light of Congress-Government collusion in later years, particularly during 1946-47 when Lord Mountbatten was Viceroy, it is not difficult to believe that some sort of understanding was reached by the two parties.

1. *Parliamentary Debates*, H. C. 322. 5S, 8 April 1937, col. 362.
2. I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi, 1965), pp. 80-81.
3. N. B. Khare, *My Political Memoirs or Autobiography* (Nagpur, n. d.), p. 9.

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See note on Document 27.

37

A tentative scheme for the Congress campaign of Muslim mass contact was outlined at Vithalnagar on 21 February, 1938, in an informal meeting of Muslim members of the All India Congress Committee. Among those present were Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, Vallabhai Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Syed Mahmud, Dr. K. M. Ashraf, and nearly twenty prominent Muslim Congressmen from all provinces.[1] At some unspecified date Dr. Ashraf was put in charge of the campaign section of the All India Congress Committee.

A detailed contemporary report throws some light on the mind of Nehru and on the motives and expectations of the Congress. "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru realizes", wrote *The Times*' India correspondent in June 1937, "that the Congress election success was almost solely due to the Hindu vote, which was inevitable in view of the nature of the electorates. But he is now making strong efforts to bring the Moslem community within the Congress fold. Pandit Nehru attributes the Congress failure to attract Moslem votes to Congress leaders having neglected to work among the Moslem masses and having too long thought in terms of communal pacts for dealing with what are essentially economic problems. A Hindu campaign to secure the support of the Moslems has therefore been launched on the basis of economic rather than religious and communal considerations. It has, however, a political objective, which is to strengthen the organization of the Congress Party in its fight for further constitutional concessions. While it will be difficult to win the support of the

1. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 February 1938. For a defence of the campaign see Sri Prakasa, "Congress and the Muslims," *Indian Review* (Madras), April 1938, pp. 225-227. For a short sketch of Ashraf see Ashiq Husain Batalvi, *Chand Yadain, Chand Taassurat* (Lahore, 1969, pp. 159-168).

Moslem community as a whole, the party will probably secure the adhesion of the Moslem *intelligentsia* and will inevitably affect the illiterate peasantry. Congress blandishments are likely to leave untouched most of the present Moslem leaders and will have little effect upon the specific religious sects into which the Moslems are divided. In those Provinces where Congress already has a majority Moslems will most likely affiliate with the Hindus. But an intensive drive on an all-India scale to bring Moslems into a Hindu organization is almost certain to aggravate communal tension in some places.... The Congress Party has always contained some Moslems, and is likely to add to them during the present campaign....Some artificial association between certain Moslem sects and the Hindu Party will clearly result from the present Congress overtures, but competent political observers believe that the attempt to arouse the Moslem masses on an economic policy 'may result in heaping economic fuel on the smouldering religious fire'....On the constitutional issue the Moslems are certainly not in agreement with the Hindus, and the recent history of the reforms suggests that they remain apprehensive of anything that savours of a Hindu *raj*....A general belief is that the methods which the Congress has adopted for the attainment of its political ends will continue to prevent Moslems as a whole subscribing to its creed.... But there is little doubt that the party will enhance its prestige and political power by obtaining additional support from various Moslem elements, whose jealousies over matters of leadership within their own community have been among the principal weaknesses of Moslem organizations in India. The struggle for political power has introduced entirely new features into communalism. The old communalism, with its ' cow and music' features, is today intensified by social and economic changes, and new political factors complicate communal conditions almost everywhere, particularly in the North. Educationally and in other respects the Moslems lag behind the Hindus, and they view with apprehension the growth of political power in Hindu hands. The great agitations of recent years have been inspired and organized by Hindus, and Moslems chafe under the prominence the Hindus have attained in the national struggle. This accounts largely for Moslem insistence on the protection of specific rights and their refusal to concede to the Hindu idea of Indian nationalism anything which means a surrender of Moslem rights. The political conversion of the Moslems will henceforth be one of the primary aims of Congress

propaganda. The campaign was recently opened in the U. P., and with much beating of drums the party has captured many of those local Moslems who form a tiny island in the sea of Hindus surrounding them in that Province. Their success evoked bitter comments from Moslem leaders elsewhere, men more prominent and important to their own community than those who accepted the new allegiance. Thus the stage is being set for new political developments in the country, and interest in the campaign will reach its climax when the Hindus enter the Moslem strongholds in the northern Provinces, where traditions die hard and where a distinctive race upholds social and cultural ideals which have little in common with the Hindu philosophy, political, social, economic, or religious."[1]

On 8 April 1937, the Karachi District Congress Committee received a special circular from Jawaharlal Nehru ordering it to pay special attention to enrolling Muslims as Congress members.[2]

According to one report, as the plan officially devised and circulated by the Congress headquarters had failed to make much headway in the Punjab, "it is now to be supported by unofficial attempts to excite the feelings of Muslims on religious issues against the British Government and the provincial Minsitry." One feature of all these moves was "that neither the All India Congress Committee nor the Punjab Congress accept openly or officially the responsibility of sponsoring or supporting them. Apart from the fact that these moves in the Punjab are not consistent with the Congress policy of deprecating anti-British propaganda in the Congress-governed provinces, the official association of the Congress with the Punjab move would perhaps open the way for a war of propaganda between different provincial governments."[3]

The president of the Punjab Moderate Muslim Association sharply criticised the Congress campaign, calling it "conversion of Muslims" and a real ' threat."[4] A former official of the All India Muslim Conference was also critical of the movement and, at the same time confident that it was bound to fail everywhere.[5]

1. India Correspondent, "New Trends in India: Congress and the Moslems: Pandit Nehru's Policy," *The Times*, 7 June 1937.

2. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 April 1937.

3. *Ibid.*, 23 December 1937.

4. Maulvi Abdul Hakim Khan, Letter to *ibid.*, 13 April 1937.

5. He was Haji Rahim Bukhsh. See his statement in *ibid.*, 5 May, 1937.

A most reasoned statement of Muslim reaction to the campaign is contained in the letters of Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru.[1] Two or three points made by Ismail Khan need to be repeated here with a view to emphasizing the Muslim outlook. He was convinced that the campaign had actually helped to spoil Congress-Muslim relations. If it "had not been thrust upon us and the Muslim League parties had not in the various legislatures been so contemtuously treated by the Congress wherever they happened to be in a majority, the Musalmans would have been nearer the Congress ideals than they are likely to be for some considerable time to come. I knew many Musalmans who had Congress leanings or had been formerly active members of that organization, [and who] viewed with grave suspicion and dismay this new move of the Congress." The Nawab continued, 'There are many thinking Muslims who firmly believe that the Congress by this movement is trying to destroy Muslim solidarity and create disruption in the community, and that the Muslim supporters of the Congress are being financed and helped by the Congress which, as at present constituted, is an overwhelmingly Hindu body, to fight their co-religionists and curb their spirit."[2]

After a few weeks he again took up the subject with the Pandit. "If the object of the Congress", he wrote, "had been merely to convert the Muslim masses to its political and economic programme it should have employed politicians in preference to these worthy gentlemen [the Maulvis and Mullahs] who by their training and education are prone to give a religious tint to every secular affair. On the contrary, our experience was that in every election frantic efforts were made to secure the assistance from these Ulemas [*sic.*] for the Congress candidate. I was personally informed at several places during the recent by-election by Muslim voters that they dare not vote for our candidate because their *Pir* had threatened to excommunicate them if they did so." He continued, "I do not for a moment deny the right of the Congress to convert Muslims to its ideals. It is the right of every political organization to do so. What we do object to is the concerted efforts liberally financed by the

1. See *supra*, Document No. 44.

2. Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Meerut, 30 November 1937, *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 July 1938.

Congress that are being made not only to induce the Muslims to join the Congress but also to bring into disrepute the Muslim League. The Muslims are being urged to wind up their communal organizations. Similar efforts as far as I know are not being made among other communities. Nor have these communities been asked to disband their organizations." Then he gave an interesting example from recent history. "I believe that it will be recollected that when separate electorates were provided for the Untouchables at their own request and Muslims backed up their claims, the Hindu leaders were most vehement in their denunciation of the Muslims' attitude towards the question. They were charged with breaking up the solidarity of the Hindu community. Muslims entertain similar resentment against the Congress leaders for launching this mass contact movement."[1]

Three short quotations from the *Pirpur* Report are in order here. Answering the Congress allegation that it was the Muslim League which had begun to exploit religion for political purposes and raised the slogan of "Islam in danger", the report said, "As a matter of fact the Muslim Ulema working for the Congress dragged in religion to enlist support for the Congress candidates. In the Bijnor bye-election the Congress Muslim workers were dressed in the green Islamic colour, carried the Islamic flag with the Crescent and Star and raised the cry of Allah-o-Akbar at their meetings. The Muslim League on the other hand never depended on the Ulema for its success. It was not the League that raised the cry of 'Islam in Danger'. It has been put into its mouth by its opponents. Every Muslim believes that Islam can never be in danger."[2] At another place, the Report echoed what Ismail Khan had told Nehru. "Whatever be the idea behind this movement, it remains an undisputed fact that after the general election Mass Contact was carried on amongst the Muslim masses alone. We have not heard of the religious heads of other minorities working on behalf of the Congress to bring their co-religionists into its fold."[3] And, finally, "though the Mass Contact Movement was on the programme of the Congress no one heard about it until the general election was over and Congress majorities were assured. Even the Congress leaders, who made and unmade Cabinets and who

1. Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Meerut, 16 January 1938, *ibid.*, 3 July, 1938.

2. *Pirpur Report* (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 10-11.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

appointed and dismissed Ministers, avoided the Muslim massess and employed Maulvis to convert the Muslim masses to the Congress creed."[1]

All Muslim sources agree that the mass contact campaign was a complete failure. What Hindu evidence we have supports this finding. To start with one who was a member of the Congress Working Committee during these crucial years, "Much was expected of Jawaharlal's scheme of Muslim mass contact, but for reasons not yet known the Muslim mass contact Committee never published its report and the work was only half heartedly taken up and never resolutely pursued."[2] A recent Hindu historian of Muslim politics provides similar testimony. "In the first place," writes Ram Gopal, "the mass contact programme was never taken up seriously; and in the second, it was crushed, wherever it was launched, by the wheels of the League, which were rapidly gaining speed, strength and mobility."[3] The most important contemporary Scheduled Caste leader, Dr. Ambedkar, believed that this movement lacked both wisdom and utility. "In its essence," he commented, "it was the plan of the British Conservative Party to buy Labour with 'Tory Gold'. The plan was as mischievous as it was futile. The Congress forgot that there are things so precious that no owner, who knows their value, will part with and any attempt, to cheat him to part with them is sure to cause resentment and bitterness. Political power is the most precious thing in the life of a community especially if its position is constantly being challenged and the community is required to maintain it by meeting the challenge. Political power is the only means by which it can sustain its challenge. To attempt to make it part with it by false propaganda, by misrepresentation or by the lure of office or of gold is equivalent to disarming the community, to silencing its guns and to making it ineffective and servile. It may be a way of producing unity. But the way is despicable for it means suppressing the opposition by a false and unfair method. It cannot produce any unity. It can only create exasperation, bitterness and hostility. This is precisely what the '*mass contact*' plan of the Congress did. For there can be no doubt that this mad plan of mass contact has had a

1. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

2. Asoka Mehta and Achut Patwardhan, *The Communal Triangle in India* (Allahabad, 2nd. ed. August 1942), p. 231. Patwardhan was a member of the Congress Working Committee during 1937-39.

3. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims* (Bombay, 1959), p. 254.

great deal to do with the emergence of Pakistan."[1]

The mass contact campaign was a child of Nehru's brain, and it seems that, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, he really believed that it was a success; or perhaps he was deceiving his English friends so that they might accept the Congress as the sole representative of India. He told Edward Thompson, for example, that the campaign was proving very successful.[2] While the fact was, as Sir Reginald Coupland observed, that it made no headway. "The Congress leaders had underestimated, it seemed, the strength of Muslim religious feeling and had failed to take account of the fact that a Muslim's religion pervades all his life, including his politics".[3] Even if the figures of a hostile and unreliable source be admitted in evidence, by January 1938 the Congress could claim the support of a mere one hundred thousand Muslims out of its total membership of 3.1 million[4]; thus, with all the talk about the mass contact and its success, the Muslims constituted 3.3 per cent. of the total Congress roll.

But all this failed to have any effect on the Congress. The most consistent feature of Congress policy and politics throughout its career has been its inability to learn from events and its failure to relate its claims to political evidence. Needless of all Muslim resentment, alienation and bitterness, the Congress leaders continued to say that they spoke for a majority of the Muslim and that their mass contact efforts had been a success. Not only that, but many years later, a prominent Congress leader once again asked the party to launch another such campaign. Addressing a meeting of the All India Congress Committee at Bombay in 1946, J.P. Narayan said, "I feel confident that the Congress can break the League's hold on the Muslims by its going direct to the Muslim masses. Instead of making this approach we are trying to negotiate with the leader of the Muslim League whom we know to be the friend of our enemies."[5]

1. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India* (Bombay, 2nd. ed. 1945), pp. 337-338.

2. See Edward Thompson's reply to a letter from Nehru, in Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1960 ed.) pp. 233-241.

3. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 182.

4. R. Palme Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow* (London, 1955), p. 234. For evidence of Dutt's hostility to Muslim India and his tendency to make untrue statements see K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India* (London, 1963), pp. 200-201.

5. J. P. Narayan, *Towards Struggle* (Bombay, 1946), pp. 217-218.

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Nothing in the conduct of the Congress party and its rule in these years has beed condemned so universally as its refusal to form coalitions with the Muslim League and share the power with it. I will confine myself, in this note, to three things : Congress defence of its decision, Congress-cum-Hindu evidence showing the unwisdom of the decision taken, and external (British and other) testimony to the effect that the Congress was guilty of a blunder in doing this. I will merely reproduce the statements and arguments of reliable and well-known authorities and observers, keeping comment to the minimum.

K. M. Munshi explained the Congress refusal in these words: "A multiple ministry would have been weak; the Governor and the bureaucracy would have outridden the ministerial power and the national will as expressed by the legislature would have been circumscribed. Further, such ministries would have frustrated the national unity which the Congress represented. The communal groups would have permanently become component parts of the administration, just as the British had made them in the legislatures, destroying every chance of effective executive government. If the Congress had agreed to set up multiple ministries the anomalous result would have been that while insisting on Indian nationalism it would have perpetuated a multiplicity of communal claims, its representatives thus destroyed the very object of their existence."[1] The official historian of the Congress admits that "there was naturally concern before the elections to obtain a majority for the Congress and this resulted in a certain co-operation between the League and the Congress in United Provinces while they fought each other openly and irreconcilably in the other provinces". However, when the

1. K. M. Munshi, *The Changing Shape of Indian Politics* (Poona, 2nd. ed. 1946), p. 17.

election results were known and Congress majority seen to be assured, "there was appreciable and weighty opposition in United Provinces Congress circles to the coalition when the Congress had a clear majority".[1] Acharya Kripalani, a front-rank Congress leader, made a distinction between a political party and a communal party. The Congress was a political party and therefore could not sacrifice the principle of cabinet unity by joining hands with the Muslim League which was a communal party. "Such communal and religious organizations are not recognized in any democracy as national or Political Parties".[2] Rajendra Prasad had a different argument to offer. "As a matter of fact", he wrote in his autobiography, "the Muslim League had not acquired any great prestige and popularity at that time....The Congress, therefore, had no reason to take a Muslim Leaguer as a minister".[3]

Lord Birdwood, in one of his books on India, relates a conversation he had with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur which shows Nehru's mind and also the fact that his view was shared by several other Congress leaders. "I questioned her then as to the reason for the rigid exclusion of the Moslem League from all deliberations of Provincial Congress Governments and she in turn quoted Nehru's reply to her own query on this very question: 'How could we possibly let down those Moslems who had stood by us by taking in as colleagues others who had worked against us? We should indeed have been unworthy of the loyalty of our friends.' These words, she told me, mirrored the background to the inhospitable attitude of Congress to the great rival organization".[4]

A Hindu student of the Hindu-Muslim question and an academic of some reputation shared the above-mentioned arguments of Munshi and Kripalani and added some more of his own. "In India a coalition ministry", said Dr. Beni Prasad, "might have failed to present a united front to the Governor or to resign collectively on an all-India issue like the terms of participation in the war. The dominant mood in the

1. P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress* (Bombay, 1947), Vol. II, pp. 689, 690.

2. A. Kripalani in *Modern Review*, Vol. LXVIII (1940), No. 1, p. 7, quoted in Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan* (Lahore, 1964) p. 88.

3. Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography* (Bombay 1957), p. 446.

4. C.B. Birdwood, *A Continent Experiments* (London, n.d.? 1945), p. 18. This conversation took place in late 1944.

Congress was that of fighting British imperialism, so that it was reluctant to loosen the ties of discipline in a manner which a coalition often renders necessary. There was a feeling that there could be only one people's party so long as complete independence was not attained, that the Congress was that party and that it could absorb, but not coalesce with, any other group. For the rest, it was out to reform the country and was afraid that a coalition might weaken the agrarian, temperance and other programmes".[1]

It seems, however, that Dr. Beni Prasad was, in the above passage, summarizing the Congress view and not expressing his own opinion. In his own view the Congress decision was not justified "Orthodox Parliamentarism led the Congress leaders to forget that the one-party theory, even if true of political agitation, was not, in the absence of an accomplished revolution, applicable to Ministerial office. The change from extra-constitutional action to governmental responsibility to which the Congress assented in 1937, was a change of scale and methods of the profoundest significance and called for an evaluation and rearrangement of political forces. The country was passing through a crisis and crises have usually been surmounted even in England through coalitions, for instance in 1915, 1931 and 1940". And further, "The 'majority principle' is at bottom not an ethical maxim but a rule of expediency, and has always to be so interpreted as to command minority affirmation. Orthodox parliamentarism, however, carried the day and excluded the Muslim League as an organization from a share in power".[2]

Other modern historians have expressed similar views. According to Ram Gopal, "Understandably, the League leaders characterized this as the death warrant of the League, which, curiously enough, they of all people, were asked to sign. Was it, it was asked, for this that the League had built itself up as an all-India party, issued an election manifesto, presented itself before the Muslim voters and contested the elections? And, having miserably failed in Muslim constituencies, was it ethically proper for the Congress to suggest that the Leaguers should virtually enter the Congress through the back door? No straight answer to these questions was given, though the anxiety of the Congress to make its actual form reflect its creed was an answer....".[3] A Bengali

1. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions* (London, 1946), p. 61.

2. Beni Prasad quoted in Abdul Waheed Khan, *India Wins Freedom: The Other Side* (Karachi, 1961), pp. 86, 86-87.

3. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims* (Bombay, 1959), p. 249.

Hindu used more categorical language "...the conditions of Maulana Azad must be considered impossible by every organization if it does not want to liquidate itself."[1] Similar words are employed by a more recent historian, R. C. Majumdar; "Nobody who had any knowledge of the background of Muslim politics could imagine for a moment that the Muslim League would commit political *Hara-kiri* at the bidding of the Congress.... Jinnah now finally realized that the Muslims, as a separate community, had no political prospects in India. They had no chance of sharing political power with the Hindus; they must either surrender their individuality or cut themselves adrift from the Hindus. The Congress ultimatum was thus the signal for the parting of the ways which, by inevitable stages, led to Pakistan".[2]

In the opinion of Dr. Ambedkar, the Congress plea that coalitions would have run counter to the principle of collective responsibility was not only really impertinent" but "even dishonest, because, it is a fact that in the Provinces where the Congress was in a minority, they did form Coalition Ministries without asking the Ministers from other parties to sign the Congress pledge. The Muslims are entitled to ask 'if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another?'."[3] V.P. Menon, who was even then in close contact with Hindu leaders, feels that "this was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the League and was a factor which induced neutral Muslim opinion to turn to the support of Jinnah".[4]

Perhaps even more significant than these Hindu confessions is the admission of a Congress Muslim—significant because it was extremely rare for a "nationalist" Muslim to be critical of any Congress policy or decision. Sayyid Abid Husain acknowledges that "there was bitter resentment among the Muslims, not only in League circles but also outside it, at the attitude which the United Provinces Congress had taken after the elections." [5]

A large majority of British writers on this period have condemned the Congress decision and pointed to it as one of the outstanding factors

1. B.M. Chaudhri, *Muslim Politics in India* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 50.

2. R. C. Majumdar, *Three Phases of India's Struggle for Freedom* (Bombay, 1961), pp. 51, 51-52.

3. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India* (Bombay, 2nd. ed. 1945), p. 28.

4. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Calcutta, 1957), p. 56.

5. S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims.* (Bombay, 1965), p. 104.

leading to Muslim alienation and ultimately to partition. A representative selection of their views may be cited here. "No single event", says Richard Symonds, "did more than this to bring Pakistan into being".[1] Sir Reginald Coupland says that the Congress terms for a coalition and Abul Kalam Azad's note on them "show that in the first action taken by the Congress leaders under the new constitution, in their first move in the field of parliamentary politics, there was nothing of that spirit of compromise without which parliamentary government cannot be expected to work successfully or long".[2]

According to Ian Stephens, "the first effect of this, simultaneously on many Muslim minds throughout India, was of a lightening-flash. What had before been guessed at, now leapt forth in horrid clear outline. The Congress, as a Hindu-dominated body, was bent on the Muslims' eventual absorption; Western-style majority rule, in an undivided sub-continent, could only mean the small community being swallowed by the larger, as Syed Ahmad Khan had long ago pointed out; in the end, Muslims would find themselves just one of the lower Hindu castes, dissolved in a general grey idolatrous mush".[3] Sir Percival Griffiths calls it unfortunate that "at this stage the Congress Party behaved with a complete lack of trust".[4] Professor Nicholas Mansergh's judgment is that "on any reckoning the decision would seem in restrospect to have been ill-advised".[5] Dr. Percival Spear believes that "at a stroke it destroyed hope of friendly independent co-operation and in a moment revived the simmering Muslim suspicions of Hindu absorptive tendencies".[6] *The Round Table* called it a "fatal mistake" and regretted that a great chance of uniting the Hindus and Muslims was deliberately spurned.[7] The semi-official biographer of Nehru, who is no friend of the Muslims, used the term "incredible" for the terms laid down by the Congress; this "was nothing short of an ultimatum for the League's self-destruction".[8] According to another modern historian of India,

1. R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1966 rep.), p. 54.
2. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 112.
3. Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London, 1963), p. 76.
4. P. Griffiths, *Empire into Commonwealth* (London, 1969), p. 262.
5. Nicholas Mansergh, *The Commonwealth Experience* (London, 1969) p. 307.
6. T.G.P. Spear, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford. 1958 ed.), p. 818.
7. *Round Table*, March 1946, p. 154.
8. Michael Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 231.

who is not British, "it did more to alarm and alienate the Muslims than all the bitter words that had been exchanged before. Congress itself, with its own hands, created its inevitable counterpart: Pakistan, the expression of the Muslims' separate nationhood."[1]

This account of the significance and implications of the Congress decision may be concluded with a short quotation from what I have written elsewhere: "It must be recalled that in 1937 the Congress had flatly refused to share power with the Muslim League on the ground that it could not compromise its economic and social programme by forming a coalition with a conservative body like the League (though in fact the election manifestos of the two parties were almost identical even on economic and social matters). But in 1946 the same Congress party cheerfully agreed to form a coalition in the Punjab with the Unionist Party, which was notoriously reactionary in policy and feudal in composition, and which had won only a handful of seats in the legislature. It was even worse than a coalition because the leader of the tiny Unionist Party was accepted as Chief Minister. This unnatural alliance can be explained in political terms: it was a tactical move to keep the Muslim League out of office in a province where it had won an overwhelming majority of Muslim seats. This telling contrast between its proclaimed principles and its political action convinced the Muslims that the Congress had no policy or principle except to divide the Muslim with a view to maintaining its own hegemony".[2]

In the end, it must be explained how Abul Kalam Azad came to be the author of these terms for a coalition. In a meeting held at Delhi on 15-22 March 1937 the Congress Working Committee had appointed a Parliamentary Sub-committee ' to be in close and constant touch with the work of the Congress Parties in all the legislatures in the provinces, to advise them in all their activities and to take necessary action in any case of emergency". This small group consisted of Abul Kalam Azad, Vallabhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad.[3] The sub-committee met at Wardha on 8 July 1937 and allotted certain provinces to each of its members, authorizing the member in charge of a group to "deal with matters coming within the purview of this Sub-Committee". The allocation was as follows: Patel was to look after Bombay and Madras

1. A. de Reincourt, *The Soul of India* (New York, 1960), p. 340.
2. K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1967), p. 190.
3. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. I, p. 179.

Presidencies, the Central Provinces and Sindh; Rajendra Prasad was given Bihar, Orissa and Assam; and Azad received Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province.[1]

In his autobiography Abul Kalam Azad has mentioned this sub-committee under a different name: Parliamentary Board; he is also wrong in saying that it was appointed "when Congress accepted office". In fact, this Sub-Committee was appointed in March 1937, nearly four months before the Congress entered office. The list of provinces under his charge as given by him does not agree with the text of the resolution that I have quoted above. He says that he looked after "Bengal, Bihar, United Provinces, Punjab, Sind and Frontier."[2] According to the decision of the Sub-Committee itself Bihar was placed in Rajendra Prasad's jurisdiction and Sind was made Patel's responsibility. Either this decision was later amended or Azad's memory is at fault.

After drafting the terms for a coalition Azad had sent the text to Gandhi who had approved it and called it a "good document."[3] It is, therefore, surprising to find Pyarelal saying that "this decision of the Congress High Command taken against Gandhiji's best judgment proved to be a tactical error of the first magnitude".[4] As far as I know Gandhi never criticised the decision or stated that it had been reached without his approval. His letter to Nehru is evidence enough to prove Pyarelal wrong.

1. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 217.

2. A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative* (Calcutta, 1959), p. 22.

3. See Gandhi's letter to Nehru, 22 July 1937, in Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1960 ed.), p. 243.

4. Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase* (Ahmedabad, 1956), Vol. I, p. 80.

39

See notes on Document 38.

40

This is Aurobindo Ghose's translation, though Coupland does not mention this. The song occurs in *Anandamath* (The Abbey of Bliss) by the well-known Bengali Hindu novelist Bankim Chandra Chatterji. It was first published in 1882.

The text of the song is also reproduced in C.H. Philips (ed.) *The Evolution of India and Pakistan* 1858-1947 (London, 1962), pp. 117-118. The original text in Devanagari characters, an English translation in verse and an English paraphrase in prose are given in Aurobindo Ghose, *Bankim-Tilak-Dayananda* (Calcutta, 1940), pp. 1-2, 3-4, 5-6. For some extracts from the novel and the context of the song see "Ain-ul-Mulk" in the *Statesman* (Calcutta) of 5 September 1937, and F. K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan* (Lahore, March 1944), pp. 42-46. A short extract from the novel is also printed in C. H. Philips, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-120, taken from T. W. Clark's English translation.

The song is favourably mentioned or discussed in John Pollen's (with the aid of Mrs. Sen) "The National Song of India: Vande Mataram", *Asiatic Review*, October 1915, pp. 319-320; and C.B. Cs.' "Bande Mataram: A Paean of Peace", *The Review of India* (Calcutta), March 1932, pp. 31-33. For general background and neutral comment see "Bande Mataram" in the *The Englishman* (Calcutta), 1 October 1906, and J. C. French, "The Song of the Indian Revolution", *National Review* (London), October 1938, pp. 492-500.

We are told that, in the original, the song consists of 36 lines out of which only 7 are in Bengali ingeniously blended with 29 lines of Sanskrit."[1]

For Bankim Chandra Chatterji see T.W. Clark, "The Role of Bankimchandra in the Development of Nationalism" in C. H. Philips

1. A. Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India* (Lahore, 1967), p. 221.

(ed.), *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon* (London, 1961), pp. 429-445, a good analysis; Nirad C. Chaudhri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London, 1951), pp. 426-429, for his ideas on Hindu-Muslim relations; Amales Tripathi, "Bankim Chandra and Extremist Thought", *Bengal Past and Present* (Calcutta), July-December 1965, pp. 167-169, and January-June 1966, pp. 82-112; and Sumil Kumar Banerjee, *Bankim Chandra: A Study of his Craft* (Calcutta, 1968), the only full-length study of the man as a novelist that I know of.

41

It should be noted that throughout this statement the Congress party is nowhere mentioned. The words used repeatedly are "nation" and "national". The sentence "They contain certain allusions and a religious ideology which may not be in keeping with the ideology of other religious groups in India" shows that the person who drafted the statement was obviously a Hindu.

Some Hindus did not like even this vague and, to the Muslims, completely unsatisfactory explanation. Suresh Chandra Deb, who used to contribute a long introduction entitled "India in Home Polity" to each volume of *The Indian Annual Register*, was enraged by the vacillation and weakness of the Congress Working Committee which "without referring the matter to public opinion, without submitting it to public discussion, declared through the mouth of the President, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, that the song was one to parts of which the Moslem community could take legitimate objection, and, therefore, only the first two stanzas should be sung on the occasion of meetings and conferences held under Congress auspices. It is difficult to justify the hole-and-corner way in which the Working Committee decided a matter round which the deepest of human feelings had entwined themselves; for the protection of the honour of this song thousands had bled; the inspiration of this song has moulded the life and conduct of millions in course of two generations in a country that has been struggling to be free. The injustice of the decision, and of the method in arriving at it, rankles in hearts that are silent with the silence of a great sorrow."[1]

In spite of the Working Committee's statement of 1 November 1937, the Congress persisted in its view that the song was a national song. The 1939-40 annual report of the Congress contains this passage:

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, p. 55.

"Singing of vande matram, flying of the national flag on public institutions, popularisation of Hindustani and such like activities were instanced as attempts to crush Muslim culture. These activities were nothing new. The national flag had ever since 1921 been the symbol of national solidarity and opposition to foreign rule. It was not in opposition to Islam. Bande matram had come to be the national song by historical associations since the early years of the present century and had been in vogue ever since the partition [of Bengal]. The Muslim agitation against it was a new phenomenon."[1]

The song also continued to be sung in the provincial legislatures of Congress provinces. For example, when the budget session of the Madras Legislative Assembly opened on 27 January 1938, the proceedings began with the singing of it. Abdul Hamid Khan, the leader of the Muslim League parliamentary party, protested against this, but the speaker, Sambarmurthi, paid no attention. At this eight members of the house walked out. At the end of the day, while winding up the day's proceedings, the speaker said "that he fully sympathised with the feelings of the Muslim members in respect of Bande-Matram song, but he felt that such spectacular demonstrations were not indispensable to exhibit the feelings.'[2] A Madrasi Hindu saw much humour in this daily spectacle of a Muslim walk-out. "In Madras the Muslim opposition to this song, which is both a song and a prayer, takes a very humorous form. As soon as the Assembly meets, all members stand up and a lady member begins singing, or rather praying. Immediately the Muslim League members strut out in a body and keep outside in the verandah till the song is over."[3]

There were also cases where Muslim school students were forced to sing the song.[4] The Pirpur Report contained several examples of this with specific details and particulars. The Congress reply to the Pirpur

1. Report of the General Secretary of the Indian National Congress from 1939 to February 1940 submitted to the All India Congress Committee session at Ramgarh, *Indian Annual Register 1940*, Vol. I, p. 273. This report is also reproduced in *Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vol. II, pp. 257-281, and on p. 269, this passage appears as given above, except that the date of 1921 is here given as 1920.

2. See *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. I, p. 167.

3. S. Ramaswamy, "The Comic Side of Indian Politics", *The Empire Review and Magazine* (London), May 1940, p. 301.

4. For examples see *Pirpur Report* (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 21-22,66.

Report was a pamphlet, containing three press notes, published by the Department of Information, Government of Bihar, Patna, in 1938. The effectiveness and quality of the reply may be judged by what it said about the singing of the Bande Mataram. It ascribed the use of the "national flag" and the song to students who "in the exuberance of enthusiasm" wanted "to celebrate the dawn of what they thought a glorious day." This contradicts the statements of the Congress party itself. And yet Sir Reginald Coupland calls this pamphlet a "carefully considered" and "reasoned" rejoinder.[1]

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 187.

42

This circular was issued by C.W. Gwynne, Chief Secretary to the Government of the United Provinces, on 29 November from Allahabad.

On 2 February 1938, questions were asked about this circular in the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, when some members stated that it "discriminated against the Liberal Federation and the Muslim League, by asking officials to seek help and co-operation from Congress organizations only. The Premier defended the circular, by stating that officials and Congressmen had for years been opposed to each other, and it was necessary to remove a mutual suspicion. No such difficulty had been felt regarding other organizations. Mr. M. Farooq regarded this as creating a privileged position for Congressmen. The Premier retorted that the circular imposed a privileged duty on Congressmen to help the Administration."[1]

The effect of the circular on the day-to-day administration is described thus by one observer. "Petty officials of the Congress Party have assumed powers they have no right to exercise. They interfere in police cases and claim the right to conduct investigations alongside those of the administrative officials. A circular issued by the Government asking district authorities to consult local Congress leaders has been responsible for much of the mischief."[2]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. I, p. 184. See also *Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the United Provinces 1938*, Vol. III, No. 13, pp. 1443-44.

2. India Correspondent. "A Province on its Own : Difficulties in the United Provinces : Where Congress Fails," *The Times*, 27 June 1939.

43

This was one of twenty resolutions passed by the Congress at its fifty-first annual session at Haripura in Gujrat.

This was the notorious Wardha Scheme of Education prepared by a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Zakir Husain and the inspiration and guidance of Gandhi.

On the Wardha scheme there is considerable agreement among neutral and foreign observers that it alienated the Muslims by cutting at the roots of their cultural tradition and educational system. "Was this not bound to be regarded as a deliberate challenge to the Muslim hatred of the Hindu temple as the quintessence of idolatory ?" asked Sir Reginald Coupland.[1] For non-Muslim Indian criticism see Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji, *Through an Indian Camera* (Bangalore, 1946), Vol. I, pp. 199-200; and the resolution of the National Liberal Federation passed on 31 December 1937 at its nineteenth annual session at Calcutta.[2] For Muslim criticism see Muslim League resolutions and other documents reproduced in the present volume; Fazlul Haq's presidential address to the fifty-first annual session of the All India Muslim Educational Conference at Patna on 1 October 1938;[3] proceedings and resolutions of its fifty-second session at Calcutta on 29-31 December 1939 under the presidentship of Nawab Kamal Yar Jung Bahadur;[4] Liaquat Ali Khan, *Muslim Educatianal Problems* (Lahore, 1945); Rushbrook Williams, "Moslem opinion and the Wardha Scheme", *Great Britain and the East* (London), 29 June 1939, p. 727; presidential address of Maulana Abdul Haq Madani at the annual

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-42* (London, 1943), p. 191.
2. See *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, p. 376.
3. See *ibid.*, 1938, Vol. II, pp. 437-438.
4. *Ibid.*, 1939, Vol. II, pp. 425-428.

session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind at New Delhi on 3 March 1939;[1] a speech of Maulana Ahmad Saeed at an open meeting at Delhi on 5 March 1939, as reported in the *Medina* of Bijnore on 13 March; and a report in *The Times of India* of 7 March 1939 to the effect that the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind had decided to warn the Congress that a civil disobedience movement would be started if the entire scheme were implemented. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Jamiat was a "nationalist" body in close alliance with the Congress.

For details of the original scheme and its making see All India Education Board, *Basic National Education : Syllabus prepared by the Zakir Husain Committee* (Wardha, 1938), and Hindustani Talimi Sangh, *Educational Reconstruction* (Sevagram, 1939) which contains the proceedings of the Wardha Educational Conference, the report of the Zakir Husain Committee and a few articles by Gandhi on the subject. A detailed Hindu exposition of the scheme is to be found in Kalulal Shrimali, *The Wardha Scheme : The Gandhian Plan of Educat'on for Rural India* (Udaipur, 1949). For a favourable review see C.J. Varkey, *The Wardha Scheme of Education : Exposition and Examination* (Madras, 1939), which carries a foreword by Zakir Husain.

1. *Ibid.*, *9139*, Vol. I, p. 380.

44

This is resolution No. 16 passed at the fifty-first annual session of the Indian National Congress.

45

For Jinnah's reply to this claim see Document 67.

46

This statement was issued by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress after its 4-day meeting at Bardoloi (Gujerat). Subhas Chandra Bose presided, and the members present were: Abul Kalam Azad, Sarojini Naidu, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Jairamdas Daulatram, Bhulabhai Desai, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Shankerrao Deo, Sarat Chandra Bose, Hare Krishna Mahtab, and J B. Kripalani. Jamnalal Bajaj was also present for some time.

47

It was passed at the fifty-second annual session of the Indian National Congress held at Tripuri in the Central Provinces. Subhas Chandra Bose was the president. This resolution was moved by Jai Prakash Narain, seconded by Acharya Narendra Deo, opposed by S.C. Bose and Bharadwaj, and supported by A. M. Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru.[1] It had earlier been unanimously approved by the Subjects Committee. After a long discussion it was passed by an overwhelming majority.

1. For a summary of the speeches delivered by these persons see *The Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 330-331.

48

The conduct of the Congress high command in relation to Dr. Khare's Congress ministry in the Central Provinces is a very good example of the highhandedness and autocracy of the party. From the beginning Khare's ministry of six members was riven by internal squabbles. The premier's two oldest colleagues, Shukla and Misra, came from Mahakoshal, the Hindi-speaking area in the north and east, which was the Congress stronghold in the province. Khare himself was from Maharashtra and he was "not fully trusted by the high command." At the time of the introduction of the new constitution he had expressed his willingness to take office, and for this he was "firmly called to order" by the high command. Therefore, when he became premier he was kept "under close surveillance" from Wardha and Sevagram. The ministry did not have the respect and esteem of the people right from the outset. This was not because of any reflection on the premier's personal character who had given up a lucrative medical practice to take up his job. His colleagues were freely accused of nepotism, corruption and "even worse offences." The conduct of M. Y. Sharif, the law minister, resulted in an open scandal. The dissensions inside the cabinet increased and finally the high command decided to impose its will. Khare, unwilling to be a pliant instrument in the hands of the Working Committee, anticipated the decision of the high command and resigned with two of his colleagues a few days before the Committee met. The three other ministers refused to resign. As no person was available for premiership, the Governor dismissed them. In the meantime, Khare was persuaded to withdraw his resignation. But after a visit to Wardha on the Committee's order he renewed it. On the following day he was again induced to remain in office until the Provincial Congress Committee met a few days later. At this meeting, which was attended by Bose, the Congress president, Patel and other top-

ranking leaders from outside the province, Khare was replaced by Shukla as leader of the parliamentary Congress party in the province. On the previous day the Congress Working Committee had already passed judgment and condemned Khare for "grave errors of judgment and gross indiscipline". Later he was expelled from the Congress for two years.

Sir Reginald Coupland's comment on this incident is unequivocal. "Dr. Khare still nominally commanded a majority in the legislature. No vote of 'no confidence' was moved against his Government. He was forced out of office not by any decision in the Provincial Assembly, still less by any pressure of the Provincial electorate on its representatives, but by a decision of the Congress Working Committee adopted by the Provincial Congress Party under pressure from some of the Committee's foremost members. Was anything left, it might be asked, of Responsible Government or Provincial Autonomy?"[1]

For Khare's own account, as also for several revelations about the working of the Congress party on the all-India and Provincial levels, see his *My Political Memoirs or Autobiography* (Nagpur, n. d. ? 1959).

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London, 1934), pp. 124-125. The account of developments in the Central Provinces given in the preceding paragraph is also based on Coupland, pp. 123-124.

49

See Document 70 and the note on it.

50

See note on Document 41.

I have not been able to determine the identity of "Our Muslim Correspondent", the author of this article. It is possible that he was the same person who wrote at another time for the same newspaper under the pseudonymn of "But Shikan". If that may be true, then he was Abdul Majid Rao, the son of a highly-placed Madrasi Hindu, who embraced Islam and edited the *Eastern Times* of Lahore in the early 'thirties. He was also a columnist and contributed to various English newspapers of northern India. He was married to a Japanese lady. He lies buried in Lahore.

51

This speech was delivered at the twenty-fifth annual session of the All India Muslim League at Lucknow on 15 October 1937. The chairman of the Reception Committee was the Raja of Mahmudabad. This session has much significance in the history of the Muslim League, for it signalized the birth of a rejuvenated party, and it was during this session that the premiers of Bengal, the Punjab and Assam acknowledged the leadership of Jinnah and swore their allegiance to the Muslim League.

Full text of Jinnah's address is also available in Jamiluddin Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Statements of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 5th ed. 1952), Vol. I, pp. 27-41 ; Pirzada, *Foundations* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 265-273 ; and a summary is furnished by *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, pp. 403-405.

52

The resolution was moved by Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan of Calcutta who, in his speech, traced the history of the incidents related in the novel from which the song was taken. Quoting passages from the book he said that the song was not a national one as claimed by the Congress but, as its origin showed, an anti-Muslim one. He wondered why such a song should be sung in the legislatures when Muslims had declared their dislike of it, and why the Congress should take exception to a Muslim member when he walked out of the house at its singing. Moulvi Sayyid Badruddaja of Calcutta, seconding the resolution, saw in Chatterjee's novel an attack on Islamic culture and a conspiracy against Islam. He accused the Congress of possessing a small mind. In a supporting speech Muhammad Habibullah of the United Provinces said that the song was not only anti-Islamic but also anti-national. If the Congress persisted in its approval and use of the song, he would be convinced that it wanted a Hindu revival and the perpetuation of British rule in India. Khan Bahadur Haji Rashid Ahmad of Delhi, in supporting the resolution, asked that if the Congress was showing such indifference when Muslims were being subjected to indignity, what would the Muslim position be if they were not provided with proper safeguards.[1]

See also note on Document 41.

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, p. 407.

53

This resolution was moved by Malik Barkat Ali of the Punjab. In his speech he said that Muslims could not repose confidence in non-Muslim ministers and that Muslim ministers in the Congress provincial governments were not the real representatives of the Muslim community. He advised the Congress not to encourage Muslims to accept a ministry in opposition to the Muslim view. Ismail Chundrigar, in his speech seconding the resolution, said that the Congress had formerly complained that ministers were selected from amongst the government flatterers and were not the real representatives of the people, but the same could now be said of the Congress's action in the appointment of Muslim ministers in its governments ; he believed that the Congress was the greater sinner in this respect. Similar views were expressed by three other members who spoke in support of the resolution : Muhammad Ishaq of Bihar, Seth Haji Abdus Sattar of Madras, and Haji Muhammad Husain of the United Provinces. The resolution was passed unanimously.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1937*, Vol. II, p. 407.

54

This resolution constitutes the origin of the Pirpur Report. The official record of the All India Muslim League, from which the text is taken, does not mention the names of those who moved, seconded and supported it.

By an obvious printing error the date of the appointment of this committee is given as 2 March by S. S. Pirzada (*Foundations*, Karachi, 1970, Vol. II, p. 306 fn.).

55

The address was delivered at a special session of the All India Muslim League at Calcutta on 17 April 1938. The *pandal* was located in the Muhammad Ali Park. The welcome speech was given by A. K. Fazlul Haq of Bengal. For full texts of Haq's speech and Jinnah's presidential address see S. S. Pirzada, *Foundations* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 282-296, and *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. I, pp. 377-385. Jinnah's address is *not* reproduced in Jamiluddin Ahmad's *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 5th ed. 1952), Vol. I.

56

This resolution was moved by Shaikh Zahur Ahmad of the United Provinces, seconded by Husain Imam of Bihar, and supported by M. Iftikhar Ali of the Central Provinces. In putting it to vote Jinnah said that the Council had appointed a responsible committee to inquire into all allegations of ill-treatment in the provinces where the Muslims were in a minority (he was referring to the Pirpur committee). When they reported, they would not allow themselves to rest content until they had vindicated themselves. The resolution was carried.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. I, p. 387.

57

In moving this resolution Husain Imam of Bihar deprecated the disunity in Muslim ranks in the two provinces referred to in it. For the first time in history, he said, the majority community in Bengal had got power in their hands, and this the Hindus could not tolerate because of their historic prejudices. The Muslim League appealed to the Congress to come to the right path and give up its tactics of dividing the Muslims. He asked those Muslim members who had left the Coalition Party to realize the real intention of the Congress and come back to the fold of the Muslim League.[1] Maulvi Badruddoja of Bengal seconded the resolution, and it was supported by Haji Rashid Ahmad of Delhi, Ashrafuddin Muhammad of Assam, and Jafar Imam of Bihar.

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1938,* Vol. I, p. 385.

58

This resolution was proposed by M. Ziauddin and seconded by Sardar Muhammad Aurungzeb Khan both of the North-West Frontier Province.

59

For the past few years the Congress had been voicing a new demand for a Constituent Assembly, elected by the Indians to determine and draft the future constitution of the country. In fact, this idea had been sketched by Clement Attlee, Stafford Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru during the late 'thirties ;[1] and, therefore, it was strongly supported by Congress friends among the British Left. For example, the *Manchester Guardian*, in a leader whose logic was difficult to follow, said that Jinnah violently denounced the scheme for a constituent assembly, but that only suggested that he felt that a workable constitution might be evolved by it. The Congress leaders, it claimed, had always been ready "to go to any lengths" to secure Muslim agreement. The "better minds" among Muslims, it went on, would certainly choose to run the risk of self-government without any safeguards, but the Muslim community was ill-educated and hence faction-ridden and therefore the "better minds" had little chance of showing themselves.[2] The *New Statesman*, which had made it an article of its faith to support Hindu politics in India no matter what happened, could not see how the majority of the people of India could be asked to submit to a negative veto by the Muslims.[3] Similarly, Professor Harold Laski and Wedgwood Benn added their unequivocal support to the Congress plan.[4]

It was obvious that a plan by which the future of India was to be settled by a body elected on universal, adult franchise without

1. See C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (London, 1954), p. 181.
2. *Manchester Guardian* (leader), 20 December 1939.
3. *New Statesman* (editorial comment), 28 October 1939.
4. See H. J. Laski, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 14 November 1939, and William Wedgwood Benn, "The War and India's Freedom", *Contemporary Review* (London), December 1939, p. 655. Benn, later Viscount Stansgate, was Secretary of State for India in the Labour government of 1929-31.

any special representation or satisfactory safeguards for the Muslims could never be acceptable to the Muslim community. The result would have been far worse than that emanating from the Nehru Committee recommendations. Therefore, the Muslim League did not even care to consider this scheme.

Several journals and knowledgeable persons in Britain appreciated Muslim fears and realized the wisdom of their refusal to support the scheme. *The Times*, for example, considered the proposal impracticable and dangerous. It could, it said, only prove to the world the extent of Indian political disunity. It warned, prophetically, that any attempt to solve the communal problem on a simple majority basis, and the idea of a constituent assembly amounted to this, would split India from top to bottom, perhaps irretrievably.[1] In the opinion of the *Observer*, no such proposal could possibly be contemplated unless the Congress had rid itself of its Fascist aspiration to dominate India.[2] The *Economist*, reading the Congress mind correctly, saw that the significance of the demand was that it would give the Hindu majority the power to impose a constitution on the minorities. And it warned that any imposition of a constitution that was not voluntarily accepted by the Muslims would lead to disruption, insurrection and the risk of a Palestine in North India.[3]

All this, however, and the political developments in India failed to dissuade the Congress from persisting in the demand for a constituent assembly. It continued to harp upon it almost till the end.

See also notes on Document 47.

1. *The Times* (leader), 15 December 1939.

2. *Observer* (leader), 29 October and 25 November 1939.

3. *Economist* (editoral comment), 16 December 1939. Later Professor John Coatman also warned the Hindus and other interested parties that Muslims would never accept a constitution made by a freely elected assembly; see his letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 28 August 1941.

60

This speech was delivered at the Sindh Muslim League Conference held at Karachi. The welcome address was read out by Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon. It was at this meeting that the famous resolution envisaging the Lahore Resolution and claiming separate nationhood for Indian Muslims was passed.

After Jinnah's presidential address Fazlul Huq and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan made important speeches.

This address by Jinnah is not given in Jamiluddin Ahmad's compilation of his speeches and statements.

61

No details about the mover and supporters of this resolution are available. The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League held its meeting in Karachi because the Sind Muslim League Conference was then in session and all prominent leaders were present for the occasion.

62

For a summary of the report submitted by this committee see Document 68.

63

The committee was appointed by the Muslim League Council in its meeting at Delhi on 4 December 1938. See Document 37 and the note on it.

64

See notes on the Documents relating to the Wardha Scheme of Education.

65

This address was delivered at the twenty-sixth annual sessions of the All India Muslim League held at Patna. Syed Abdul Aziz was the chairman of the Reception Committee.

The text of the address is also available in S. S. Pirzada, *Foundations* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 302-311, and Jamiluddin Ahmad, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 77-90. A shortened version is given in *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 344-346.

66

The discussion on this resolution is reported by a contemporary source as follows:

In moving the resolution on direct action Mr. *A. A. Khan* said that Muslims would adopt all possible means sanctioned by their religion in order to defend their rights and interests and would not hesitate to make any sacrifices to achieve that end. He added that such a decision should be reached after careful deliberation and direct action would be undertaken only as the last resort. Muslims would adopt measures even more drastic than civil disobedience, if necessary. Such action would be taken not against any other community but against Government. Out of the three Provinces concerned, namely, Bihar, U. P. and C. P., atrocities and repression had been carried out by Bihar and C. P. in a greater measure than in U. P. He however warned the U. P. Government that if they attempted to emulate the two adjacent Provinces in oppressing the Muslims, the latter would strive their utmost to assert their rights in a greater degree in the Province.

Mr. *Ashi Hussain Warsi* (Bihar), seconding the resolution, spoke in the strain of the previous speaker and pointed out cases of alleged oppression carried out by the three Congress Governments in the Provinces mentioned above. As an instance, he recounted an incident which, he said, occurred in Hazaribagh, where a Muslim had been maltreated and humiliated by the police. He added that when the Congress Government were questioned with regard to such incidents, they took shelter by saying that the matter was under investigation, and hence sub-judice. Thus, Muslim rights of cow-slaughter, taking out of processions, etc. had always been interfered with, and even suppressed, under the pretext that many Muslim rites were against local custom.

Mr. *Syed Abdur Rauf Shah,* Leader of the Muslim League Party in the C. P. Assembly supporting the resolution, narrated the grievances of Muslims in C. P. including the grossly inadequate representation of Muslims in the services and public bodies. He added that C. P. Muslims were the most persecuted. He referred to the singing of the Bande Mataram song and to the term Vidya Mandir which were highly resented by Muslims. Attempts were also being made to suppress cow-slaughter in that Province and legislation to this effect, he said, was proposed to be brought forward. The C. P. Muslims would anxiously wait and see if the Governor would give his assent to a measure, which was directed against the traditional religious rights of the Muslims.

The hon. *Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan,* Punjab Premier, then rose amid loud cheers. He said that he did not intend to speak on the resolution but mention had been made of the Muslim-majority Provinces and he would like, therefore, to explain the position in his province. The grievances of Muslims in the Congress governed Provinces would prove a revelation to any sane thinking person and certainly would cause concern to any Muslim. He had always avoided saying anything about the administration in other Provinces, which might be termed a criticism. The Muslims were not in an overwhelming majority in the Punjab, but he had assured Mr. Jinnah at the Lucknow session that on the question of safeguarding Muslim interests, every Muslim would stand behind the League.

Referring to his difficulties, Sir Sikandar said that there were certain traitors in the Muslim League camp who had been intriguing with his opponents with a view to creating dissension in the Muslim ranks. It was easier to deal with open enemies but it took time to expose and deal with secret 'serpents in the sleeves'. The time, however, had arrived to deal with them properly, which would be done by the provincial organisations. He would like to assure Indian Muslims that despite these intrigues his Government were firmer now than ever before. He had been following the policy of scrupulously safeguarding the interests of all communities. He had given the minorities 50 per cent representation in the Cabinet and the Services. He thought that the Congress Governments in some Provinces had been intoxicated by their newly-acquired power, they should remember that ninety millions of Muslims could not be suppressed or turned out of the country as a minority. The Congress dream of Swaraj

would never come true if they did not learn to practice toleration. Happenings like those mentioned by the mover and others, if they were not stopped and were allowed to grow in number, might lead not only to civil disobedience but to worse results. It had been asked what help the Muslim majority Provinces would give them. Mere paper resolutions would not help, nor were Government able to protect the minorities. He assured Muslims in the minority Provinces that if the necessity arose every Punjab Muslim would be prepared to lay down their lives [*sic.*] in the defence of Islam. Referring to the controversy about his offer of military help to Britain, Sir Sikandar said that his intention of making such a statement was not to offer help to Britain, but to assist the growth of solidarity among Indians. He was pained to find even Congressmen criticising him, but he had made the position clear when he said that he would oppose sending Indian troops to Palestine. Concluding, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan said that he was a practical man and no weaver of words. If the need arose, he would demonstrate that he could fight better than his critics.

The hon. Mr. *A. K. Fazlul Huq*, Bengal Premier, supported the resolution. He declared that the Bengal Ministry was not in any danger, although antagonists of the Government had made various baseless statements that the overthrow of the Cabinet was imminent or that factions and dissensions had crept in. He continued that if Muslims decided to launch civil disobedience, he could speak on behalf of Bengal Muslims that they would stand solidly behind the move. Perhaps, there was no Muslim Minister in India, who would not resign his office and join the movement when launched. In fact, he would be the first to do so. The League had not been able to assert itself in Bengal to the same degree as in some other Provinces. He hoped however that it would establish itself in Bengal more firmly than in the past. Referring to the Muslim Mass Contact movement of the Congress, Mr. Huq said that such contact was no more possible than contact with the man in the moon. He sounded a note of warning that if oppression continued against Muslims in the Hindu Provinces, the Government of India Act would cease to function ; at least, it would be their duty to prevent its working and they could do it by bringing to a standstill the administration in the non-Congress Provinces. He hoped that the Congress Governments would be endowed with better sense and change their treatment of Muslims, otherwise the latter would be

compelled to resort to civil disobedience and direct action.

Sheik Abdul Majid, M.L.A. (Central), said that it was the first time in the history of the League that civil disobedience had been contemplated. The Congress Governments must realise that civil disobedience would not be confined to the Province where it was launched but that Province would become a place of pilgrimage to the Muslims all over the country".

Sir A. M. K. Dehlavi (Bombay), supporting the resolution said that the time had arrived when every Muslim should be united with every other Muslim under the banner of the League. He had been perturbed by the situation in Sind and the Frontier, but he hoped that the Muslims in these Provinces and the Punjab would attain greater solidarity through the League and that the Muslims in the minority Provinces would stand shoulder to shoulder in the march to common progress

Mr. *Latifur Rahaman*, M.L.A (Orissa), speaking on behalf of the Muslims of Orissa, said that they were imbued with the same religious favour and enthusiasm as the Muslims in other parts of the country, although the Orissa Muslims were in a microscopic minority. He supported the resolution.

Mr. *Abdul Matin Chowdhury*, a former Minister of Assam, referring to the situation in his Province, said that in the present Government, there were four Ministers, who had no following whatever. He pointed out the methods adopted by the Congress in attempting to overthrow the past Government. The League was not yet properly organised in Assam but the last three months of Congress rule in Assam has [*sic.*] made the League more popular than ever before. He supported the resolution.

Sardar Aurangzeb Khan (Frontier) declared that he would not rest until the present Ministry in the Frontier Province had been replaced. It was an irony of fate and a curse that the Frontier, having more than 90 per cent of Muslims, should be under the Congress Administration. The Congress lived in a world of illusion. It was not Indian nor National nor Congress. The Muslims need not look up to Kamal Ataturk for guidance. They had two Ataturks in India, the Punjab and the Bengal Premiers. The Congress relied on the strength of their numbers. But the Muslims relied on the strength of the Almighty. "Hands off C. P. Muslims" was the warning given by him to the Congress which, if unheeded, would result in history repeating itself. He recalled that a handful of Muslims

from North-West corner had pushed their way further inland. It was not possible to ignore the ninety million Muslims and govern.

The last speaker was *Maulana Zafar Ali Khan*, who congratulated the League on the resolution which was passed unanimously amid loud acclamation.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register, 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 346-348

67

This statement was given by Jinnah in reply to Gandhi's claims made in an interview with H. V. Hodson. See note on Document 45.

68-69

See notes on Documents 62, 63 and 64

70

The statement was issued from New Delhi. The text given here is the one circulated by Associated Press of India.

The date of this statement is wrongly given as 9 November 1939 by Jamiluddin Ahmad (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 103), who has reproduced it on pp. 103-105.

See also Document 49.

71

This correspondence is also available in *Nehru—Jinnah Correspondence* (pub. by J.B. Kripalani, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, n. d.), pp. 81-90; and in *Re. Hindu-Muslim Settlement : Correspondence between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Jinnah and between Mr. S. Bose and Mr. Jinnah.* (All India Muslim League, Delhi, n. d.), pp. 1-14.

72

These letters are also reproduced in *Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence* (pub. by J. B. Kripalani, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, n.d.), pp. 1-36.

73

This correspondence is also available in *Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence*, published by J. B. Kripalani, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, n. d., pp. 36-80. See also *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. I, pp. 359-376; S.S. Pirzada, *Leaders' Correspondence with Jinnah* (Bombay, 1944); *Re. Hindu-Muslim Settlement* . . . (All India Muslim League, Delhi, n. d.), pp. 15-41; and Hindu Correspondent, "What Hindu India Thinks", *Civil & Military Gazette*, 17 and 25 June 1938.

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See also *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 284-286; *Re. Hindu-Muslim Settlement* . . . (All India Muslim League, Delhi, n.d.), pp. 79-94; S. C. Bose, *Crossroads : being the Works of Subhas Chandra Bose, 1938-1940* (Bombay, 1962), pp. 37-46; Hindu Correspondent, 'What Hindu India Thinks", *Civil & Military Gazette*, 24 May 1938; and S.S. Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence* (Karachi, 1966), pp. 33-46.

75

See notes on Documents 20,37,41 and 52.

76

See Document 86 and the note on it.

77

Some of these letters are reproduced in Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1958, pp. 413-419). Recently some of these have been reprinted by the Book House of Lahore under the title of *Jinnah—Nehru Correspondence*; but the printing is very defective and the material has been presented without any introduction, particulars, annotation or notes.

See also S. S. Pirzada (ed.), *Leaders' Correspondence with Mr. Jinnah*, Bombay, 1944; *Re. Hindu—Muslim Settlement : Correspondence between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Jinnah, and between Mr. S. Bose and Mr. Jinnah*, published by S. Shams-ul-Hasan, Assistant Secretary, All India Muslim League, Delhi, n.d. (? 1938). An abbreviated edition of the latter was published at Delhi, probably in 1939, which omitted some less importan tletters; no publisher is mentioned on its title page.

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This meeting of the Congress Working Committee was presided over by Rajendra Prasad. Those present were Abul Kalam Azad, Sarojini Naidu, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Jairamdas Daulatram, Shankerrao Deo, Profulla Chandra Ghose, Harekrishna Mehtab and J. B. Kripalani. C. Rajagopalacharia was present by special invitation. Gandhi was present throughout the discussions.[1]

Immediately after the passing of this resolution the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, with the approval of the Working Committee, issued the following instructions for the guidance of ministries and Congress parties in the Congress provinces :

"The Working Committee is of opinion that the Viceroy's statement in answer to the Congress invitation for a clear declaration of the British war aims, particularly in their application to India, is wholly unsatisfactory and calculated to rouse resentment among all those who were anxious to gain, and are intent upon gaining India's independence. This invitation was made not only on behalf of the people of India, but for millions of people all over the world, who were weary of war and violence, and Fascist and Imperialist systems which exploited nations and peoples and were ultimately the causes of war, and who yearned for a new order of peace and freedom. The Viceregal statement is an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialistic policy. The Committee regard the mention of the differences among several parties as a screen to hide the true intention of Great Britain. What the Committee had asked for was a declaration of war aims as a test of Britain's *bona fides* regarding India, irrespective of the attitude of opposing parties and groups. The Congress has always stood for the amplest guarantee of

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vol. II, p. 236.

the rights of minorities. The freedom the Congress claimed was not for the Congress or any particular group or community, but for the nation and for all communities in India that go to build that nation. The only way lo establish this freedom and to ascertain the will of the nation as a whole is through a democratic process which gives full opportunity to all. The Committee must, therefore, regard the Viceroy's statement as in every way unfortunate. In the circumstances, the Committee cannot possibly give any support to great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end. As a first step in this direction the Committee call upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations.

"The Committee earnestly appeal to the nation to end all internal controversies in this hour of great crisis and call upon all Congress Committees and Congressmen generally to be prepared for all developments and eventualities, and to show restraint of word and deed so that nothing may be said or done which is not in keeping with India's honour or the principles for which the Congress stand. The Committee warn Congressmen against any hasty action in the shape of civil disobedience, political strikes and the like. The Committee will watch the situation and the activities of the British Government in India, and will not hesitate to guide the country to take further steps whenever the necessity for this arises. The Committee desire to impress upon all Congressmen that a programme of resistance, commensurate with the magnitude of the issue before the country, requires perfect discipline within Congress ranks and the consolidation of the Congress organisation.

"The Working Committee realise that the non-violent resistance offered by the Congress in the past has sometimes been mixed with violence. The Committee desire to impress upon all Congressmen that any resistance that may have to be offered must be purged of all violence and to remind them of the pledges taken to this effect as early as 1921 during the Congress session at Ahmedabad and repeated on many subsequent occasions."[1]

For the statement of the Viceroy spelling out the war aims of the British Government, the official intentions about the future of India and the immediate steps to be taken for associating India with war effort see *India and the War : Statement issued by the Governor-General of India on*

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

17 October 1939, London, 1939, Cmd. 6121.

The Congress demand for a definition of war aims pending its co-operation was severely criticised by every shade of public opinion in Britian except, of course, the Left. *The Times* blamed Gandhi for arrogating to the Congress an "all inclusive" status.[1] The *Observor* chided the Congress for "playing politics" and sabotaging self-government ulterior for ends.[2] The *Spectator* called it unfortunate.[3] Even the *Manchester Guardian*, generally a staunch Congress supporter in Britian, acknowledging that all other Indian parties had dissociated themselves from the Congress stand, asked the Congress to accept the Viceroy's declaration, lest by insistence on its full demands it "lost India's national unity."[4]

The decision to withdraw Congress governments in the provinces was widely condemned in the Parliament. Lord Samuel, a Liberal, front rank political, and intellectual, called it a negation of democracy.[5] The Marquess of Crewe, a former Secretary of State for India, characterized it as "some-what more in the spirit of Berlin than in the spirit of Washington."[6] In the House of Commons, Sir Stanley Reed took notice of the fact that when the ministries resigned they consulted neither the legislatures to which they were responsible, nor the electorate to which they were answerable. They "threw up office in obedience to the orders of a junta. If that is democracy, then the word 'democracy' has a meaning in India which is totally different from its implication in any other part of the world."[7] Outside the Parliament, Sir William Barton called it undemocratic and "foolish."[8]

The Muslims of India were, of course delighted at the resignation of Congress governments.

1. *The Times* (leader), 10 October 1939.
2. *Observer*, 19 November 1939.
3. *Spectator*, 22 September 1939.
4. *Manchester Guardian* (leader), 18 October 1939.
5. H.L. 119. 5s. 5 August 1941, col. 1070.
6. H.L. 116. 5s. 8 April 1940, col. 184.
7. H.C. 338. 5s. 11 September 1942, col. 584.
8. W. Barton, "Political Deadlock in India", *Empire Review*, July 1941, pp. 12-15.

79

Marquess of Salisbury ; James Edward Hubert Gascoyne-Cecil (1861-1947). Lord Privy Seal, 1903-05, 1924-29. Member of Parliament, Conservative, 1885 92, 1893-1902. Lord President of the Council, 1922-24. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1922-23. Leader of the House of Lords, 1925 29.

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Marquess of Zetland ; Lord Ronaldshay ; Laurence John Lumeley Dundas (1876-19). Travelled in India, 1899-1900. Member Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912-14. Governor of Bengal, 1917-22. Secretary of State for India, 1935-40. President Royal India Society, 1923-50, and Royal Asiatic Society, 1928-31. Member, Round Table Conference on India, 1930-31, and of Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on India, 1933-34. Author of *Sport and Politics under an Eastern Sky*, *An Eastern Miscellany*, *India: A Bird's Eye view*, *The Heart of Aryavarta*, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (3 vols.), *Steps Towards Indian Home Rule*, and *A Wandering Student in the Far East.*

For his later opinions, including references to contemporary official occurrences, see '*Essayez*' : *The Memoirs of Laurence, Second Marquess of Zetland, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.*, (London 1956), chapter 27.

81

Jawaharlal Nehru's remarks on Jinnah's call were angry, bitter and tendentious. He wrote to Mahadev Desai, "you must have seen Jinnah's new statement. There is a limit even to political falsehood and indecency but all limits have been passed."[1]

A typical British comment was more objective than the Hindu outburst. "One need not approve the wisdom of Mr. Jinnah's call to the Muslims of India to observe a day of deliverance and thanksgiving that Congress governments have ceased to function. This is a dangerous and ill-considered challenge to further communal dissension. Yet it is a retort invited by the action of Congress itself."[2]

A contemporary Muslim view ran as follows ! "How can the mere celebration or observance of such an occasion, particularly in the manner suggested by Mr. Jinnah, be provocative when in the past the Congress has observed many 'days'?... For the last ten years or so January 26 has been regularly observed by the Congress as 'Independence Day' but the Muslims never called it 'provocative' or 'mischievous'....You cannot prevent a sense of relief at the end of tyranny or oppression by any amount of wordy warfare. It is only the wounded person who knows where he is injured. But the Congress would not even let the injuren person cry".[3]

The official opinion of the British Government was contained in a reference made to Jinnah's call by the Marquess of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, on 14 December, when, speaking in the

1. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mahadev Desai (Gandhi's secretary), 9 December 1939, Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 264.

2. Sir Alfred Watson, in *Asiatic Review*, January 1940, p. 65.

3. A Correspondent, "Mr. Jinnah's Appeal—A Muslim View", *Civil & Military Gazette*, 22 December 1939.

House of Lords, he appealed to the Muslim leader to consider carefully the effect of such action upon the communal situation in the country.[1]

The *Round Table*, a reputable British quarterly devoted to empire and commonwealth affairs, recorded Jinnah's call and commented that it showed most clearly the depths of communal feeling.[2]

1. See H. L. 115. 5s. 14 December 1939, cols. 288-289.
2. *The Round Table*, March 1940, p. 398.

82

There is ample Hindu and British testimony to show that the Muslims observed the Deliverance Day with solemnity and unanimity, and in the spirit in which Jinnah had asked them to do so. There was not a single communal riot, an angry word, or a provocative action.

A Hindu historian of the Muslim League, who confessedly set out to show the "reactionary" character of the organization, admits that "the Muslim reaction to resignation by Congress Governments was one of unbounded joy and felicitation... a great demonstration of outward felicitation marked the occasion..."[1] A contemporary Hindu observer recorded the fact that "those taking part in the celebrations were not only Muslim Leaguers but several other Hindu and Parsi elements who were not pleased with the Congress rule," and that "hundreds of thousands of Christians and Untouchables joined in the demonstrations".[2]

The peaceful character of the celebrations, the universal participation of the Muslims in them, and the joining in of several non Muslim elements are confirmed by several contemporary reports. The Delhi Correspondent of *The Times* wrote in his dispatch that the day was "widely celebrated throughout the country, although its significance has been greatly underrated in the Nationalist Press", and added that it was observed not only by Muslims but also by those Hindus and Parsees who had disliked Congress rule.[3] *The Times of India*, covering

1. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League* (Agra, 1954), p. 257.

2. S. Srinivasan, "Communal Problem in India", *The Empire Review and Magazine*, January 1941, p. 25. This should not be regarded as a partial and pro-Muslim view, for the whole article is hostile to the Muslims, even to the extent of suggesting the abolition of seperate electorates for them.

3. Delhi Correspondent's dispatch, *The Times*, 27 December 1939.

the occurrence in detail, also noted the participation of many non-Muslim groups in the demonstrations and celebrations.[1]

Arthur Moore, then editor of the *Statesman*, deeply felt the Muslim reaction and credited Jinnah with sound leadership in calling for the observance of the day. "For swift and sound decision at a critical moment this leadership may be compared in its own Indian sphere with Mr. Churchill's speech when Russia was attacked by Germany. The Congress was taken aback.....The 'Day' was observed almost in a religious spirit. There were no riots and deep thanksgiving was expressed in responsible accents. It soon became clear to Governors and the rest of us (myself included) who had handed out bouquets to the Congress Governments that these Governments had been piling up for themselves amongst the Muslim villagers a dissatisfaction, distrust and resentment which we had not understood."[2]

Jinnah's English biographer found that "to the surprise of Congress, December 22 became not merely a Muslim celebration: Parsees, Christians, Hindus opposed to Congress, and hundreds of thousands of the 'Untouchables' joined in the demonstration."[3]

It is indicative of the Congress indifference to Muslim affairs that the official historian of the Indian National Congress, who is normally very careful of his dates and figures, twice gives the date of "the 22nd of November" on which the Deliverance Day was observed.[4]

1. For details of the Deliverance Day celebrations see *The Times of India* (Bombay), 23, 25 and 27 December 1939.

2. Arthur Moore, quoted in A. A. Ravoof, *Meet Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 2nd. ed. 1947), p. 105.

3. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), p. 124.

4. P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress* (Bombay, 1947), Vol. II, pp. 153, 154.

83

Lieut. Colonel Sir Richard Durand Temple; born 1880. Son of Sir R. C. Temple. Succeeded father in 1931. Educated at Harrow and Sandhurst. Entered Army, 1900. D. S. O., 1918.

84

The Report bears no date of publication; and the chairman's letter to the President of the Muslim League is also undated. *The Indian Annual Register*, in the second volume for 1938, omits all reference to the appearance of the Report. Sir Reginald Coupland also mentions no specific date but says that it was published "at the end of 1938".[1] According to S. S. Pirzada it appeared on 15 November 1938.[2] If that is true, it is surprising that it was not mentioned in any of the resolutions passed at the annual session of the Muslim League at Patna on 26-29 December 1938. Assuming that it appeared immediately after the sessions, it ought to have figured in one of the resolutions, passed on the next occasion, *i. e.*, in the Muslim League Working Committee meeting held at Meerut on 26 March 1939 or in the Muslim League Council meeting held at Delhi on 8 April 1939. As it does not, it seems that officially the Report was never acknowledged in any Muslim League resolution; which was, to put it mildly, remarkable.

However, the Report was referred to by Jinnah in his presidential address to the Muslim League Patna session. He said, "you have seen the Pirpur Report, and I need not add to what has been described in that document."[3] Thus it is evident that it had appeared before the session met; which makes the mystery of its absence from the session's proceedings even deeper.

As mention has already been made, the committee which prepared this Report was appointed by the Muslim League Council in its

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 185.

2. S. S. Pirzada, *Foundations* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. II, p. 306 fn.

3. *Ibid.*, and Jamiluddin Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 5th ed., 1952), Vol. I, p. 81.

meeting held at Delhi on 20 March 1938.[1] Its members were: Raja Sayyid Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur (chairman), Ali B. Habibullah (secretary), Khan Bahadur Haji Rashid Ahmad, Sayyid Ashraf Ahmad, Maulvi Abdul Ghani, Mian Ghiasuddin, Sayyid Zakir Ali, Sayyid Hasan Reyaz, and Sayyid Taqi Hadi.

1. See *supra* Document 74.

85

It is very significant that the Jamiat which passed these resolutions was, what the Congress and other Hindu parties used to call, a "nationalist" organization, i.e., one which always sided with the Congress point of view and severely criticized the Muslim League. The fact that even a party of such antecedents and politics felt obliged to these resolutions is proof enough that Muslim discontent and dissatisfaction with Congress rule was neither confined to the Muslim League nor was it a party matter.

The Jamiat was founded in 1919 by the divines of the well-known conservative seminary at Deoband so that they could play a more important part in the Khilafat movement and could enter the political field in their own right. For some time it had some support among the Muslims, but once the Khilafat agitation was at an end, it became the political arm of the Deoband School and nothing more.[1] In the 1937 Muslim mass contact campaign organized by the Congress the Jamiat had given full support to Congress.[2]

These resolutions were passed at the Jamiat's regular annual sessions held at New Delhi on 3-6 March 1939. Dr. Shaukatullah Shah Ansari was the chairman of the Reception Committee, and in his address of welcome he said that "the best way to fight communalism was not to keep aloof from the Congress but to participate in its activities." Six hundred delegates from all over India were reported to be present.

1. For the Jamiat see Sayyid Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai* (What is Jamiat-ul-Ulama?), Delhi, n.d., Part I; Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, 1963), pp. 274-275; Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964* (London, 1967), pp. 104-109 (especially for the Deoband School); Z.H. Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay, 1963); and K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1967), pp. 177-181.

2. Z. H. Faruqi, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

The president was Maulana Abul Huque Madani of Moradabad, who, in his address, criticized the Wardha and the Vidya Mandir schemes of education, chiefly on the ground that they ignored religious education. He also "deplored the tendency to unnecessarily revive the use of Sanskrit words in the 'Hindustani' language which was being evolved."[1]

1. See summaries of both addresses in *The Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 381-382.

86

This long statement was issued by Fazlul Haq from Calcutta on 18 December 1939.[1] An abridged version, consisting of seven pages, was also published, this time under the authority of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League ; it was undated.[2]

Abul Kasem Fazlul Haq was born in 1873 in the famous Kazi family of Chakhar district in Bengal. Educated at Presidency College, Calcutta. Started legal practice in 1900. Editor, *Balak*, 1901-06. Joint editor, *Bharat-Surhid*, 1900-03. Deputy Magistrate, Calcutta, 1906. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Department, Bengal, Bihar and Assam, 1908-12. Resigned government service and joined the bar. Elected member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1913-35. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935-37. Minister of Education, Bengal, 1924. Secretary, Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1913-16. President, Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1916-21. President, All India Muslim League, 1918. General Secretary, Indian National Congress, 1918. Signatory to Lucknow Pact, 1916. Delegate to the Round Table Conference, 1930-31, 1931-32. Founder, leader and president, Krishka Proja Party since 1927. Mayor of Calcutta, 1935-36. Member Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937-47. Chief Minister of Bengal 1937-41. Expelled from the Muslim League, 1941. Chief Minister of Bengal, 1942-43. Mover of the Lahore Resolution, 1940. Rejoined the Muslim League, 1944. Advocate General, East Pakistan, 1951-53. Chief Minister of East Pakistan, 1954. Minister of Interior, Government of Pakistan, 1955. Governor of East Pakistan, 1956-58. Founder of the Islamia College, Calcutta, (renamed Central Calcutta College after

1. See the *Civil & Military Gazette* (Lahore), 19 December 1939.

2. It bore the same title. *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule*, and was published from Calcutta.

partition), Lady Brabourne College for Girls, Calcutta, and Fazlul Haq College at his home town in Barisal. "Foundation member" of the first court of the Aligarh Muslim University. Sometime president of the All India Muslim Educational Conference. President, All India Khilafat Conference, 1929. He died in April 1962.

Unfortunately, the only book written on him so far is more of an exercise in hagiology than a critical, reliable and detailed biography.[1]

1. See A.S.M. Abdur Rab, *A. K. Fazlul Haq* (*Life and Achievements*), no publisher or place of publication mentioned, n. d. (? 1966).

87

The personnel of the committee which investigated the matter contained in the report is given in the letter from S. M. Shareef to Syed Abdul Aziz, president of Bihar Provincial Muslim League, which is attached to the Report. The Report is undated, but from the letter it is obvious that it was submitted in December 1939, and must have been published soon after that. Sir Reginald Coupland's statement that it was "published in March 1939"[1] does not seem to be correct.

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-42* (London. 1943), p. 186.

88

On the controversy about the hoisting of the Congress flag it will suffice to quote two opposite views. According to Gandhi, it was "Inconceivable for me to find a meeting of Indians, especially where national leaders are invited, without the national flag flying there."[1] To which the Muslim answer was, "We should like to know if the hoisting of the so-called national flag on the unwilling minorities is anything but an expression of the narrow communalism of the majority community."[2]

This question is also referred to in the Nawab Ismail Khan—Jawaharlal Nehru correspondence (Document 72).

1. Gandhi's speech at Aden on his way to the Round Table Conference in London, quoted in P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress 1884-1935* (Allahabad, 1936), Vol. I, p. 828.

2. *Pirpur Report* (Delhi, n.d.), p. 22.

89

A few days earlier Bhai Parmanand had issued another statement on this matter. It read as follows :

"I would suggest that in the light of Mr. Jinnah's latest utterance, the Congress leaders should face realities, give up this policy of wild goose chase, follow the advice of Mr. Jinnah and declare themselves a Hindu organisation. By doing so they will soon find that they will achieve the goal of Hindu-Muslim unity much quicker.

The seven new points of Mr. Jinnah, as reported in the Press, and their underlying principle, so well supported by the speeches delivered at the Muslim League Conference held at Calcutta, cannot but serve as an eye-opener to my Congress friends. I do not at all blame Mr. Jinnah for any change of front. Ever since he formulated his 14 points he has consistently followed one policy without concealing it from either the public or the Congress.

Ever since that time I have held him to be right, not because politically or morally his principle is correct, but right only in the sense that he truly represents the mentality of his community. And, if in the face of his clear declarations, the Congress leaders have not tried to understand him they have been simply deceiving themselves and also their followers.

Some time ago Mr. Jinnah openly said that he wanted both the Hindus and Muslims to organise and strengthen themselves till they are in a position to understand each other and come to a proper settlement. Mr. Jinnah has repeated the same view by saying that 'we cannot surrender, submerge or submit to the dictates of High Command of the Congress, which is developing into a totalitarian and authoritative caucus, functioning under the name of the Working Committee and aspiring to the position of a shadow Cabinet of a future republic'. Do the Congress leaders want a more clear enunciation of the Muslim

policy?

Mr. Jinnah and the leaders of the Muslim League want to treat the Indian National Congress and wish to negotiate terms of compromise with it as they would do with a Hindu organisation. That is, in short, the outcome of more than 50 years' effort of the Congress to establish itself as an organisation of nationalists in the country. My view is that the more they follow this line of action to remove the communal evil the worse will become the disease.

The Bengal Premier, Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, has thrown light on another point. He tells us that Muslims should stand on their own legs and fight their battles alone, abandoning all hopes of protection through sefeguards. He says : 'British authority in India has indeed ceased to function and the sceptre is slipping off fast from British hands The British believe that their commercial interest would be best served through an alliance with the Congress. Therefore they are anxious for that alliance.'

This remark does not need any comment, but I would like to add that the Congress for the last half a century have humiliated themselves and the whole Hindu nation by running after communal unity. The head of the Muslim community in a Muslim province tells them that the Muslims do not stand in need of any alliance with them and that it is the British Government which is now anxious to seek friendship with the Congress. With all humility I make bold to advise the Congress to try this new. . . .experiment for only a very short time and carefully watch its effects"[1].

At this time Parmanand was a member of Indian Legislative Assembly, and a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader.

1. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 21 April 1938.

90

Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji, C.S.I., C.I.E., was born at Bristol in 1871. He was the son of Sasipadia Banerji of Barnagore in Bengal and Raj Kumari Banerji, the first Indian woman of high caste to visit England. He married, in 1898, the daughter of Sir Krishna Gupta. Educated at Calcutta University and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered the Indian Civil Service, 1895; retired in 1922. Diwan of Mysore, 1922-26. Foreign and Political Minister in Kashmir State, 1926-29. Author of *The Indian Tangle* (1933), *An Indian Pathfinder* (1934), and *The Rhythm of Living* (1940).

91

This resolution was passed at the fourteenth annual session of the Justice Party held at Madras on 29-30 December 1938. The president of the year was E. V. Ramaswami Naicker.[1] This resolution was moved by T. S. Nataraja Pillai.

The Justice Party was the new name of the South India Liberal Federation.

1. For a summary of Naicker's presidential address see *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 379—382.

92

It is not known who moved this resolution. In his presidential address at this session of the Justice Party, E. V. Ramaswami Naicker had said that "it was a strange and novel scheme unknown to the world till now, and its result would only be to ruin education itself. Great educational experts had condemned the scheme, and yet serious efforts were being made to put it into practice."[1]

See also note on Documents 62,68 and 69.

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, p. 381.

93

Another resolution protested against the use of the prefix "Sri" by the Madras Government before names of persons.[1] Evidently, the party considered this as unnecessary Hinduization and also as an attempt to impose Hindi on the South Indian population, both Hindu and non-Hindu.

1. See *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, p. 383.

94

This address was delivered at the twentieth annual session of the National Liberal Federation held at Bombay on 30-31 December 1938. The venue was the Sir Cowasjee Jehangir Hall. The chairman of the Reception Committee was Sir Cowasjee Jehangir who read out a fairly long address of welcome.

Prakash Narayan Sapru was the eldest son of the well-known Liberal leader, the Rt. Hon. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Born in 1894. Educated at Allahabad University and Lincoln College, Oxford. Called to the Bar, 1921. General Secretary, All India Liberal Federation, 1934-35. Member, Council of State, from 1934 onwards. Lawyer by profession.

95

This resolution was moved by Dr. R. P. Paranjpye of Poona.

Sir Raghunath Purshottam Paranjpye was born in 1876, and educated at Bombay, Poona, Cambridge, Paris and Gottingen. Senior Wrangler at Cambridge 1899. Professor of mathematics and principal, Fergusson College, Poona, 1902-24. Vice-Chancellor, Indian Women's University, 1916-20. Member. Bombay Legislative Council, 1913-23, 1927. Minister, Bombay Government, 1921-23, 1927. Member, Reforms Enquiry Committee, Government of India, 1924. Member, India Council, 1927-32. Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, 1932-38. President, National Liberal Federation, 1924 and 1938. Knighted in 1942. Author of *Gokhale*, *Karve*, *The Crux of the Indian Problem*, and *Rationalism in Practice*.

See the following on the National Liberal Federation : V. N. Naik, *Indian Liberalism : A Study* (Bombay, 1945), which is the party's official history covering the years 1918-1943, and carries a foreword by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad; B.D. Shukla, *A History of the Indian Liberal Party* (Allahabad, 1960), a large volume based on his doctoral thesis at Agra; M.A. Buch, "Rise and Growth of Indian Liberalism", a London University doctoral thesis, 1937; Lucian, "The Twilight of Indian Liberalism", *Indian Empire Review* (London), March 1938, pp. 101-106; and *The Indian Year Book 1943-44* (Bombay and Calcutta, n.d.), pp. 844-857.

96

I have not been able to identify the pseudonymn. As *The Twentieth Century* was a Liberal journal, it is permissible to assume that the author was a Liberal leader or journalist. Nothing more can be said until his identity is known.

97

The italics are in the original.

C. Ramlinga Reddy was born in 1880 and educated at St. John's College, Cambridge, where he won a first in the History Tripos. First Indian to be elected vice-president of Cambridge Union Society in 1906. Principal Maharajas College, Mysore, 1916-18. Inspector General of Education, Mysore, 1918-21. Deputy Leader and organiser of the United Nationalist Party, 1924. Member, Legislative Council of Madras, 1935-37. Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University, 1928-30 and again from 1936 onwards. Author of *Speeches on University Reform*, two books on political economy and principles of poetry in Telugu, and *Congress in Office* (1940). Did not marry.

98

The presidential address was delivered at the twenty-first annual session of the National Liberal Federation held at Allahabad on 27-29 December 1939. The welcome address was given by Pandit Iqbal Narain Gurtu.

For biographical note on Paranjpye see note on Document 95.

99

For Reddy see note on Document 97.

100

I have not been able to identify this "India Correspondent", or to discover whether the writer of this dispatch was the regular correspondent of the journal in India or some other person, for it was not uncommon for the *The Times* to publish reports from India sent by individuals other than its accredited man on the spot.

The editor of *The Times* during this period was Geoffrey Dawson (1874-1944) who had special interest in India. He worked at the Colonial Office from 1898 to 1901, and served as private secretary to Lord Milner from 1901 to 1905. He edited *Johannesburg Star*, 1905-10, *The Times*, 1912-19 and 1923-41, and the *Round Table*, 1919-22 and 1942-44. For him see the comprehensive and sympathetic account in John Evelyn Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times*, London, 1955. See also *The History of The Times, Vol. IV: The 150 th Anniversary and Beyond 1912-1948, Part II, 1921-1948*, London, 1952, for the journal's attitude towards India and Dawson's editorship.

101-102

The eleventh Marquess of Lothian; Philip Henry Kerr, (1882-1940). Editor of the *State*, 1908 and of the *Round Table*, 1910-16. Private Secretary to Llyod George, 1916-21. Secretary to Rhodes Trust from 1925. Ambassador to the United States, 1939-40. A members of Milners "Kindergarten". A friend of Jawaharlal Nehru and other Hindu leaders.[1] On him see J. R. M. Butler, *Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940*, London 1960, especially chapter X, pp. 175-189, which deals with his views on India; ' Philip Kerr: Marquess of Lothian", *Round Table*, March 1941, pp. 197-220, which is a long and appreciative obituary notice by an unnamed writer. His own views on India during this period were summed up in two articles he wrote for *The Times*, published on 9 and 10 March 1938. Two criticisms of his opinions. and particularly of his pro-Congress stand may be seen in Louis Stuart's "Lord Lothian on Federation in India", *Indian Empire Review* (London), May 1938, pp. 175-181, and in L. F. Rushbrook Williams's letter to the *The Times*, 11 March 1938.

1. See, for example, his correspondence with Nehru in the latter's *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 2nd ed. 1960).

103

See note on Document 100.

Six months later, the same or perhaps some other correspondent reported that authority in the United Provinces was disintegrating, that law and order were not being maintained, that administration of justice was being tempered with, that the services and police were losing confidence, that agrarian discontent was widely spreading and that communalism was more rampant than ever. Petty Congress officials, he declared, were interfering with the police, and the Government had issued a circular asking the district authorities to consult local Congress leaders.[1]

1. See a "Special, Correspondent's" dispatch, *The Times*, 27 June 1939.

104

The italics are in the original.

Sir Louis Stuart (1870-1949). Educated at Charterhouse and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered the Indian Civil Service in 1891 and retired in 1930, the last appointment being Chief Judge of Oudh Chief Court, 1925-30. Editor, *Indian Empire Review*, 1932.

105

Sir William Pell Barton, K. C. I. E., C. S. I., C. I. E., was born in 1871. Educated at Worcester College, Oxford, and University College, London. Entered the Indian Civil Service, 1893. Served on the north-west frontier, 1899-1920. Resident in Mysore, 1920-25, and at Hyderabad, 1925-30. Author of *The Princes of India* (1934) and *India's North-West Frontier* (1939).

106

The italics are in the original.

Sir Michael Francis O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K. C. S. I., (1864-1940). Entered the Indian Civil Service, 1885, and retired in 1919. He was governor of the Punjab during the hectic days of 1919. For his views on, and an account of his stay in, India see his *India as I Knew It 1885-1925*, London, 1925.

107

Sir James Crerar, K. C. S. I., C. S. I., C.I.E., was born in 1877. Educated at Edinburgh University and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered the Indian Civil Service in 1900, Home Secretary to the Government of India 1922-27. Home Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1927-32. Retired in 1934. Served for a long time in Sind and Bombay.

108

Laurence Frederic Rushbrook Williams, C. B. E., O. B. E, was born in 1891. Educated at University College, Oxford, where he had a brilliant academic career. Lecturer in Medieval History at Queen's University, Canada, 1913-14. Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1914-21. Professor of Modern Indian History, Allahabad, 1914-19. Director, Central Bureau of Information, Government of India, 1920-26. Political Secretary to the Maharaja of Patiala, 1925. Secretary to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, 1926-30. Foreign Minister of Patiala, 1925-31. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1924-25. Delegate to the Round Table Conference, 1932. Head of Middle East Section, British Ministry of Information during the war. Author of, among other works, *A Sixteenth Century Empire-Builder*, *A Primer of Indian Administration*, *A History of India under the Company and the Crown*, *What about India?*, and *The State of Pakistan.*

109

See note on Document 108.

110

Sir Harrington Verney Lovett, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., was born in 1864. Educated at Balliol College, Oxford. Entered the Indian Civil Service in 1884 and retired in 1919, spending most of the service in the United Provinces. Reader in Indian History at Oxford, 1920-32. Author of *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, *India* (in Nations of Today series) and ten chapters in Vol. VI of the *Cambridge History of India*. He died in 1945.

111

Sir Reginald Coupland, C.I.E. (1884-1952). Educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford. Fellow and Lecturer in Ancient History, Trinity College, Oxford, 1907-14. Beit Lecturer in Colonial History at Oxford, 1913-18. Editor of the *Round Table*, 1917-19 and 1939-40. Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1920-48 and of Nuffield College, 1939-50. Member, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1923. Lowell Lecturer at Boston, 1933. Member, Royal Commission on Palestine, 1936-37. Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford, 1929-48. Author of several works on colonial and imperial history.

The book from which the first section is reproduced here formed Part II of his report on the Indian constitutional problem which he submitted to the Warden and Fellows of Nuffield College. The three parts of this report constitute the most detailed and balanced study of the background, incidence and consequences of Congress rule ever made by a British writer.

112

The Economist, an English weekly of repute and wide influence, was edited at this time by George Crowther. The identity of the writer of this passage is not known.

113

This important resolution, a significant landmark on the road to final separation, was passed at the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference held at Karachi. Seth Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon read the welcome address, and Jinnah delivered the presidential speech. After Jinnah, short speeches were made by A. K. Fazlul Haq, premier of Bengal, and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, premier of the Punjab [1]

Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi tabled the following resolution:

"The Sind Provincial Muslim League Conferenc, considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast India Continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two Nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two Federations, *viz*: the Federation of Muslim States and the Federation of non-Muslim States.

This Conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslim majority provinces, Muslim native States and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of a federation of their own with admission to any other Muslim State beyond the Indian Frontiers to join the Federation and with such safeguards for non-Muslim minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India "[2]

But this resolution was not passed, and instead the one reproduced in the body of the present volume was adopted. This resolution was proposed by Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, seconded by Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani of the Punjab, and supporting speeches were made

1. For these speeches see *The Indian Annual Register 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 352-356.
2. *Star of India* (Bombay), 10 October 1938.

by Haji Abdullah Haroon of Sind, Syed Abdur Rauf Shah of the Central Provinces, and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni of the United Provinces.

The dates of the Conference as given by the Muslim League official publication (7-9 October) seem to be incorrect. According to both the *Star of India* of 10, 11, 12 and 15 October, and *The Indian Annual Register*, the Conference opened on 8 October and this resolution was passed on 10 October, while the Conference continued till 13 October when Jinnah made his concluding speech.

114

The Indian Annual Register gives the date of this meeting as 25 March.[1] The meeting was held at Mustafa Castle (residence of Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan) in Meerut, under Jinnah's presidentship. Among those present were Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sir Abdullah Haroon, Haji Abdus Sattar Eshak Seth, Syed Abdul Aziz, Aizaz Rasul, Syed Abdur Rauf Shah, Malik Barkat Ali, Raja of Muhmudabad, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, Begum Muhammad Ali and Liaquat Ali Khan.[2]

In a meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League at New Delhi on 8 April 1939, Jinnah told the gathering that there were several schemes in the field, as alternatives to the Indian federation, including that of dividing the country into Muslim and Hindu India. These schemes were before the Committee appointed on 26 March. He assured the meeting that the Committee was not pledged to any particular scheme. It would examine the whole question and produce a scheme which, according to the Committee, would be in the best interest of the Muslims of India.[3]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1939*, Vol. I, p. 373.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
3. *Ibid.*

115

According to Jamiluddin Ahmad, from whose compilation I have taken this extract, this statement was made by Jinnah for the *Manchester Guardian*, presumably to the paper's Indian correspondent. He gives no date to this statement, but as it is placed between one dated 1 October and another with no date (the one after that is of 9 November), it is reasonable to assume that it was made at some time in October-November 1939.

116

Jamiluddin Ahmad gives it the date of 19 January 1940[1]. According to Dr. Waheed-uz-Zaman, this article was entitled "Two Nations in India", and was published in no. 10 of Volume XXI of the *Time and Tide* of "1949".[2] The year 1949 is evidently a misprint. I was not able to check the date of the issue of the paper bearing this article; but some time ago, Dr. Waheed-uz-Zaman told me that the date given by Jamiluddin Ahmad was incorrect.

1. Jamiluddin Ahmad (comp.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 5th. ed. 1952), Vol. I, p. 128.

2. Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan* (Lahore, 1964), p. 120 fn. 1. However, in the second edition of this book, the footnote has been reduced to "M. A. Jinnah, *Time and Tide*, p. 240" (1969 ed., p. 120 fn. 1).

117

This meeting of the All India Muslim League Council also unanimously elected Jinnah as president of the forthcoming annual session to be held in Lahore in March. All the provincial Muslim Leagues had unanimously suggested his name.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1940*, Vol. I, p. 305. Jinnh's speech is summarized on pp. 305-306.

118

This meeting of the Council was held at the central office of the All India Muslim League in Daryaganj, Delhi. The resolution reproduced here was moved by Naimal Huq of Bihar.[1]

1. *The Indian Annual Register 1940*, Vol. I, p. 307.

119

The Muslim League met similar success in by-elections held after 1942. From the middle of 1943 to the middle of 1945 there were 11 elections in the provinces. The League won 8, independent Muslims 3, and Congress Muslims none. All the four elections to the central legislature were won by the League. In September 1945, the total results of all by-elections, in the provinces since 1937 and at the centre since 1934, stood as : Muslim League 66, independent Muslims 18, Congress Muslims 6.[1]

1. R. Coupland, *India : A Re-Statement* (London, 1945), p. 242 and fn. 1.

APPENDIX I A

This address was given at the eighteenth annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha held at Lahore on 21-23 October 1936. Among leading figures present were Raja Narendra Nath, Bhai Parmanand and Sir Gokal Chand Narang. The welcome address was read by Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Das, Chairman of the Reception Committee.

For Hindu Mahasabha see Indra Prakash, *A Review of the History and Work of Hindu Mahasabha*, (New Delhi, 1952 ed.), which is an official party publication; A. S. Bhide, *Veer Savarkar's Whirlwind Propaganda: Statements, Messages and Extracts from the President's Diary of his Propagandistic Tours, Interviews from December 1937 to October 1941* (Bombay, 1941), a good source book for a study of the party; Bhai Parmanand, *Hindu National Movement* (Lahore, 1929), tracing the origin and growth of the party; N. C. Banerji, *At the Cross Roads, 1885-1946: An Autobiography* (Calcutta, 1950), the memoirs of a Mahasabha leader; S. P. Mookerjee, *Awake Hindustan* (Calcutta, n.d. ? 1945), speeches of an important Mahasabha leader; S. Prakash, *Hindu Rashtravad: being an Exposition of the Ideology and immediate Programme of Hindu Rashtra as outlined by Swatantraya Veer V. D. Savarkar* (Rohtak, 1945), an annotated selection from Savarkar's speeches and statements; V. D. Savarkar, *Hindu Sangathan; Its Ideology and Immediate Programme* (Bombay, 1940), containing three of his presidential addresses given at Karnavati, Nagpur and Calcutta; and Craig Baxter, *The Jana Sangh* (Philadelphia, 1969) for the connection between the Mahasabha and the present-day Jana Sangh party of India.

Appendix I B

The address was delivered at the twentieth annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur on 28 December 1938. The welcome address was given by M. G. Chitnavis, Chairman of the Reception Committee. See previous note for books on the Mahasabha.

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was born in 1883. Educated at Poona and London. Sentenced to transportation for 14 years and later to internment. Released in 1937. Since that date the leading figure of the Mahasabha, having presided over its sessions at Ahmadabad (1937), Nagpur (1938), Calcutta (1939), Madras (1940), Bhagalpore (1941) and Cawnpore (1942).

Appendix I C-E

These resolutions were among the 27 passed at the twentieth annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha at Nagpur on 29-30 December 1938.

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(*c*) **Bihar Provincial Muslim League**

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